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This book discusses the extent to which the Japanese economy encourages
entrepreneurship and innovation.
Although Japan has a strong reputation as an innovator, some people
argue that this reputation is misplaced. Contrary to earlier expectations,
the USA rather than Japan emerged as the leader in the biotech industries
in the 1990s. Moreover, many small firms in Japan supply only few
companies, thereby limiting their view of the marketplace and the
commercial opportunities within it. Despite the increase of international
patents, international scientific citations and a positive technology trade
balance, the Japanese innovation system is weak in giving birth to radical
innovations.
The book explores fully these issues, making comparisons with other
countries where appropriate. It concludes that the Japanese innovation
system has both advantages and disadvantages and contributes to a better
understanding of how policy changes take place.
Cornelia Storz is Professor of Japanese Economy at the Faculty of
Economics and Business Administration as well as at the Centre for
Japanese Studies, University of Marburg. Her research focuses on the
comparison of economic systems; genesis and change of institutions;
comparative institutional analysis; innovation systems; entrepreneurship
in the modern Japanese economy.
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The Japanese innovation system is said to be outdated. The increase of
international patents, international scientific citations or the positive tech-
nology trade balance all do not alter the fact that the Japanese innovation
system has distinct weaknesses: it is weak in giving birth to radical inno-
vations, and is strong only in giving birth to more incremental innovations.
This weakness is perceived as problematic since it may hinder welfare in
the long run: firms become routine entrepreneurs, unable to read the com-
petitive environment, and simply unable to produce innovative ideas.
Indeed, Japan lost markets of leading-edge technologies to the USA in the
1990s, such as biotechnology or information and communication technol-
ogy. In leading international rankings, Japan is placed low, compared to
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
members in the last years. One of the reports, which was especially sober-
ing for Japan, was the Global Information Technology Report of the World
Economic Forum of 2004, which placed Japan at no. 20, far behind the
leading OECD members. Obviously, the estimation of the Japanese inno-
vation system is not too high. The international pressure on Japan to gen-
erate original knowledge of its own and to take responsibility for the
international community in the production of knowledge and technical
progress gives additional incentives to reform the established innovation
system.
It has been argued that the reason for the weakness of the Japanese
innovation system lies in its institutional structure, which is adapted to the
needs of a catch-up economy. Even if one admits that single companies
bring out successful innovations in niche markets, the Japanese innovation
system in general does not seem to be suitable for radical, risky innova-
tions. On the micro level, the integral cooperation of research departments
with production or marketing departments, the low degree of internation-
alization in research laboratories, the education towards generalists or the
close and long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers are often
identified as reasons for lacking the readiness to be more innovative.
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On the macro level, the closed labour market, the underdeveloped
capital market, an industrial policy neglecting the importance of more
competition, and the low openness of and mobility between institutions
are seen as central reasons for its distinct weaknesses (e.g. Anchordoguy
2000; Goto 2000). Formerly competitive advantages have obviously
developed into competitive disadvantages since new technologies
require other institutional settings, based on openness, competition and
mobility.
All the critics are right in the point that these characteristics are deci-
sive for the Japanese system, but they underestimate one important factor:
the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the innovation
process. In contrast to the USA, where a lot of the new industries’ success
in the 1990s can be traced back to an innovation system which gives
SMEs a stronger role, in Japan, the institutional framework with its weak
competition policy, its underdeveloped labour and capital market, and
especially the weak institutional ties between universities and SMEs
(whether start-ups or cooperations) were not suited for the generation of
innovative ventures. Indeed, most of the mentioned elements of the catch-
up-state do not foster the increase of SMEs: education at universities is
designed for generalists in large firms, but not for young start-up entre-
preneurs; basic research takes place, but is not transferred into enterprises,
and especially not into SMEs; the capital market is dominated by banks
and venture capital is still scarce; the labour market gives no incentives for
mobility and the exchange of knowledge. The political concepts and
policy tools – tax credits and subsidies, research infrastructure, the intel-
lectual property system, competition policy – showed a preference for
cooperation, diffusion and risk-adversity, but not for the promotion of
entrepreneurship until the 1990s. As for SMEs, Japanese SMEs can be
characterized by their lasting integration into enterprise groups: almost
every second SME in Japan is a supplier, the majority of them even work
as exclusive suppliers, hardly diversifying their customers or generating
products of their own. They are the core of the Japanese ‘network-
economy’ with a distinct long-term orientation. Given this background it
is not astonishing, that a Japanese ‘Silicon Valley’ is not in sight yet
(Okada 1999; Hall 2002; Kawashima 2002).
The specific orientation of the Japanese innovation system can be
assessed, in a pointed way, as being tragic: we learnt from institutional
theory that single institutions are always interlinked and mutually com-
plementary, both resulting in path dependence. For a true and successful
change in one institution, it is therefore necessary to provide compatibil-
ity with the overall system of existing formal and informal rules. As this
is tremendously difficult to accomplish, every single reform could
even hamper the effectiveness of the whole system. This is the reason why
2 Cornelia Storz
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system change is typically rigid and slow: the stability of existing
institutions may lead to a low success in institutional transfers and ‘best
practice’-rules (Berkowitz et al. 2003). Certain authors surely recognize
the openness of development – North (1997) already conceded that there
are ‘windows of opportunity’ which make change possible – but especially
in applied research, a certain determinism has gained a foothold, and a
scepticism towards institutional change and the ability to implement
successful reforms preponderates: Eggertsson (1998), for example, heads
one of his works with the title ‘Limits to Institutional Reforms’, and other
critical writers analyse the reasons for the reduced options for designed
policy planning (Zysman 1994; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1998). The
problems of the transformation process in Eastern Europe were used as
an illustrative example of how restricted the options for political reforms
can be, and what role the complementarities of formal and informal insti-
tutions play (cf. Panther 1998; Schröder 1999).2 Several younger publica-
tions explain the restrictions on change in Japan and East Asia as resulting
from complementarities between formal and informal institutions (compare
e.g. Aoki and Hayami 2001; Pascha 2002; Storz 2002). The more the
institutional settings differ, the more difficult the transfer will be:
But to recognize the superiority of one organizational mode of
capitalism is not to say that it is an easy task to import, copy or assim-
ilate its rationale and its institutions, by the very fact of their being
specific to a society.
(Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997: 93)
In homogeneous groups, institutional change may take place even more
slowly (Eisenberg 1999). If one classifies Japan as a relatively homoge-
neous culture,3 the persistence of established institutions can be consid-
ered as especially strong here. Indeed, younger works on Japan support the
thesis of institutional path dependence, in relation to monetary or fiscal
policy. As for the Japanese innovation system, complementarities can be
found between research and marketing departments, the human resource
system, the education of young, mouldable generalists, the diffusion ori-
entation of property rights and the credit-based and risk-averse financial
system. A change of the whole Japanese innovation system will require
reforms in all sub elements – universities, enterprises, politics, capital and
labour market. As a consequence, a change of one institution, whether for-
mal or informal, necessitates the change of all institutions in which it is
embedded: since the human resource department does not accept mobility,
there is no incentive for individuals to change firms or to start an enter-
prise of their own. On the other hand, as re-employment is sanctioned by
the decline in earnings, there are no mobile individuals and no incentives
Introduction 3
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for human resource departments to change established practices. Another
example for mutual reciprocity is property rights. Changing the law would
only make sense if legal decisions were governed by the idea that innova-
tors indeed had rights which need to be protected, but this is obviously not
the case. In other words, the problem of reforming the Japanese innova-
tion system lies in its path dependencies, called knowledge regimes,
trajectories, dominant designs or techno-economical paradigms in other
contributions. These path dependencies work as a specific selection
environment, which only includes or excludes the possibilities that suit
the already existing institutional setting.
With the negative experience in developing and transforming countries,
a certain tradition of perceiving chances for reform and leeway for action
as utterly restricted, has been established. In this understanding, path
dependencies of given institutional settings are often understood as a sys-
tem to which actors have to adapt. Therefore, suitable formal (and infor-
mal) institutions become an important prerequisite for the development of
nations. The influence of history and the resulting persisting difficulties
of the transformation process in Eastern Europe give indeed enough
reason to convince critics that the potential for political reforms is not as
high as was assumed, and that it is wise to make the limits of planned
design evident.
The authors in this volume support the thesis that the challenges for the
Japanese innovation system are high because of path dependencies. But
then they leave the widely spread scepticism and suggest another
approach: they identify a high willingness to learn, which differs, depend-
ing on the field, but is nevertheless high, which can be demonstrated as
well in the political as in the entrepreneurial area, and they stress the ratio-
nality of slowness of change which results from the complementarities in
innovation systems. In cases where the results do not correspond with the
expectations, the authors ask whether the expectations were appropriate:
if change had taken place radically, single reforms could have been unco-
ordinated, which would have been even more problematic. Also they could
have unleashed opposition since people have to invest in learning new
rules, which presupposes an understanding of the necessity of reforms.
Which change, which learning took place in Japan at the interface of
SMEs and innovation policy?4 On a political level, new targets were set in
relevant political areas in order to make the Japanese innovation system fit
for more radical innovations. This meant the establishment of new policy
concepts, new policy tools and of new institutions that superseded the
previous diffusion-oriented innovation system, which mainly targeted
large firms. As far as the level of targets is concerned, this change can be
described as a paradigm change5: Japanese policy-makers today are
4 Cornelia Storz
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moved by new underlying ideas, impelled by the incentive to leave Japan’s
position as a catch-up state and give up previous practices, such as the
indiscriminate distribution of funds and the diffusion-oriented intellectual
property system. They are eager to build up a more frame- and competition-
oriented political framework, to professionalize and open up national
research and technology institutes and to foster mobility between the
single elements of the Japanese innovation system. In this new political
concept, SMEs play a central role in the realization of innovation and
economic growth.
Taking this approach, the authors want to diverge from the view that
institutions and their complementarities are a given fact, but stress that
it is more useful to understand institutions as entities that can be
creatively designed, presupposing that there is a societal consensus on
the need for reforms, and for appropriate incentives to lead the reforms
into the right direction. This requires an understanding that reforms are
needed, an open discourse about the necessity of change, a broad soci-
etal communication and the individual conviction that a need for action
is given. From this viewpoint the preconditions for change are not
suitable institutions to which actors have to adapt, but the insight that
a change of institution may lead to increased benefits. If one takes this
approach, new leeway for reforms and change emerges. Yet, without
a consensus and the understanding that reforms are appropriate, no
change is to be expected.
In order to answer the question to which degree and how institutional
change takes place in the Japanese innovation system, the volume is
divided into two main parts: the first part (Part I) analyses the shift in pol-
icy changes, the second part (Part II) the shift in entrepreneurial behaviour
in SMEs in selected industries. Since a separation between the micro and
the macro levels is necessary for the clearness of argumentation on the
one hand, but both levels are closely interconnected on the other hand, the
authors assembled here focus on one level in their argument, but try to
consider the other as well.
Part I starts with general theoretical considerations on the options of
political reforms. In his contribution, Lambert Koch (Chapter 2) shows
that every policy-making process starts with cognition and communica-
tion: which state of affairs is perceived as a problem, and which state of
affairs is recognized as a problem. This prephase of the political process
is important, because it explains when and under what conditions political
decisions can be really enforced. In cases where the problem is not
perceived as a general problem which should be solved by the society,
some groups will try to push through ‘their’ problem in later phases of
policy making. Therefore political reforms require a sufficient societal
Introduction 5
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consensus that the new policy is indeed beneficial. The following contri-
butions take up this issue of policy formulation and discuss the change of
the Japanese innovation system, partly in a comparative perspective with
the USA. The contribution by Martin Hemmert (Chapter 3) discusses the
policy shift in innovation policy in the 1990s. The shift took place in order
to address the perceived weaknesses of the Japanese innovation system
since, following the idea of Koch, the necessity to reform was recognized:
the low volume of public R&D spending, the previous focus on large
firms (e.g. in research consortia), the traditional diffusion orientation and
the low degree of openness (e.g. mobility on the labour market for
researchers; internationality of research) on one side, and the clear success
of the American system in new industries on the other side were obviously
strong incentives for real adjustments. An important tool of the new
political aim is the ‘Science and Technology Basic Law’ whose rigidity of
enforcement is indeed striking: despite a harsh macroeconomic environ-
ment, the aim to increase R&D (especially basic R&D) spending was not
given up. As a result, the intensity of public R&D spending rose, a clear
exception in the global trend of declining or stagnating R&D intensities.
One reason that is identified in the broad consensus in the Japanese soci-
ety is that a change of the Japanese innovation system is necessary, which
finds its expression from the fact that, in contrast to other law initiatives,
the ‘Science and Technology Basic Law’ was enacted due to the initiative
of a multiparty group of Diet members, which is highly unusual in Japan.
The subsequent contribution by Klaus Ruth (Chapter 4) analyses a suc-
cessful tool of the Japanese innovation policy, which was learnt the ‘other
way around’, namely by the USA from Japan. The author analyses the pol-
icy tool of Japanese technology and research centres (kôsetsushi) in the
national and regional innovation system (called industrial culture by him),
the reasons for their previous success and their adaptation process in the
American innovation system. This contribution is of special political inter-
est because, first, the Japanese technology centres have worked quite suc-
cessfully in Japan so that there should be an incentive to learn from Japan,
and second, it gives a good illustration of mutual learning: the so-called
MEP programme (Manufacturing Extension Partnership) can be inter-
preted as a successful institutional transfer from one cultural context into
a very different one. In a broader sense, Ruth’s contribution shows that the
idea of path dependence and complementarity is helpful for understand-
ing the adaptation processes, but that the difficulties of the transfer should
not be overestimated as they can be overcome by entrepreneurial alertness.
While Hemmert and Ruth focus on policy changes in the Japanese inno-
vation policy, the contribution by Cornelia Storz (Chapter 5) focuses on
the new role of SMEs as innovators in the Japanese small firms policy.
6 Cornelia Storz
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The perception of SMEs had been far from attributing them an important
role in innovation in the past; in contrast, they were even seen as a problem
for the welfare of the Japanese economy – coined in the specific Japanese
expression of ‘SME as a problem’ (chûshô kigyô mondai). This explains
why traditional innovation policy, as described before by Hemmert, had
been focused on large firms: SMEs were just not perceived as being suit-
able candidates for policy tools conducive to innovation. Here again, the
importance of cognitive models as described by Koch becomes visible.
With the 1990s the perception of SMEs changed in Japan: the previous
‘problem’ became a ‘problem-solver’. The relative slowness in the imple-
mentation of reforms is interpreted as being rational: it is argued that, in
contrast to innovation policy and locally based SME policy, the need for
action on the national level was only seen superficially, so that in the
phase of policy formulation, the idea of ‘weak’ SMEs could be pushed
through again. This stance is rational because first, the Japanese supplier
system is relatively stable (comp. Ueno/Murakoso/Hirai in this volume),
so that special policies directed towards smaller and weaker enterprises
still make sense; second, a radical change may cause numerous liquida-
tions and by this a macroeconomic instability; and third, a radical reform
of small firms policy may be misguided if Japan’s comparative strengths
lie especially in the integrated assembling industry, and not in independent,
radical innovations generating venture businesses. Storz therefore identi-
fies a certain change, but not as radical as Hemmert did for innovation
policy, resulting from different convictions towards reforms.
In Part II, the innovative potential of Japanese SMEs is discussed. The
two contributions in this part focus on two industries with absolutely dif-
ferent strengths and weaknesses: the biotechnology industry, where Japan
is said to have lost its competitiveness, and the assembling industry,
where Japan is leading worldwide. The function and role of SMEs in the
two industries can be described as being opposite. The authors of this part
support the thesis that the Japanese innovation system possesses specific
characteristics which are different from the American system, but they
come to interesting conclusions concerning the assessment of the politi-
cal and entrepreneurial leeway for action. Reiko Kishida and Leonard Lynn
(Chapter 6) analyse SMEs in the biotechnology industry in Japan. The
background to this contribution is that, up to the 1980s, one believed that
Japan would dominate the biotechnology industry, just as it headed the
assembling industries before. However, in the 1990s it seemed that the
American model, supporting university research and new business ven-
tures, was more conducive to strength in biotechnology. Kishida and Lynn
first qualify the position of Japan, as it is only weak in comparison to the
USA, but not unusually weak in comparison to other OECD countries,
Introduction 7
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and second recommend a concentration on industries where Japan has
natural comparative advantages, namely industries in which a comple-
mentarity to the existing innovation trajectory is given. A radical rebuild-
ing of the Japanese innovation system would be misguided from this
point of view. The authors acknowledge the concept of path dependence
and the characteristics of the Japanese innovation system (including
exclusive labour markets), but are not so sceptical about the inherent
strengths of the Japanese innovation system, since they accentuate the
varieties and learning options existing in established paths. The contribu-
tion of Hiroshi Ueno, Takashi Murakoso and Takumi Hirai (Chapter 7)
discusses the leading role of SMEs in the assembling industry. They
analyse the changes taking place in the Japanese supplier system which
necessitate a policy shift from a policy which aimed at adjusting the
small size of enterprises to larger entities by promoting cooperation and
cartels, to an entrepreneurship policy which takes the specific compara-
tive advantages of SMEs and the possible innovative potential into con-
sideration. The disintegration of the traditional vertical enterprise groups
‘automatically’ led to a greater independence for smaller firms and to the
necessity of strengthening their innovation potential. The question is how
the Japanese industrial organization is suited for such radical changes, or
whether it would not be more helpful for its competitive strength to only
revise the system. They show that especially on the local level new forms
of learning are taking place, for example, research-intensive cooperation
between government and SMEs, which is, in the Japanese context, highly
innovative.
Debating changes in innovation policy in Japan and the attempts to
secure a stronger and more innovative role for SMEs, the authors of this
volume come to the conclusion that institutional barriers to change
indeed exist – in their weight dependent on the functional subject – but
overall they are positive in their estimation of Japan’s competitiveness.
The volume thus has three important results: first, the harsh assessment
of the Japanese innovation system seems to be misguided; second, sug-
gestions for radical change have to be encountered carefully; and third,
learning potentials in given paths should not be underestimated.
Therefore the problem is not that institutions are a given fact, but that a
certain combination of explaining factors may explain certain develop-
ments, as the superiority of certain institutions, whereas opposite devel-
opments exist as well. It is important to identify these approaches since
they only affirm already existing prejudices, and it will then not be
possible to understand other modes of development. We hope that this
volume contributes to a better understanding of how policy changes take
place and how new policies and new roles assigned for SMEs result in
innovation in Japan.
8 Cornelia Storz
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Notes
1 The editor of the book led a research project on technology dissemination policy in
Japan and the USA which was financed by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research. Technology transfer centres and the transfer of their
concept to the USA were the main focus of the project. The project was further
supported by the University of Applied Science of Bremen.
2 Leipold (1997: 64) writes that because of the necessity of reform policy to take
effect on all levels, there are no prospects for quick success of reforms in Russia.
3 Important foreign culture influences, which lead to disruptures in Japan, are not
denied with this statement (cf. Storz 2002).
4 Innovation policy and SME policy takes place mainly in a framework and rules-
oriented policy (e.g. property rights (esp. patents), enforcement of competition) and
in a more regulative approach, aiming especially at adjusting market failures
(e.g. infrastructure, public subsidies, regulation). The authors in this volume refer
to different areas. It should be mentioned that the Japanese policy shift is not to be
understood as a singular development, but has to be understood against the back-
ground of an international shift to entrepreneurship policy (comp. e.g. OECD
2000).
5 According to Hall (1993), the new setting of targets can be described as a paradigm
change when it is accompanied by new instruments and new political objectives. A
paradigm change means a radical break with the setting of instruments, with the
instruments themselves, and with the hierarchy of political objectives.
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Initial thoughts
The aim of this chapter is to understand and analyze policy, economic
policy in particular, as an evolutionary process. Agents in this process are
by no means only those who are in the public eye perceived as responsi-
ble parties for policy and decision-making. Every policy has its roots
beyond the official political structures, in areas where there is ‘private’
dissatisfaction, where there is a need for action, where this kind of
perception is shared with others, where potential policy content is defined
and, finally, where critical masses, which can generate pressure for policy
action, are created.
The view of the policy-making process proposed here, goes beyond
traditional approaches by emphasizing the relevance of cognition and
communication. It moves away from the implicit idea currently prevailing,
even in well-informed circles, that there are ‘born’ state tasks, ‘right’
packages of measures to implement ‘objective’ aims and scientific
methods to find out what ‘good’ policies are. The basic credo of an
evolutionary theory of economic policy is to see policy as a product of
communicated, related perceptions (cf. Hodgson 2001: 279ff., for a
more general perspective). These perceptions – which influence evalua-
tions of policy conditions, formulation of objectives and packages of
measures – are themselves transformed by the results of running political
processes.
This doubly recursive structure leads to innovations, giving the
phenomenon its evolutionary character.1 With each change in perception,
the scenario of incentives to implement creative and rational adjustments
also changes – on the one hand on the part of the political decision-
makers, on the other hand on the part of those affected by policy. If, for
example, measures to fight mass unemployment in a country are perceived
as being increasingly ineffective, over time opposition to this policy will
grow. The result is increased motivation on the part of politicians, afraid
2 How do we formulate
policies?
The problem of defining policies
and their evaluation
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of losing the next election to create new solutions to the problems and to
make sure these are implemented in spite of various obstacles. From the
perspective of politics this implies not only a continuous political innova-
tion process but also a policy for innovation in the economy and in favour
of those who are considered to be promoters of innovation and employ-
ment. Hence a policy that regards the special requirements of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), clearly a primary source of innovation, has
to be considered as most important.
Accordingly and in turn, processes of innovation are not only relevant
to politicians and politics; they are also essential to strategic management
and strategic processes within enterprises. Again, the cognitive abilities
and imprint of those acting strategically on behalf of an economic entity
are especially liable for the success and innovativeness of their respective
institution.
Today, the media play a decisive role in the assessment of initial situa-
tions as well as in the evaluation of corresponding (new) approaches to
solving problems (cf. Luhmann 2000). They accelerate the process of
finding areas of dissatisfaction among citizens, they strengthen interest
groups, increase the pressure for action on the decision-makers, thus rep-
resenting both an instrument and potential threat to these people, they sup-
ply alternative interpretations of political answers and thereby increase the
possibility to react between impulses from the political basis on the one
hand and those of action-takers on the other hand. With a view to the over-
all theme of this chapter, the interesting point here is how, in the process
of a worldwide media-supported intensification of information and com-
munication, political paradigms which have dominated for many years can
be rendered obsolete and apparently effortlessly replaced by new ones. It
would seem as if the relative sluggishness of informal and formal institu-
tions is reduced in this process.
These preliminary thoughts should make clear that the evolutionary
policy approach to be presented in part in the following chapter is in many
ways inter-disciplinary. For example, it takes up criticism that was already
expressed as far back as Albert in his time: he proposed that older ideas of
economic policy-making had a tendency towards being instrumentally
technocratic and that this tendency should be accompanied by exagger-
ated ideas of feasibility (cf. Albert 1977). Therefore this chapter will deal
with a methodological foundation, called for by Albert and others, with
the consequence of endogenising and to a certain extent of ‘depriving’
democratically legitimized (economic) policy of its power. This is demon-
strated in the course of the argumentation, when the process of economic
policy-making is analysed from a relativistic perspective, which is consti-
tutive for the evolutionary economics thought. This also allows to inte-
grate older lines of argument into this process, such as von Hayek’s
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knowledge debate (cf. von Hayek 1983) or Simon’s rationality discussion
(cf. Simon 1955) as well as public choice theory and institutional
economics at a later stage.
On the basic assumptions of economic policy 
from a constructivism perspective
Those who recognize the individual actor as the basic unit and point of
departure for all economic action in the sense of methodological individ-
ualism, will not be able to avoid first dealing with the conditions of human
perception and action in any analysis of economic policy phenomena.2
This ‘relative nature’ mainly takes concrete form in the epistemological
restrictions of the make-up of the human perceptive apparatus. It is the
brain that provides the action-taker, and thus also all those participating in
the process of economic policy-making, with access to an outside world,
however this world may be characterized. How the latter functions and
what consequences it has is the theme of modern cognitive science.3
In tune with mainstream ideas, initially, a departure from the idea of
a passive, externally determined perception of the environment can be
recognized. Today, it is normally considered as proven that our brain,
which processes environmental stimuli, links these external impulses with
already existing cognitive structures in an actively constructive way.4
Every piece of incoming information that is absorbed receives its specific
identity in our brain and mechanisms such as perception, inference, attri-
bution and memory, in particular, act as mental operations.5 Cognitive
psychology provided sound theoretical and empirical proof of these con-
texts as early as the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Neisser 1976) and this later
provided strong support for the development of an approach which was
to become known as cognitive constructivism. The following ideas in this
chapter are based on this approach, which is present in almost all areas
of contemporary psychology (for an overview cf. Nüse 1995). In this
epistemological model, it is important to understand cognition also as
discovery and invention, without having to commit oneself to a decision
as to which parts of human perception actually provide information about
the existence of an outside, subject-independent world. Without negating
the idea of a ‘neutral’ environment, there is an unavoidable aura of
uncertainty surrounding any statements made about it (cf. Vinden and
Astington 2000).
The main general consequences which result from the integration of
these contexts into an analysis of economic policy can be outlined in three
points: in the first place, the idea of ‘information’ as the basic variable
of planning in economic policy needs to be rethought. Here, the basic
significance of information within this process is not being questioned,
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however a modification of the way information is understood is required.
Modern cognitive sciences clearly prove that information about facts does
not exist independently of individuals and thus cannot simply be passed
on to others. Information in the actual sense of the word is created at the
moment of reception of external signals in the apparatus of human per-
ception. Thus, in the context of economic policy, the prevailing conditions
of this genesis or transformation of information need to be investigated
more intensively. Information transformation and transfer can be taken as
phenomena which belong together and it is of particular importance to
realize that each piece of transferred information gains a new identity in
the act of being transferred. The main question to be looked at here is
which factors, either intended or non-intended, influence the process of
gaining meaning.
Then it should be pointed out that, second, these aspects throw a
different light on the problem of forecasting, both at a scientific and an
economic policy level. In information transformation the way our percep-
tive apparatus functions seems to hinder any use of transformation rules.
Research into perceptive physiology has proved that the brain works in a
kind of temporal rhythm, always combining several physiological events
into one perception, then to be replaced autonomously or spontaneously
by another. Here the content of a later perception can be changed, even if
there has been no change in the sensory data (for an extensive description
see Oeser 1987; Pöppel 1988). All of a sudden, completely new interpre-
tations of situations can be created, which may then lead to very unex-
pected and new reactions.6 This means ceteris paribus, that it is for purely
cognitive reasons that the possibilities of forecasting economic, social and
political cycles decrease with increasing complexity of information net-
working in a society and between societies (globalization), especially as
there are basic difficulties in connection with the attempt to observe and
evaluate internal personal processes (cf. Little 1972; Nisbett and Ross
1980; Witt 1992).
Third, another consequence of integrating perception and cognition the-
ories into the formation of a theory on economic policy originates from
the central idea that no economic subject thinks, plans and acts against the
background of an objective reality, but rather always within the framework
of its own subjective reality which only experiences a partial comparison
with other individual ‘realities’ via an act of communication. On the one
hand ‘cognitive maps’ play a role here, a concept which will be dealt with
in more detail later. On the other hand, the function of social interaction
as a reality shaper comes into play. Living together in a society and eco-
nomic policy is therefore conceivable only if, at least in certain areas,
common relevant realities are created by way of communication
as described by Berger and Luckmann (1979). This means that, from
a cognitive-evolutionary perspective, social communication has a much
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more important function than merely the exchange of information, if we
understand the term ‘information’ here in the traditional, more technical
sense (cf. Habermas 1984). Acceptance of new information and its diffu-
sion into society is thus an effect of society-specific communication struc-
tures and habits. In turn, the (political) reaction to such information and
the dynamics of political decision-making according to it depend on these
rules of communication. Societies like the Japanese, as it is analysed in
this book, are orientated towards consensus and are therefore in need of
thorough communication. Before any action taking is possible, promoters
of change are likely to rely on slow or piece-meal decision processes
(Introduction in this book) in order to achieve the necessary social accep-
tance of new information and thus of new developments or circumstances.7
For an initial summary the following should be kept in mind: an
evolutionary theory of economic policy that attempts to understand real
policy formulations on the basis of the previously occurring construction
process of this ‘econo-political reality’, should differentiate between two
levels of thought. On an individual level the creation of individual infor-
mation is in the foreground, that is, subjective boundary conditions of the
genesis of very specific construct. On a collective level, on the other hand,
it has to be found out whether individual impulses spread out in the social
environment and how they can thus make a contribution to the formula-
tion and evaluation of economic policy.
On the evolution of content in economic policy
Following the ideas presented in the last section, this section will first
separately address the two levels of identifying econo-political reality.
Here, to a certain extent analogously with evolutionary biology, logic
of variation or selection will be identified. On the individual level the
question is why, of all incoming sensory stimuli, some are always selected
from a complex variety and, as initial perception, influence the individual’s
own subsequent perceptions, so that an unmistakeable path-dependent
reality is created for each individual. On the collective level, on the other
hand, the interesting aspect is how certain interpretations prevail – at least
temporarily – when alternative realities meet, and how they gain influence
on the political communication process.
Variation/selection processes on the individual level
As an aid for the investigation into the individual level, the concept of
‘cognitive maps’ will be addressed here. This concept, the development
of which is linked to Piaget’s work (1987), combines the above-mentioned
concepts with a series of sub-phenomena in information processing which
have not yet been addressed. For example, an important point is that
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cognitive maps are highly selective, meaning that pieces of knowledge are
linked within them under the same label in the form of terms for charac-
teristics, prototypes, limiting cases and examples.8 Parallel to this so-
called, tacit knowledge is arranged knowledge, which is constantly being
developed and applied, thus changing in action and at the same time
influencing the human ability to act without the agent himself or an exter-
nal observer being able to systematically describe its structure (for an
application-based overview see, for example, Hirschfeld et al. 1994).
In any cognition and memory process, cognitive maps, which help master
the complex range of sensory stimuli, play a central role: they form
the framework, so to say, into which newly constructed information is
inserted, to then be complemented by already organized pieces of knowl-
edge (cf. Eysenck 1984: 324). Thus a referential network is created within
which experiences are condensed into patterns, which themselves then
shape experiences. All evaluations, expectations, plans and decisions made
by agents are based on this interdependent linkage of present and past cog-
nitions (cf. Koch 1996). All economic subjects, whatever role they may be
playing at any moment in the process of economic policy, are affected by
this subjective pre-structuring of perception. Politicians, bureaucrats or
voters, members of whatever social class, the old or the young: in their
reception of information, events and complex situations all are subject to
the biological restriction of only being able to perceive what their brains
offer them on the basis of their personal (stored) ‘history’.9
In contrast to the concept of ‘bounded rationality’, the concept of ‘cog-
nitive maps’10 thus emphasizes not so much the lack of quantity in infor-
mation gathering as the unavoidability of path-dependent quality changes
in the reception of information. In addition it has been shown that the
process of variation and selection taking place in the perceptive apparatus
can only be indirectly influenced by perceptive content. This happens when
the focused reception of knowledge and the effort to gain experience in a
certain area change the basic content which is selectively relevant in the
construction process. A relevant example here would be reading a book on
technology and innovation policy and possible economic implications.
A further decisive sub-phenomenon in the process of cognition-led
action is the creation of intentionality. Going backwards from the already
structured econo-political situation, one point of reference is the idea
of the econo-political problem whose roots are in the perception of
contradictions in the subjective area. If there are such considerable
contradictions to the previous subjective ‘reality’ in an individual
perceptive situation in the face of certain ‘information conditions’, these
cognitive dissonances can at the same time awaken the wish to reduce
them. How strong the stimulus is, depends on the estimation of the
expected costs and benefits of corresponding activities.11 The costs can
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be, for example, to analytically structure and then to communicate the ini-
tially subjectively defined problem (e.g. in discussions or publications),
they can express themselves in altered choice behaviour and they can (this
option involves the highest costs) imply triggering off activity in citizens
initiatives, parties or government authorities. ‘Information conditions’ in
which cognitive dissonance occurs can on the one hand be newly created.
However, they can also remain unchanged and the ambiguity solely results
from a recombination of established consciousness content which is pro-
duced by the apparatus of perception (cf. Pöppel 1988). While the latter
possibility can occur at any time, the reception of new target parameters
(e.g. ideas or values) or new knowledge about actual parameters (causal
contexts and restrictions) must be added for the former – for example, by
reading the above-mentioned book.
As already indicated, the discussion so far implies an altered image of
the agents in the political process. Initially, we have the politician in mind
as the economic policy-maker, but the assumption of the ubiquitous influ-
ence of cognitive maps emphasizes that any idea of an exogenous con-
troller having a complete catalogue of assumptions about the behaviour of
agents in a system, is doomed to failure. His perception and his resulting
behaviour are rather inseparably and reflexively coupled with the specific
social context which he is a part of. Every economic politician is himself
‘just’ an endogenous variable in the model of economic policy (cf. Witt
1992: 119ff.). In the process of changing cognition, knowledge compo-
nents and evaluations, his own cognitive maps are just as inconsistent as
those of any other individual agent, so that in principle no ‘objective’
decision-making field can exist in the area of economic policy (cf. Scherer
et al. 1988: 803ff.; Eggertsson 1997: 1189).
Regarding the group of voters, there are important conclusions to be
drawn from the point of view of cognitive science, which are complemen-
tary to corresponding reflections in political economics: in the case of
democratic votes on agents and programmes in economic policy, for
example, it must seem obsolete to look for voting procedures which could
represent an ‘objective’ portrayal of voters’ preferences. Also the idea of
the ‘voters’ mandate’, which is often diagnosed is nothing more than
a point-in-time-based open structure which changes its importance in a
continuous process of reflexive interpretation of reality.12 Each elected
person interprets the ‘voters’ mandate’ just as contextually as the voter
evaluates the information available to him concerning a social situation.13
Voters and the elected will change their ideas of target and performance
mutually dependent on each other in the course of a legislative period and
will thus also alter their interpretation of problem situations, leading to a
co-evolution of relevant decision-making fields. This clearly shows why
an evolutionary understanding of economic policy is supported here and,
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at the same time, leads to the analysis of the collective level of the process
of economic policy-making.
Variation/selection processes on a collective level
Here, the question needs to be dealt with as to which kinds of subjectively
perceived discontent (problem variation) – for example, if faced with an
expected under-supply of certain public goods – actually end up becom-
ing a problem of economic policy (problem selection). To explain this, the
constitutive function of interaction and communication for societies needs
to be examined (cf. Blume and Durlauf 2001). When individuals take up
contact with each other, they ‘automatically’ alter the reality for the per-
son they are interacting with. They observe reactions to their own actions
and, if necessary, conceptualize recurrent new experiences together with
previous knowledge as cause–effect relationships in new variations or
cognitive maps. The fact that in this situation each individual acts accord-
ing to his own, subjective, schematically coded expectations, aims and
purposes is also termed ‘double contingency’. As we can assume that
within social communities the subjective realities of interactive partners
are at least partly synreferential in advance, agents can also always work
towards orienting the cognitive area of others towards a certain object (cf.
Rusch 1994: 63). This point represents an important interface where it
is decided whether individually perceived problems ever become inter-
subjective or societal problems at a certain point in time.
Here the mobilization resources of individual economic subjects play a
decisive role and there is a wide range of possibilities: first, it depends on
the strength of the intrinsic potential, that is, on the degree of subjectively-
perceived dissatisfaction and on the will to mobilize. Second, there must
be sufficient mobilization abilities such as the correct selection of com-
munication partners and the necessary argumentation skills. Here the
social position taken on by the mobiliser is important, as well as the eco-
nomic and/or political resources and power potential available to him and
the experience already made with him in similar situations in the past.
When the spark of problem perception jumps from the individual level to
the collective level, a problem subsequently gains a new piece of identity
with each further communication step, that is, its quality by no means
remains constant during the diffusion process, nor is there any guarantee
that every person concerned will interpret a communicated problem in
a similar way. Here the complexity of the subject matter and the quality of
the communication process play an essential role. ‘The more successful
orientation interactions there are and the more reliable they are, the
stronger will the agents be convinced of the common and equal nature of
reality’ (cf. Rusch 1994: 71). In other words, depending on the situation,
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there can be a homogenization of how people interpret reality and prob-
lems. Whether a problem which is perceived and discussed in parts of
society actually becomes an issue in economic policy depends, in essence,
on this homogenization process. The more homogenous the perception of
a certain economic target/performance discrepancy and the larger and
more powerful the dissatisfied group, the higher the probability, all else
being equal, that the problem will be admitted to the political level. In
spite of this, no generally valid if-then criteria can be derived for this step.
Historical constellations play a role which needs to be evaluated accord-
ing to what kind of macroeconomic situation a society is in, what other
problems are on the issues list and how urgent they are, and thus what
problem perception and problem treatment capacities are still available at
that point in time (cf. Meier and Slembeck 1994: 75). An additional, very
important point to consider is what institutionally dictated mechanisms
facilitate or how they impede the problem being admitted to the political
level (e.g. constitutional requirements for referendum petitions) – a ques-
tion which will not be dealt with further here. But even if a certain degree
of homogeneity is necessary as a kind of minimum ‘critical value’ for
admitting a problem to the level of economic policy, the relativity of this
context must be considered. The reason is that in increasingly intranspar-
ent, pluralistic and multicultural societies, it will become generally more
difficult to install homogenous, powerful interpretations of problems
which are at the same time stable in time and content.
With the acceleration of technological progress and the global diffusion
of knowledge (decreasing ‘knowledge half-life’), as well as the interna-
tionalization of the economic and inter-jurisdictional competition that
goes with it (cf. Vanberg 2000), the relevant problem areas and at the same
time the interpretation of individual problem areas are fanning out more
and more. However, the more heterogeneous the prevailing and competing
realities are, the more difficult it is, all else being equal, to make any qual-
ified statement on the course of problem admittance processes and thus
projections about future developments in the process of economic policy
as a whole. As a result of this development, one thing is becoming more
and more important: to what extent are initially alien problem areas and
interpretations of problems communicated to the other groups in a society
in order to create a pool of relevant information in common knowledge
(intended reduction of ambiguity)? From the perspective proposed
here, such a pool seems to be a condition sine qua non for constructive
socio-political discussion on the solution of problems which come up.
To a certain extent it combats a ‘de-rationalization’ of the process of
economic policy-making. In accordance with this, the economic policy-
making process would be ‘rational’ in a sense that what is being commu-
nicated about it is also what every individual concerned understands as
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being what the sender wants to express; therefore, the more intensively a
theme-based process of mutual orientation gets going, the higher the prob-
ability that a problem recognized by many will later be treated ‘correctly’
or ‘rationally’ – in the view of many.
Now, a closer look will be taken at the mechanisms and patterns which
play a role in the process of problem diffusion in economic policy. This
includes, above all, the observation that cost–benefit relations which eco-
nomic agents are confronted with, if they want to spread an individual
view of a problem, are highly dependent on the established communica-
tion structures within a society. These form the ‘resonance space’ in
which problem interpretations have to prove themselves (cf. Siegenthaler
1994: 177ff.). Here, communication structures should be understood as
the total number of valid possibilities and limits of communication
between economic subjects in a society. In the modern ‘information econ-
omy’, the various media are of particular importance (cf. Löffelholz and
Altmeppen 1994). They do not simply function as ‘neutral’ communica-
tion channels (information transfer); they rather play a decisive control-
ling role in problem origination processes by spreading new possibilities
for interpretation (information transformation). The abstract object of
public opinion as an obstacle or selector for individual models and inter-
pretations is, to a great extent, a product of the media. A careful evalua-
tion of public opinion can show individuals or groups of agents what costs
of mobilization and thus what level of material and personal resources are
to be expected to ensure that a problem actually becomes an issue in
economic policy (cf. Kuran 1995). Here, it can be shown that the problems
by no means always originate in the same way. Ideally, there are two basic
patterns.14
The first one, the bottom up formation of opinion, represents the ‘ideal
democratic situation’: a problem is perceived relatively homogeneously by
a group of individuals, and potential supporters – that is, interest groups,
governments and parliamentarians – have to be ‘triggered into action’ by
the basis. The extensive overlapping of individual cognitive maps, which
is necessary in advance of this, means that this type seldom occurs in its
purest form, especially considering the fact that there are many structural
obstacles which can have an effect. Of particular importance is the fact
that, as a rule, the so-called agenda setters are indispensable, that is, those
who take a problem and make it a political issue, whereby the mobiliza-
tion of effective media is potentially very ‘expensive’ in this case.
Therefore, second, a large part of the formation of opinion in society is
a more top-down situation, that is, it is triggered by influential agents. For
politicians and representatives of powerful interest groups – for example
trade union functionaries – the access to relevant publicity channels and
the focused influence on public opinion that goes with it, mostly incurs
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relatively low transaction costs.15 ‘They have capacity available to them to
ensure a media-friendly processing of issues and therefore enjoy good
access to the mass media’ (Meier and Mettler 1988: 41). Thus it is rela-
tively easy for them to produce certain problems or interpretations of
problems in a focused way, that is, to choose the right moment in time, in
order to instrumentalize them in the process of economic policy-making.
This can be observed in the discussion about a potential involvement of
the German army in a possible war in the gulf region at the moment.
Now, an important role is played by the question as to what events or
constellations kick off a problem process and in which economic, social
and political context. If there is latent discontent, which has been pre-
dominant in a larger social group for a long time, the course of problem
diffusion will be different than if only a small peripheral societal group
sees need for econo-political action on a certain issue. Based on a catego-
rization in Bennett (1980: 113ff.), various categories of initiation of
econo-political problems can be differentiated according to the number of
people affected and the extent to which they are affected (cf. Meier and
Slembeck 1994: 68ff.).
In this context, one can speak of an interest group problem if only a
minority in society is affected, but this minority organizes itself formally
on the basis of the high willingness to pay, shown by the individuals con-
cerned. On the basis of the German coal problem in the Ruhr area, the
cognitive determinants which are relevant here become clear: normally
this concerns groups of economic subjects whose individual realities have
a high level of synreferentiality in advance, as they have economic (indus-
try, profession etc.), social (class, ethnicity etc.) and/or geographical
(estate community etc.) features in common. This means that the costly
setting up of functioning communication structures and the spread of
common interpretations of reality are rendered superfluous. In case of
structural problems, however, there are a large number of affected agents,
but the individual is affected to a lesser degree. Even if the motivation to
form a formal organization is weaker for this reason, this type of problem
triggering is still just as significant as the former one. To go back to the
introduction of the euro, for example, the political significance associated
with it becomes clear. In the run-up to the Bundestag elections in 1998,
the election campaign strategists of the largest German parties saw an
above-average level of uncertainty concerning this issue. From a cogni-
tive-evolutionary point of view, the reason for this was that in the course
of the currency debate, each potential voter had an opinion, but these
opinions were based on completely different backgrounds concerning
knowledge, experience and interest. As a result, it seemed dangerous to
commit to a certain strategy at too early a stage, as public opinion was
extremely unstable under the given circumstances. Only the latter of the
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ideal types of elite and crisis problems, which are less frequent in reality,
will be addressed here as this is a particularly interesting phenomenon for
the context under discussion. A chaotic situation is characteristic, after
which a coincidental individual event can very quickly completely change
the societal assessment of the situation and thus also the relevance of
possible previously existing problems (interest group, structure or elite
problems) (cf. Kuran 1995). For example, taking a look at public reaction
to a media-effective accident at a chemical production plant, extremely
intense ‘avalanche-like’ protest can be observed in certain cases – espe-
cially if there have been no similar accidents in the recent past. It may even
happen that all chemical production plants in a country become time
bombs in public opinion. The decisive consideration here is that the sud-
denly altered assessment of the situation can lead to huge pressure on
political agents. A social problem is ‘born’, which results in a political
necessity to immediately formulate and implement new aims for a certain
area which has been at most a peripheral issue for a long time as regards
social interest. It is obvious what kind of economic consequences such
coincidental individual events can have, for example, for a whole indus-
try. From a cognitive-evolutionary point of view, the interesting aspect to
such an example is that in certain cases the homogenization of cognitive
maps can take place very quickly and unpredictably. When a large major-
ity has swung towards a certain view of reality, decisions can be taken
which would never have had a chance of implementation in the past. This
is also an aspect which again makes the significance of the factors ‘coin-
cidence’, evolutionary self-dynamics and path dependency very clear for
the results of the process of economic policy.
On the evaluation of econo-political action
So far the genesis and formulation of economic policy have been
emphasized and there are methodological reasons for this, which stress the
separation of the origin of problems and their treatment. However, in
reality, both phases in the policy-making process overlap. As policy is
already ‘underway’ at any point in time of observation, the variation/
selection processes on the individual and collective levels are also influ-
enced by the perception of previous steering efforts. This is just one rea-
son why a prejudice-free evaluation of current measures never takes place.
In this context it would not be right to claim that evolutionary processes
of policy formulation have evolutionistic characteristics. This would
mean, assuming a positive selection which would regularly bring policy
onto the right path, that it would prove itself most suitable ‘overall’ as
opposed to other alternatives. However, the fact is that in an evolutionary
world, society’s evaluation of centralized steering efforts must always be
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seen as competition in itself (cf. Breton 1998). In this competitive situa-
tion, evaluations can dominate for a certain period, maybe because the
political decision-makers provide a ready-made evaluation to stabilize
their power. Here it is possible that a selection of ‘independent’ expert
consultants, evaluators or research institutes has an influence on the result
of the analytical task. Furthermore, the way the problem develops plays a
role here. If it is a crisis situation, there is often temporary dominance of
one or a small number of motives. This results in the fact that packages
of measures, which were previously rejected, suddenly seem to become
suitable, for example, due to a series of undesired side and remote effects.
For example, after 11 September, 2001, safety policy measures in
domestic and foreign policy were judged to be ‘good’ solutions by the
broader population, who, only a few weeks earlier would have criticized
such measures as causing unacceptable damage to their freedom as State
citizens. Similarly, in Japan and other countries, economic crises which
led to bankruptcy and mass redundancy resulted in a call for supply-side
policy measures, regulatory reforms and an intensification of innovation
and entrepreneurship (e.g. Boltho and Corbett 2000; Matsuba 2001). Here
it is obvious that the enhanced status of one ideology reduces the status of
competing models.
This means that economic policy and politics in general are – to a cer-
tain extent – subject to the laws of Schumpeterian competition, that moti-
vates the creation of the new and rejection of what seems to be proven.
Here, there are wave movements of different lengths, analogue to eco-
nomic phenomena. Considering this, the replacement of one paradigm by
another must appear as a comparatively long-term phenomenon. It took
years for all executive bodies in Germany to move away from Keynesian
demand-side policy. Political growth cycles are, on the other hand, short-
term wave movements. Determined by legislative periods, policy tenden-
cies in this area change on a regular basis, for example, after elections
have been won, savings policies are replaced by generous spending gifts
in order to win support before the next vote (e.g. Frey 1983).
The shortest and at the same time most irregular fluctuations in policy
take place, of course, in the almost omnipresent political competition.
This even happens when a problem has long been recognized by poli-
tics and its treatment is already in full swing. Here too, current power
constellations play an important role. Individuals and groups will contin-
uously attempt to change the perception of a problem on the part of the
decision-makers to their own benefit. Here, there are many different
formal and informal options of problem treatment on various decision
levels, depending on the specific structure of the political system. For
example, it is well known that preventive measures taken against the
State’s abuse of power in the more recent constitutional democracies
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(‘checks and balances’), result in many veto and influence possibilities,
which do not exist in other systems. However, there are also considerable
differences between the various forms of democracy. For example, the
British Westminster model or its New Zealand offshoot enable a deter-
mined head of government or an ideologically homogenous ‘policy
conspiracy’ to act much faster on the basis of their own interpretation of a
problem than is possible in corporatist systems (cf. Wallis 1997).
It should not be forgotten that, regardless of to what extent they can
influence and affect the situation, agents will attempt up to the last to use
all their power, resources and powers of persuasion in order to ensure the
success of their own interpretation of a problem and normally also the
implementation of their own solution model. This continuous competition
between alternative interpretations means that the observer is constantly
being offered numerous – prima facie unsystematic or even seemingly
contradictory – partial interpretations of the process of economic policy.
Such apparent ‘irrationalities’ can be observed in particular when very
different reality models are almost forcibly combined into one perspective
in the problem treatment phase. The reason is that certain aims are for-
mulated and certain measures are chosen from this political reality, solely
due to the fact that this ‘artificial’ current perspective spreads very
definite causalities – even if the latter often seem very unsuitable to the
external observer (cf. Luhmann 1989).
In the background there is an important basic assumption which moti-
vates the political process. This assumption aims at overcoming societal
conflicts which hinder action by taking the wide variety of individual real-
ities into consideration.16 So it is no surprise from a theoretical point of
view that in this hither and thither of competing ideas about econo-political
cause–effect contexts, chains of action are created which are difficult to
comprehend taken at face value. Furthermore, a cognitive-evolutionary
approach lends credibility to the assumption that the idea which could be
labelled systematic ‘muddling through’ (cf. Lindblom 1959: 79ff.) is not
a contradiction in itself. It should be much more the rule in economic
policy – at least in a democratic market economy system, which is con-
ceived as an open and pluralist society.17 This is because, with the institu-
tionally secured admittance of variety, there is an unavoidable necessity of
making compromises on the public level of action, implying a loss of logi-
cal consistency of the sub-arguments. Thus, the newer a field of policy is to
a specific society, the less (formal) institutions exist to govern the processes
that directly affect it. All the same this means that lobbyist interests
powerful enough to affect policy, are more likely to succeed as there are no
or only a few institutions that might prevent their influence-taking. In the
case of Japanese SME-policy, in which a new body of rules and regulations
is still emerging, these considerations are especially applicable. According
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to the reasoning mentioned earlier, this inhibits the danger of counteracting
the original logic or innovation-political intensions, respectively.18
However, questions as to the number of compromises made on the
steering level that a political system can cope with, would lead deeper into
a normative discussion. Or the question could be posed: what relation
must there be between stabilizing formal institutions that have a self-
binding nature as the result of a consistent regulatory policy on the one
hand, and a flexible approach to pluralistic impulses on the other hand
(e.g. Dixit 2000; Rodrik 2000; Metcalfe 2001)? What value has the natural
inertia of certain ideologies, which, as informal institutions, slow down
some current influences? How should the ever increasing penetration of
global impulses be encountered in national policy processes? Can too
much be asked of the basic social and political ability to deal with change
(cf. Marquard 1986)?
These questions will remain unanswered here. The principle aim of this
chapter was to awaken an understanding for the political process as a phe-
nomenon that can be seen under the aspect of cognitive and communica-
tions science. The cause and effect connections described, should be
considered independently of which measures and influences for stabiliza-
tion or destabilization of certain tendencies can be observed in this process.
Résumé
With these thoughts in mind a short summary can be made. The point of
departure of the argumentation in this chapter was the dissolution of the
common knowledge assumption which is implicitly taken for granted in
many papers dealing with the theory of economic policy-making. An evo-
lutionary theory of economic policy bases its analysis on the genesis of a
more or less well-defined field of occurrences and conditions. In other
words, such a theory focuses on the perception, processing and reciprocal
social construction of phenomena regarded as relevant to the political
economic sphere. Central to the understanding of the actual content
and assessment of economic policy-making and its transformation over
time seems to be the mental deconstruction of the process of problem
origination and policy formulation.
Subsequently, it becomes clear why both the process of problem
origination as well as the process of problem treatment in economic
policy, often seem to be systematically ‘unsystematic’ to the observer. As
problem origination and problem treatment are always accompanied by
complex competition for influence and power between different interpre-
tations of reality, what is left over as the final result of this process on a
collective level can still only be an ambiguous and partially contradictory
compromise. This results from the collision of many different ways of
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thinking, reality models and ideologies whose foundations, even if they
seem incommensurable, are set in relation to each other. It is the motiva-
tion of the decision-makers in economic policy to reduce ambiguity on
all levels – at least in a democratic system – in order to become or
remain able to act. The extent to which the left-over residue of ambiguity or
cognitive heterogeneity is present in the phase of problem treatment,
depends not least on the informal and formal givens of the socio-political
system of a country. In an individual case analysis, the quality of the
installed communication structures and the structure of the democratic
involvement and decision-making rules would need to be investigated here.
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the appearance of such
problem interpretations, born out of the societal communication process
and the solution patterns which follow, is in no way long-lasting; it rather
shifts according to the extent to which certain events, discoveries or power
shifts help other or new realities to become temporary ‘competitive suc-
cesses’. Therefore, a positive theory of economic policy must also thema-
tize influential factors of the variability of its categories. It should
understand the societal communication process as an all-encompassing
medium in which interests concerning economic policy, models and ide-
ologies are not only transported and strengthened, but also put in their
place. The agents, sometimes in a double role of decision-maker and party
affected by the resulting policy can be understood as evaluators – either as
creators of majorities or as grave diggers – for certain approaches.
However, with the relativistic basic positions proposed here, it would not
be possible in any way to claim that they had objective decision-making
competencies. They are always endogenous variables in a continuous
political communication process.
For analysing contemporary developments in Japan, these thoughts
should be kept in mind. It is proposed here that SME- and innovation-
policy, as largely new phenomena to a culture characterized by a strong,
yet old-fashioned institutional structure, are likely to face powerful resis-
tance from many parts of society and pressure groups stuck to the tradi-
tional perspective of the economy and policy-making. On the other hand,
if the need to reinforce efforts in support of SMEs and innovation is
understood as common consent in the consensus-oriented society of
Japan, it will be endorsed on a fruitful and very broad basis.
Notes
1 The mechanisms that underlie endogenous change of these cognitive models are
analysed in detail in the third section of this chapter (pp. 17–24). 
2 Cf. Albert 1977: 205, who demands the inclusion of epistemological aspects in a
theory of econo-political action ‘which should be taken seriously from a realistic
point of view’.
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3 The expression ‘cognitive sciences’ includes all disciplines which deal with the
phenomena perception and cognition, including neuro-biology, chemistry, physi-
ology and psychology, other fields of biology and psychology as well as some
areas of philosophy.
4 Cf. Singer 2002, who describes three stages in the knowledge development of the
human brain. In a first purely genetic step, the brain’s primal knowledge structure
as an outcome of the process of human evolution, is constructed. In the second
stage, which lasts until puberty, the physical microstructure of the brain is
reshaped by experience and the gaining of knowledge. The third step is commonly
known as learning and is nearly without effect to the physical brain.
5 Perception is the absorption of stimuli by sensory cells and organs, inference is the
formation of implicit conclusions and attribution is the sub-conscious allocation
of cause by the brain.
6 In this context Hesse’s reflections on ‘cognitive creativity’ as a basic variable in
the theory of action and economics as well as the consequences of its integration
for the explanation of innovation are particularly significant; cf. Hesse 1990.
7 Please cf. also the considerations on this topic at the end of Chapter 4.
8 Cf. Rees and Frith 1999, for a deeper insight into the neurobiological process of
perception and selection-mechanisms in the human brain.
9 In a similar context to the one discussed here, Frey and Eichenberger 1991: 75,
under the point ‘reference point effects’, refer to the example of the fear of infla-
tion some Germans have. It seems to actually make a difference in the evaluation
of econo-political scenarios whether agents still have (unpleasant) memories of
inflation they experienced themselves or not. People with experience of certain
events and developments will sub-consciously evaluate situations differently than
individuals without the same history.
10 These are sometimes called ‘scripts’, or ‘frames’. In all cases these are special
types of complex structural organizations (the terms are also partly synonymous).
For example ‘frames’, which will be dealt with later, normally describe organized
knowledge structures that order conventionally determined knowledge of laws and
standards which plays a role in social situations. Cf. Dijk 1997.
11 Cognitive assimilation and accommodation processes play a role in connection
with the motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance or ambiguity. Cf. Meier and
Slembeck 1994: 54ff.
12 In this context it can be of interest to analyse the mechanisms of reflexive reality
modeling, also in advance of elections and votes. Spontaneous actions and insti-
tutionalized procedures ensure that the actual decisions have been made long
before the formal election or vote takes place. In spite of this, this cognitive-
evolutionary aspect of preparation for votes is often undervalued in expert literature
on the subject, an exception being Slembeck, 1997.
13 Kuran 1987: 189ff. analyzes in detail the extent to which private preferences for
example are in a continuous change process depending on private knowledge and
public discussion and the ‘preference distortions’ which result.
14 Cf. Meier and Mettler 1988: 40ff. also Cf. Waterman 2002: 38f., for a brief
overview of economic reasoning concerning these approaches.
15 Cf. Mueller 1989. The general idea is that the transaction costs of turning social
or political problems into issues (in the widest sense) are basically communication
costs, using the example of patent law production; in Hutter 1989: 187f. examples
for politically motivated ‘problem generation’ (top-down) can be found, for
example, in Scharpf 1991.
16 However this does not exclude the possibility that political oppositions produce
ambiguity on purpose to hinder the success of the actions of decision-makers or
to manipulate society’s evaluation of the results of actions.
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17 A reference can be made here to Popper’s plea for a social technique of ‘piecemeal
social engineering’, which he explains on the basis of the characteristics of such
a society concept. Cf. Popper 1995.
18 A case-study on political influence regarding innovation policy is provided by
Koch and Kautonen (forthcoming 2005).
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Introduction
Japanese science and technology policy, like many aspects of the Japanese
economy, has a strong reputation for being fundamentally different from
the policies in other industrialized countries, or even for being unique. In
particular, there is a widespread conviction that the Japanese government
and bureaucracy are strongly engaged in fostering collaborative R&D pro-
jects with leading manufacturing firms in order to enhance the inter-
national competitiveness of high-tech industries (Callon 1995; Goto 1997;
Ray 1998; Sakakibara and Cho 2002). This view, however, is only based
on the observation of particular projects which represent only a small part
of the overall scope of science and technology policy. The common per-
ception that Japanese science and technology policy is primarily engaged
in organizing industrial R&D consortia, therefore does not necessarily
match the reality.
This chapter aims at attaining a more balanced and realistic view of
Japanese science and technology policy. In order to gain a comprehensive
overall picture, a broad understanding of science and technology policy is
applied. All programmes and measures by which the government influ-
ences a country’s science and technology system and the technological
competitiveness of its companies are considered.
First, Japanese science and technology policy, as it evolved during the
previous decades until the early 1990s, will be analysed. It is shown that
it was strongly oriented towards the diffusion of existing knowledge rather
than the generation of new knowledge, and therefore could be qualified as
a catch-up oriented policy which was designed to support an innovation
system still lagging behind the world’s leading nations in most fields of
science and technology.
Thereafter, the transition of the Japanese science and technology policy
from catch-up orientation towards frontrunner orientation since the 1990s
will be discussed. It is shown that in recent years, science and technology
3 Japanese science and
technology policy in transition
From catch-up orientation to
frontrunner orientation
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policy makers have been undertaking serious efforts to adjust their policy
to the needs of the Japanese innovation system, as Japan has become
one of the technologically leading nations of the world. Finally, some
conclusions from a Western perspective are outlined.
Japanese science and technology policy in previous
decades: supporting the technological catch-up
When analysing Japanese science and technology policy, a first overview
can be given by a comparison of the structure of Japan’s national R&D
spending with leading Western countries (OECD 2004; Somusho
Tokeikyoku 2004 and earlier editions). Japan’s total national R&D inten-
sity (proportion of GDP spent on R&D activities) has been rising contin-
uously throughout the last decades and already surpassed that of the major
Western countries, such as the United States, Germany, France or the
United Kingdom, in the 1980s. This observation strongly supports the
notion that Japan has become one of the technologically leading countries
worldwide.
The structure of Japan’s national R&D expenditures differed consider-
ably from other countries’ spending, however. The part of total R&D spent
by the government is clearly lowest in Japan among the group of leading
countries. It stood almost invariably at about 20 per cent of the national
R&D spending throughout the last few decades. In the Western countries,
in contrast, governmental spending accounted for between 30 and 50 per
cent of the total R&D. As a result, notwithstanding Japan’s high total R&D
intensity, the proportion of GDP which falls to governmental R&D expen-
ditures, was lower than in the United States and the leading European
countries. Only in recent years has it surpassed the United Kingdom, where
governmental R&D spending has been subject to far-reaching cuts.
The difference between Japan and the Western countries is even more
pronounced when looking at the part of business sector R&D spending,
which is financed by the government (OECD 2004; Somusho Tokeikyoku
2004 and earlier editions). This part is much lower in Japan than in all
Western countries, indicating relatively low governmental subsidies for
private R&D activities. In the last decades, only 1–2 per cent of business
R&D was financed by the government in Japan, whereas the correspond-
ing proportion was much higher in the United States and Europe and stood
somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent in most countries. In other words,
while a substantial part of private R&D activities were funded by the
government in Western countries, governmental funding of business R&D
was on a very low level in Japan.
This difference between Japan and the other countries is partially a
result of the low importance of defence-related public R&D spending in
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Japan. In some of the Western countries, particularly in the United States,
a substantial part of private R&D activities, which are funded by the gov-
ernment, is incorporated in contract R&D in technological fields related
to defence. Even when taking this aspect into account, however, the very
low direct governmental aid for business R&D in Japan is eye-catching.
Moreover, even if one includes R&D-related tax breaks, the relative con-
tribution of public funding to private R&D activities still remains very low
(Goto and Wakasugi 1988).
Altogether, aggregated statistics of national R&D spending indicate
that though Japan’s overall R&D intensity reached a very high level
throughout the last decades, the role of governmental R&D has generally
been lower, and public subsidies for private R&D activities were particu-
larly small. These findings contradict the widespread belief that govern-
mental funding of collaborative R&D efforts in the manufacturing sector
is more important in Japan than in other countries.
A more detailed look at the structure of the relatively small govern-
mental funds which were spent for the support of private R&D efforts
directly shows that a major part was actually used for the financing of
collaborative R&D projects. In Japan the support for this kind of projects
was channelled within the frame of the Act on Technological Research
Associations in Mining and Manufacturing (Kokogyo gijutsu kenkyu
kumiai-ho), which was enacted in 1961. Under this act, private firms’
limited-term R&D collaborations can be supported by the government.
A closer examination of the more than 100 research associations which
were founded under this Act until 1990 (Kokogyo Gijutsu Kenkyu Kumiai
Kondankai 1991), shows that in most cases, more than half of the total
R&D expenditures were financed by the government. Accordingly, most
of the associations apparently were founded in order to gain access to
R&D subsidies. This view is also supported by the observation that no
joint R&D laboratories were established in the overwhelming majority of
cases. Instead, R&D activities were divided between the participating
firms (Goto 1997).
An important feature of the Japanese R&D consortia, which were
built in this context, is their semi-private character. There was no right or
guarantee for a company to become a member of a research association
only because it was willing to participate. In reality, the ministries guiding
the associations often tend to pick the technologically strongest firms
within an industry, in order to enhance the diffusion of knowledge
between these firms and to improve their competitiveness as a whole. The
most prominent cases of publicly supported research consortia in Japan
were the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) and the Fifth Generation
Computer Systems projects which were organized under the guidance of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (Callon 1995;
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Odagiri et al. 1997). As a result of the dominance of such projects,
governmental R&D subsidies were primarily granted to the largest firms
in each industry, whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
have been effectively precluded from access to governmental funding of
their R&D activities.
In sum, the direct support for business sector R&D by the Japanese
government was (a) comparatively small in its total amount, (b) primarily
diffusion-oriented and (c) predominantly directed at large firms. At least
concerning the last aspect, there is a strong difference to the approach in
some Western countries. In Germany, the United Kingdom and on EU
level, there are also explicit, institutionalized programmes for the support
of collaborative R&D. In contrast to Japan, however, these programmes
are not dominated by large firms. Some of them are, on the opposite,
primarily aimed at the enhancement of the technological capabilities of
SMEs (Callon 1995; Ray 1998; AiF 2002).
Another important field of science and technology policy is the setup
and the funding of governmental research institutions. The maintenance of
such publicly financed R&D infrastructure is regarded as necessary in
fields like basic research, where the incentives for enterprises to conduct
R&D activities of their own, are insufficient. The companies’ technologi-
cal competitiveness is strengthened through access to the knowledge
governmental R&D laboratories and universities possess.
Japanese R&D statistics distinguish between three types of publicly
financed R&D organizations: (1) central government research institutions
which are subordinated to specific federal ministries, (2) other public
research institutions which are mainly positioned on the prefectural level
and (3) so-called ‘special corporations’ (tokushu hojin). The data in
Table 3.1, which show the situation in 2001, also reflect the structure of
governmental R&D institutions throughout the previous decades quite
accurately since there has been relatively little change in their number and
size. The special corporations are fewest in number, but largest in average
size and therefore account for a substantial part of public R&D infra-
structure in Japan. They include such renowned organizations as the
Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN). These institutions
have a relatively good reputation which is rooted in their comparatively
high organizational flexibility. The rigid rules of employment and internal
governance of the public sector do not fully apply to them, although they
are predominantly financed by the government.
On average the central government R&D laboratories are much smaller
than the special corporations, but many of them still have a considerable
size. They mostly aim at conducting basic research in specific technolog-
ical fields. Due to their bureaucratic governance, however, their produc-
tivity is assessed as being relatively low (Kusunoki 1998). The efficiency
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and effectiveness of their research efforts appear to be hampered by
internal and external communication barriers which stem from their
hierarchical structure and from the life-long employment of their whole
research staff.
The institutes at prefectural level are much more numerous but also
much smaller in size. Many of them seem to function as technology trans-
fer offices at the local level rather than organizations which conduct
generic research activities of their own.
Due to the very diverse institutional structure of governmental research
institutions which are located in different countries, it is not easy to make
international comparisons in this field. The total number of employees in
public research institutions in Germany, however, was slightly higher than
in Japan at the beginning of the 1990s (Hemmert 1996). This is remark-
able, considering the much larger size of the Japanese economy in relation
to the German economy. It indicates that, at least when compared with
Germany, the investment of the Japanese government in public R&D
infrastructure is not particularly high. Furthermore, an international
comparison of R&D expenditures per researcher in government laborato-
ries in the early 1990s (Barker 1998) showed that the expenditure per
capita is slightly higher in Japan than in Germany, but much lower than in
the United States, France or the United Kingdom. This also suggests
that the level of governmental funding of R&D institutions is relatively
low in Japan.
Another potentially important source of technological knowledge for
the business sector is the results of R&D activities conducted by universi-
ties. The institutional conditions for these activities are strongly
determined by the government. This particularly applies to Japan where
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Table 3.1 Number and size of publicly financed R&D institutes in
Japan
Number of Number of Average number
institutes employees of employees
per institute




Public research 549 31.066 56.6
institutions
Special 12 16.321 1360.1
corporations
Total 632 78.081 123.5
Source: Somusho Tokeikyoku (2002).
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the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (MESC) has a
strong influence on the financing and organization, not only of the public
universities, but also of the private universities, which are partially funded
by the government as well.
An international comparison of average R&D expenditures per
researcher at universities (Barker 1998) shows that the differences
between Japan and the leading Western countries are even more pro-
nounced here than in government laboratories. The average per capita
expenditure of Japanese universities amounts to only one-third of their US
counterparts’ spending and is also much lower than in Germany, France or
the United Kingdom. This indicates a relatively low level of governmen-
tal spending for R&D activities at universities. Moreover, R&D funds tend
to be distributed evenly and thinly among university departments and
chairs. As a result, each chair with its limited staff and funds often lacks
the critical mass to conduct cutting-edge research.
The efficiency of R&D activities at Japanese universities is further
hampered by an internal structure which is often described as hierarchical
and inflexible. Professors are regularly employed for most of their profes-
sional life by the universities from which they graduated, and often there
is little or no cooperation between different universities and departments.
Moreover, the degree of internationalization is very low. Foreigners
accounted for less than 1 per cent of the faculty staff at Japanese national
universities in the 1990s (Barker 1996). The involvement in international
collaborative research projects was also relatively low.
As a result of their often inadequate funding and their internal gover-
nance problems, both universities and government laboratories were not
regarded as competent partners for knowledge generation by many firms
in Japan. In Figure 3.1, the average assessment of factors related to exter-
nal knowledge for the technology acquisition of German and Japanese
pharmaceutical and semiconductor firms, which were given by the firms’
R&D managers in 1999, are depicted. Both the technological level of and
the conditions for cooperating with university and non-university research
institutions were evaluated as significantly better by German R&D man-
agers than by their Japanese colleagues.
Finally, the organization and attitude of the bureaucracy which admin-
istrates the science and technology policy may also be taken into account
when comparing Japan with other industrialized countries. One important
aspect in this area is patent policy and administration. The patent sys-
tem generally pursues two goals which are potentially controversial: the
enhancement of innovative activity by protecting intellectual property
rights and the diffusion of technological knowledge by publishing patents.
A comparative evaluation of the Japanese patent administration at the
beginning of the 1990s (Ernst et al. 1993) revealed a clear priority of the
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diffusion of knowledge. First, the technological coverage of patents was
interpreted more narrowly than in other countries, thereby giving imitators
good opportunities to invent around existing patents. Second, a patent
application was costlier in Japan than in other countries. Third, a slow
administrative process and the opportunity for outsiders to file opposition
to patents before they were actually granted, further weakened the position
of inventors vis-à-vis potential imitators. A further peculiarity of the
Japanese patent system, which potentially lowers the value of patents, is
the disclosure of all patents 18 months after their filing, even if they have
not been granted yet (Okada and Asaba 1997).
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Figure 3.1 Assessment of the impact of factors related to external knowledge on the
technology acquisition of pharmaceutical and semiconductor firms.
Source: Author’s composition.
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Another feature which is typical for the Japanese bureaucracy is the
setup of numerous councils (shingikai) which are meant to give bureau-
crats access to expert knowledge from universities, research institutions
and the business sector (Hemmert 1996). The frequent use of such
councils apparently fosters the diffusion of knowledge between different
organizations and parts of the innovation system.
As a final aspect, the competence structure for science and technology
policy on the central government level was relatively fragmented in Japan
until recently. In other leading countries, this policy field is highly con-
centrated in one administrative body like the Department of Defence
(DoD) in the United States or the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF) in Germany. In contrast, Japanese science and technol-
ogy policy used to be administered by a large number of Ministries and
Agencies which included at least three main actors: the Science and
Technology Agency (STA), MESC and MITI. Whereas each of these
Ministries was initially responsible for different fields of policy, all of
them were strongly engaged in common themes related to science and
technology. As a result, many of their programmes overlapped and were
competing with each other.
The preceding comparative review of Japanese science and technology
policy has shown that, at least until the early 1990s, there were significant
differences to other major countries in many respects. The main findings
may be summarized in the following points:
1 the volume of governmental subsidies for business R&D was small;
2 the promotion of business R&D focused on large firms;
3 the investment in governmental and university research organizations
was low;
4 the governance of public research institutions and universities was
bureaucratic and inflexible;
5 there was little interdisciplinary and international knowledge transfer
in the science system;
6 the governmental science and technology policy programmes were
dispersed between several ministries;
7 there was no strong focus on particular fields of science and
technology;
8 science and technology policy was highly diffusion oriented (and not
innovation oriented).
This overview clearly exhibits the need for a reorientation in science
and technology policy in order to increase the competitiveness of the
Japanese innovation system. In many respects, the Japanese science and
technology policy appears to have been designed for a ‘catch-up’ and not
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for a ‘frontrunner’ innovation system. Instruments for supporting R&D
activities and innovations by SMEs were given a particularly low priority.
Whereas this catch-up oriented policy may have fitted the needs of the
country’s innovation system quite well in the decades after the Second
World War, it seems to have become increasingly outdated since the
1980s, when considering the fact that Japan has become one of the tech-
nologically leading countries worldwide.
Subsequently, the various restructurization measures regarding these
issues, which are being implemented since the mid-1990s, will be
analysed. It is shown that Japanese science and technology policy has been
changing substantially towards giving the generation of cutting-edge inno-
vations in general and SMEs’ R&D activities in particular stronger support.
The recent transition of Japanese science and
technology policy
The science and technology basic law and plans
On November 15, 1995, the Science and Technology Basic Law (Kagaku
Gijutsu Kihon-Ho) was enacted by the Japanese diet. Among other issues,
this law required the government to elaborate a five-year plan for the
further development of the nation’s science and technology system. As
a consequence, the Japanese cabinet approved the first Science and
Technology Basic Plan (Kagaku Gijutsu Kihon Keikaku) on June 2, 1996.
When it was released to the public, the plan received high attention,
primarily because it intended a doubling of the government’s science and
technology budget until 2000, compared to 1992. Along with this issue,
however, it also called for a reform of the Japanese science and technol-
ogy system in a broader sense. The following aspects were particularly
emphasized:
● more government aid for the work of young researchers;
● more joint industry–university–government R&D;
● more international exchange in science and technology;
● more R&D spending.
A second Basic Plan was approved by the cabinet on March 30, 2001
(Monbu Kagakusho 2002a). This plan calls for
● a further increase of the total R&D intensity to 3.5 per cent of GDP
and of governmental R&D expenditures to 1 per cent of GDP;
● a higher efficiency of R&D spending with a focus on life sciences, IT,
environmental research, nanotechnology and material sciences;
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● a strengthening of the interface between R&D, education, the science
base and society;
● a more active role in international science and technology cooperation;
● an internationalization of the domestic research system.
These programmes apparently address most of the weaknesses of
the Japanese science and technology system, which were identified ear-
lier. This suggests that they mark a major turning point in Japanese sci-
ence and technology policy. A comparison of the Basic Law and Plans
with their predecessors, the eleventh and eighteenth recommendations of
the Council for Science and Technology from 1984 and 1992, shows, how-
ever, that basically the same programmatic goals had been set before
(Hemmert and Oberländer 1998). This indicates that there is a high degree
of continuity in the governmental agenda for science and technology.
The truly new aspect of the recent programmes for science and tech-
nology policy, particularly the Basic Law, probably lies more in the pre-
ceding policy process that finally resulted in their enactment than in their
actual contents. The Science and Technology Basic Law was enacted due
to the initiative of a multiparty group of diet members with very diverse
backgrounds under the leadership of a former MITI bureaucrat (NSF
Tokyo Office 1996). This is highly unusual in Japan where legislation is
normally put forward by the government bureaucracy and therefore the
incident strongly suggests the formation of a broad consensus among
Japanese policy makers that structural reforms in the science and technol-
ogy system had become an urgent task for preserving and enhancing the
nation’s international competitiveness.
In sum, whereas the agenda of Japanese science and technology policy
has not changed a great deal in recent years, there are signs of an increased
readiness and seriousness to implement the proposed policies. Subse-
quently, the concrete measures which have been taken since the mid-1990s
in order to address the need for structural reforms, will be discussed.
Increases in R&D spending
As a starting point for an analysis of the recent development in Japanese
science and technology policy, some aggregated statistical data are
reviewed (Figure 3.2). The R&D intensity in Japan, which had already
been considerably higher than that of the other leading countries before,
started to rise again from the mid-1990s, after some years of stagnation.
In all Western countries, in contrast, it declined in the last decade,
although a partial recovery occurred in the United States and in
Germany in the last few years. This indicates that the steady increase of
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R&D intensity in Japan is a rather exceptional trend among the leading
industrialized countries.
The difference between Japan and the leading Western countries
becomes even more pronounced, however, when the comparison is
focused on public R&D spending (Figure 3.3). In the United States, as













Figure 3.2 R&D intensity in five leading countries.
Source: Monbu Kagakusho (2004).
Note

















Figure 3.3 Intensity of public R&D spending in five leading countries.
Source: Monbu Kagakusho (2004).
Note
Intensity of public R&D spending  public R&D spending/GDP.
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well as in the Western European countries, the intensity of public R&D
spending declined steadily and substantially throughout the 1990s. In
Japan, in contrast, a considerable increase can be observed. The intensity
of public R&D spending in Japan is still quite distant from the 1 per cent
goal, which was set in the most recent Basic Plan. In recent years,
however, none of the Western countries have even come close to this
level either.
Altogether, Japanese R&D intensity in general and the intensity of
public R&D spending in particular increased throughout the 1990s and
thereby Japan is a clear exception to a global trend of declining, or at best
stagnating, R&D intensities. Thus, aggregated R&D data indicate that the
goal of a (relative) increase in R&D spending, set by Japanese policy-
makers, was clearly fulfilled despite a harsh macroeconomic environment
in Japan. Moreover, Japan is the only leading country where such an
increase has been achieved recently, although the other countries were
also struggling for an increase in R&D spending, due to intensifying
international competition in many industries.
Government support for business R&D
A feature which was identified as being typical for Japan above is the very
low level of direct financial support for private R&D activities by the
government. Concerning this aspect, a slight increase could be observed in
the 1990s. However, as recently as 2004, the proportion of total private
R&D spending, financed by the government, amounted to only 1.4 per cent
(Somusho Tokeikyoku 2004), indicating that the overall importance of
net transfers of R&D budgets from the public to the private sector is still
very low.1
The remaining question is whether a qualitative change in the focus of
government support for R&D activities in the business sector has taken
place. On the one hand, the support system for R&D consortia, primarily
formed by large manufacturing firms (Technological Research Associations
in Mining and Manufacturing), that had been dominating this policy field
for decades, is still in effect. According to a recent report by the National
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), 26 out of
113 limited-term research associations, administered by MITI since the
1960s, are still active (AIST 2002).
On the other hand, however, a new system which is directed specifically
at supporting SMEs’ R&D activities (and in particular venture businesses)
was established by the Japanese government in 1998. Under the so-called
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) system, 11 billion yen were
budgeted in the fiscal year 1999, the first year of its operation. Since then,
the amount of resources allocated to this system has been increasing.
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For the fiscal year 2004, its budget was increased to 28 billion yen
(Monbu Kagakusho 2004). This is equivalent to about 17 per cent of the
overall governmental funding of private R&D activities. Moreover, a
system of special tax breaks for start-up companies was also introduced in
2002 (Odagiri 2004).
In summary, whereas the absolute amount of direct governmental sup-
port for SMEs is still modest in Japan; its relative importance is rapidly
increasing. The fact that a system for the support of R&D activities in
such firms has been established in Japan is remarkable in itself. The recent
development indicates that the one-sided focus on the support of large
firms, which had been dominating Japanese science and technology pol-
icy, has changed to a more balanced approach which supports SMEs’
R&D activities as well as large firms’, within the frame of a relatively
small total budget for R&D subsidies.
Reorganization of governmental research institutions
The governance of public research institutions in Japan, which has
remained almost unchanged for decades with its triangular structure of
(1) a few ‘special corporations’, (2) some governmental institutes which
are attached to the central government bureaucracy and (3) a large num-
ber of smaller institutes on the prefectural level, has been undergoing
major reorganization in recent years. The ‘special corporations’ as well
as the majority of the central government laboratories have been reorga-
nized to become ‘independent administrative bodies’ (dokuritsu gyosei
hojin) since 2003, with the aim of giving them and their staff a greater
administrative flexibility (NISTEP/MRI 2004a).
Furthermore, there have been efforts under way since the 1980s to build
more flexible, project based research organizations in addition to the
traditional government laboratories. Exploratory Research for Advanced
Technology (ERATO) is probably the most prominent case among these
new types of research organizations. It widely received very positive
evaluations (Barker 1998; Kusunoki 1998).
Another more recent approach to increase the flexibility of these
laboratories is the introduction of limited-term contracts for R&D per-
sonnel. The possibility of employing researchers in government labora-
tories on limited terms was opened up by the Japanese government in
1997. Two such types of new contracts were provided: one for very
renowned senior researchers, (shohei-gata) and one for promising young
researchers (wakate kyoiku-gata). Remarkably, the new contract types are
primarily directed at attracting top researchers to government laboratories,
and not at the possibility of laying them off in case of unsatisfactory
performance.
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The statistics on the number of researchers, who have been hired by
government laboratories on limited-term contracts (Figure 3.4), clearly
indicate that the proliferation of these new contract types is rapidly
increasing. A recent analysis of the relative importance of the new contract
system revealed that in January 2004, 5.6 per cent of the research staff in
government laboratories was working under one of the new contract types,
suggesting that the overall importance of the new contract system is
still limited. In the age group between 26 and 30 years, however, the
researchers with limited-term contracts already amounted to 16.8 per cent
of the total staff (NISTEP/MRI 2004a).
Simultaneously, the law for the employment of university teachers was
amended in 1998 in order to allow limited-term contracts for lecturers and
professors as well. At the universities, the new employment system is
gaining momentum faster than in the government laboratories, with the
number of university teachers, who are employed on limited terms,
jumping from 624 in October 2000 to 5248 in October 2002 (Monbu
Kagakusho 2004). This compares with a total number of about 150,000
university teachers in Japan. Currently national universities account for
more than half of the limited-term employment.
In sum, despite its still low share of total employment in government
laboratories and national universities, the use of limited-term contracts for
researchers and professors is rapidly gaining significance in Japan. This
indicates a serious commitment to increase flexibility in the governance of
























Figure 3.4 Number of researchers employed on limited-term contracts in Japanese
government laboratories.
Source: Monbu Kagakusho (2004 and earlier editions).
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Knowledge transfer from universities and 
government laboratories to firms
Another field of the Japanese innovation system where the need for major
reforms has been indicated, is collaborative R&D between research insti-
tutions, universities and business firms which enhances technology
transfer from the public to the private sector. According to some recent
statistics (Figure 3.5), the number of collaborative research projects
between national universities and the private sector has been rapidly
increasing in the last few years.
These statistics have to be interpreted with some caution because of the
possibility that some collaborative projects which already existed before,
may have only been officially reported recently, due to the government
administration’s more positive attitude towards such activities. Therefore,
the real increase in collaborative R&D activity is probably lower. Never-
theless, the data strongly suggest that collaborative R&D and technology
transfer from the public to the private sector have gained importance in
Japan. This view is also supported by the results of a questionnaire survey
of about 1,000 Japanese venture businesses in 1998. According to this
survey, 10.9 per cent of the firms were engaged in collaborative R&D pro-
jects with government laboratories, and 19.7 per cent in projects with
national universities (Sakakibara et al. 1999). This suggests that collabo-
rative R&D between government laboratories, universities and companies
is about to become a normal phenomenon.
This development has been supported by an increasing number of
side-business allowances for professors (Monbu Kagakusho 2002a) which
indicate a relaxation of the administrative practice on this issue.
Moreover, 36 technology licensing offices (TLOs) have been set up in
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Figure 3.5 Number of collaborative research projects between national universities
and the business sector in Japan.
Source: Monbu Kagakusho (2004).
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universities to enhance the transfer of technology from universities to the
business sector (Monbu Kagakusho 2004).
Figure 3.6 shows the development of the number of new venture
businesses, originating from universities and government laboratories
each year. Whereas such academia-rooted venture businesses were almost
inexistent only a decade ago, the number of start-ups from universities has
been rapidly increasing during the last years. Compared with the overall
size of the Japanese economy, their number is still miniscule. However,
the recent increase is a sign that the combination of various policies, such
as special support programmes for venture businesses and the enhance-
ment of research collaboration between universities and companies, is
bearing some fruit.
Internationalization
The level of internationalization in Japanese science and technology,
which was indicated as being relatively low, is also certainly increasing.
The number of Japanese researchers who are sent abroad and foreign
researchers who are invited to Japan on the base of government-sponsored
fellowships, rises every year (Monbu Kagakusho 2002a). The number of
foreign university teachers in Japan amounted to 5,038 in 2000 and
thereby accounted for 3.3 per cent of the total staff. The corresponding
numbers were 3,554 and 2.6 per cent in 1994 (Monbu Kagakusho 2002b
and earlier editions). In a more recent analysis, the number of regularly
employed foreigners was estimated to amount to about 1 per cent of the



















Figure 3.6 Number of newly founded venture businesses originating from universi-
ties and government laboratories.
Source: NISTEP/MRI (2004b).
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(NISTEP/MRI 2004a). These data indicate an increasing internationaliza-
tion of the Japanese science system on the one hand. On the other hand,
the pace of this development is modest at best, resulting in a level of inter-
nationalization which is still low, compared to other leading countries.
Strengthening intellectual property rights
The practice of the Japanese patent administration in the last decades was
described earlier as being primarily diffusion oriented and less innovation
oriented. Concerning this issue, however, a certain reorientation already
occurred in the mid-1990s. The right to oppose patents before they are
granted has been removed, and the filing of patents has been made easier
and thereby less costly for applicants (Tokkyocho Somubu Somuka 1995).
More recently, the Japanese patent office has explicitly taken the stance of
a pro-patent legislation and administration. Additional measures have
been taken to strengthen the innovators’ position in the patent system
(Tokkyocho 2000, 2004):
● a strengthening of the administrative stance of inventors filing patent
violation claims against imitators;
● a rise of the administrative fines for violators of the patent law;
● an increase of administrative resources for the settlement of patent
disputes;
● a further reduction of the administrative burden on patent applications
and a waiver of patent fees for up to 3 years for SMEs.
Furthermore, the patent administration emphasizes that it is working on
a reduction of processing time for pending patent applications. The aver-
age time required between a patent application and a ‘first action’ of the
patent administration, however, recently increased from 19 months in
1999 to 22 months in 2001 to 25 months in 2003 (Tokkyocho 2004 and
earlier editions). In the United States, the corresponding average waiting
time was 14.4 months in 2001 and 18.4 months in 2003 (US Patent and
Trademark Office 2004). These data indicate that whereas the processing
times for patent applications appear to have been lengthening globally in
recent years, there is still room for improvement, as regards the efficiency
of the Japanese patent administration.
In 2002, the Basic Law on Intellectual Property (chiteki zaisan kihon-
ho) was passed by the Japanese diet. Whereas only a few concrete mea-
sures, such as the setup of an Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters in
the cabinet, are prescribed by this Law, it strongly symbolizes an increased
commitment by Japanese policy makers to care for the protection of
intellectual property. Only recently, the establishment of a special court
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for patent litigation within the Tokyo High Court was discussed. This
would improve the practical prospects for inventors who want to pursue
patent violations (Odagiri 2004).
Altogether, the recent track record strongly indicates that the Japanese
patent legislation and administration are working towards strengthening
the inventors’ position and thereby changed their earlier stance, which was
primarily diffusion oriented.
Reorganization of the government bureaucracy
A final issue, which can be expected to have a major impact on the
Japanese science and technology policy, is the merger of the Ministry of
Education, Science, Sports and Culture (MESC) with the Science and
Technology Agency (STA) to the new Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (Monbu Kagakusho or MEXT), which
took effect in January 2001 as part of a major reorganization of federal
ministries and government agencies (Monbu Kagakusho 2001). Whereas
this administrative merger was not conducted in the specific context of
science and technology policy, but in the wave of a total reorganization of
the Japanese government bureaucracy, it definitely marks the end of most
of the administrative fragmentation, which was outlined earlier as a fea-
ture of this policy field in Japan. The new ministry can be expected to
become as dominant here as the corresponding administrative bodies in
the major Western countries. While it remains to be seen how smooth the
post-merger realignment of science and technology policy on the lower
administrative level will be, at least the foundation for reducing the
inefficiencies and doubling of efforts, which were created by the former
administrative fragmentation, has been laid.
Overall evaluation
The previous discussion has shown that whereas the programmes for
Japanese science and technology policy, which have been put forward
since the 1990s, are not entirely new, the relevant actors have evidently
become more serious about their implementation than before. Govern-
mental R&D spending, as well as R&D spending in general, is substan-
tially increasing. The direct governmental support for companies’ R&D
activities, although still remaining on a low level, is gradually shifting
from a one-sided focus on large firms to the support of SMEs and venture
businesses. Considerable efforts have been made to increase the flexibil-
ity of government laboratories and universities. As a consequence, the
number of collaborative R&D projects between academia and industry is
increasing, leading the way for a more effective knowledge transfer from
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the former to the latter. The internationalization of Japanese science and
technology is also rising, albeit at a very modest pace. In the patent admin-
istration, a considerable shift towards a strengthening of the inventors’
position vis-à-vis imitators took place. Finally, the recent merger of two
major ministries bears the potential for a substantial increase in the
efficiency of science and technology policy administration.
In sum, the whole range of problems, which were outlined before as
hurdles for a better performance of the Japanese science and technology
system, has been seriously addressed, albeit with different intensities and
success in different areas. The continuous increase of governmental R&D
spending is particularly impressive when considering the serious financial
strains of the Japanese government budget since the 1990s. Moreover, as
regards policies to foster R&D activities in the business sector, a remark-
able shift of attention from large firms to SMEs, and particularly start-up
firms, has taken place. This policy shift has already resulted in a visible
increase in the number of venture businesses, although a gap to some of
the other leading countries, particularly the United States, still remains
(Odagiri 2004).
A recent study of Japanese biotechnology venture businesses (Odagiri
and Nakamura 2004) showed, however, that considerable problems still
remain for innovative small firms in the business environment. About half
of the surveyed firms quoted ‘procurement of capital’ and ‘recruiting of
research staff’ as major start-up hurdles. Despite all the recent changes,
R&D resources are still highly concentrated on large firms in Japan.
In the overall context of the Japanese innovation system, progress
appears to be comparatively slowest in the fields of the employment
system for researchers and the internationalization of the science and
technology system. Both observations are no surprise, since unlimited
employment for highly qualified workers has been a backbone of the
Japanese employment system for decades and the degree of international-
ization in the Japanese economy is generally lower than that of Western
countries. Long-term employment practices, as well as cultural and lan-
guage barriers, appear to be among the problems which are most difficult
to deal with when pursuing institutional change.
There can be no doubt, however, that, due to a major reorientation of
Japanese science and technology policy, the Japanese innovation system
in general has, to a considerable degree, been transformed from a ‘catch-
up’ system towards a ‘frontrunner’ system. Accordingly, a substantial
improvement of performance within the Japanese science and technology
system has already2 occurred, and this development may well continue in
the future, unless the institutional transformation is stopped. Time was
when Japan was famous as an imitator and not as a producer and supplier
of scientific and technological knowledge.
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Conclusion
From a Western perspective, two major conclusions can be drawn from the
analysis of the transition of Japanese science and technology policy. First,
the international technological competitiveness of Japanese companies,
which has been lagging behind in the last decade due to weaknesses in the
domestic innovation system, can be expected to improve again in the com-
ing years. The institutional environment, which firms are embedded in, is
certainly not the only, but a very important determining factor of their
technological competitiveness.3 Moreover, a significant time lag may
occur between institutional changes in upstream science and technology
system and the outcome of these changes in terms of competitive perfor-
mance of enterprises on the market. In other words, the benefits of the
transition of the Japanese science and technology system, which has
already taken place, may only be seen to their full extent on the market in
the course of time. Therefore, Western firms should not underestimate the
future technological competitiveness of their Japanese rivals.
Second, Japan now appears as a potentially more attractive partner for
international collaboration in science and technology than in the past. This
applies to collaborative research between universities and research insti-
tutions as well as to companies’ R&D activities. One reason for this is the
improvement in the Japanese science and technology system which trans-
lates into higher competencies of Japanese R&D laboratories and better
conditions for conducting R&D activities of one’s own in Japan. Another
reason is the strong interest in international exchange, shown by many
Japanese individuals and organizations. Since the internationalization of
the science and technology system is still relatively low, there is a wide-
spread interest in Japan to intensify international collaboration in this
field. Moreover, due to the increased competencies of Japanese R&D
organizations in many technological fields, the danger of being milked by
Japanese partners one-sidedly in the course of collaborative R&D should
not be as immediate nowadays as perceived by many Westerners in former
decades.
Notes
1 This proportion becomes even lower when excluding the governmental transfers to
the ‘special corporations’ which are treated as part of the private sector in the
statistics, but are predominantly financed by the government. The part of R&D
spending of private firms (in a narrow sense), which is publicly financed, amounted
to only 1.1 per cent in 2004, almost unchanged, compared to the early 1990s
(Somusho Tokeikyoku 2004 and earlier editions).
2 As can be seen from the detailed discussion of performance indicators in the most
recent White Paper for Science and Technology, Japan’s position has been improv-
ing persistently in the last years regarding a wide range of indicators which include
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the production and citation of scientific papers, patent applications and grants, and
the international trade of technology (Monbu Kagakusho 2004).
3 For a detailed empirical analysis of the importance of various institutional factors for
the technology acquisition performance of high-tech firms, cf. Hemmert (2004).
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Introduction
Innovation is often considered to be the ‘elixir of life’ for production and
competitiveness. It is increasingly considered a phenomenon that requires
active intervention and steering. Almost every country runs some innova-
tion-related programmes targeted at stimulating or increasing the perfor-
mance level of innovation. These policy measures start at various levels:
companies, intra-organizational networks, regional or national level.
Alongside general policies, there are programmes dedicated to special
groups or innovators. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are
one such group that is gaining public interest. Especially in the field of
manufacturing, these small and medium companies play an important role
in the competitiveness of many (or most) industrialized countries. They
comprise the bulk of manufacturing establishments, generate a large
portion of employment in industry, and since they are often integrated
into the supply chains, they play an important role in the production of
quality goods. Thus, they contribute to maintain global competitiveness.
However, these small companies often suffer from shortages in capital,
financial and human resources as well as in managerial and technological
knowledge. These deficiencies often force them to work below the stan-
dards and market requirements. For decades, policy makers have been
aware of the problems and also seem willing to implement policy means
targeted at supporting the SMEs. In many countries this has led to the
establishment of technology transfer centres, which preferably offer their
services to small and medium-sized companies. Two of these countries –
Japan and the United States – are the subjects of this chapter’s analysis.
When considering changes in global competition (not only goods and
labour markets, but also production sites), we can observe a general ten-
dency towards an increase of knowledge-based or knowledge-driven
production. The shift of production and innovation into new technological
fields like biotechnology might serve as an example for these new
4 Innovation policy for 
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centres
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developments, which delineate an enormous challenge to the traditional
patterns of SME operation in production and innovation. It is commonly
assumed that the SMEs’ innovation style is more small-scale and incremen-
tal rather than radical or ‘game changing’, but there are some objections to
this view e.g. by Rothwell (1983, 1992). He suggests that in innovation nei-
ther large nor small companies have any significant advantages over each
other. Advantages tend to come from the input, capabilities and compe-
tences that individuals bring to the organization, rather than from tangible
resources. Therefore, it is not the material resource scarcity of the very
small enterprises that is the crucial factor for their disadvantages, but
rather the skill, knowledge and competence that their people embody, that
is, their intangible resources. The findings presented in this chapter will
help to evaluate the role of tangible and intangible resources for the cre-
ation of innovation competence in SMEs, by considering the different
institutional settings, differences in the innovation policies etc., which in
the terminology of the underlying research approach of this chapter is
equivalent to saying: differences in their industrial cultures.
Through the industrial culture approach, this section of the book picks
up the thread of the introduction to this volume, which indicates the prob-
lem of path dependencies and the problem of embeddedness and mutual
interaction of institutions, which impede cross-cultural learning
processes. If the assumption that the institutions of an economy are com-
plementary on a systems level is true, the crucial point when changing sin-
gle institutions is the adaptation of these improvements to the system in
order to maintain the overall coherence. This is precisely what the com-
parison in this chapter is looking at: how the United States borrowed and
adapted components of a successful innovation system to meet their spe-
cific needs. Obviously, answering this question, at the same time helps to
assess how and under which circumstances Germany can borrow from the
US and Japanese experiences with technology transfer centres for SMEs.
Eventually, this chapter addresses the issue of weak institutional ties
between universities and SMEs in Japan, raised in the introduction.
Though public research and development centres are at the heart of
the analysis rather than universities, these nevertheless contribute to the
implementation of a triple helix structure (Leydesdorff 2000) of state,
industry and university collaboration in Japan – and thus may help to
overcome the traditional weaknesses.1
Research questions and empirical cases:
relevance and scope
Without major doubts, it can be assumed that SMEs have become more
important since production systems worldwide were transformed from
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Fordist into post-Fordist or from mass production towards flexibly
specialized production (Piore and Sabel 1984; Womack et al. 1992; Cook
1999; Boyer and Freyssenet 2000). The new forms of social organization
in production, accompanying these transformations were characterized by
● an increase of outsourcing,
● a restructuring of supply chains,
● generally, a disassembly of larger companies into smaller units.
These trends affected SMEs insofar as that through outsourcing and an
increased integration of suppliers into the production and innovation
processes, they became more important, but were not always able to meet
these new requirements (Szarka 1990; Storz 2000).
Nowadays it seems even more difficult for SMEs to keep pace with the
developments and derived challenges: in a technological respect, it
requires a lot of competencies and accumulated skills and know-how to
meet the needs for highly sophisticated technology in advanced produc-
tion systems. On the other hand, SMEs ‘traditionally’ are short of man-
agerial knowledge, know-how in organization and of course, financial
resources (SMEA 2001).
In the case of Japan, these factors, eventually, make up the framework
for innovation and technology policy. While the task of transferring tech-
nological knowledge to the deficient SMEs was done extremely well by
technology transfer centres during the last decades, since the mid-1990s
these centres and thus this model of support find themselves in a crisis,
because the requirements of contemporary production and innovation
have changed and have increasingly become more ambitious. In the case
of post-war Japan, this development is synonymous with the incremental
shift from a catching-up towards a knowledge-creating economy (Kodama
1995). During the former stage, the major obstacle to economic success
(especially of SMEs) was the availability of production and innovation
knowledge, in the latter phase, how to generate (technological) knowledge
becomes crucial for economic success.
These changes can be observed in many countries (and some evidence
has been gathered in this book). Thus it can be assumed that there is a par-
adigm shift taking place, a shift from diffusion-oriented policy towards a
policy of innovation support and innovation enabling. The main outcome
of this policy change is a new structure of interorganizational cooperation
and an improvement of the performance level of SMEs, the supply chains,
as well as regional and national production and innovation systems.
Supporting SMEs through policy measures is a common practice in
many countries. However, it is subject to dispute whether the measures
preferred in the past are still appropriate or if a new orientation is needed,
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and if the latter is accepted, which shall be the new goals and new means
for an SME support policy. Since there are well known examples to be
found in countries such as Japan and the United States, a research project
comparing both countries was established in 1999.2 During a three-year
period, three waves of empirical investigation in the US and Japan were
conducted. The major goal was to trace the changes in the SME support
policies in both countries. The objects of research were technology trans-
fer centres in both countries which offer their services preferably (or
exclusively) to SMEs; in the United States, these nationwide centres were
run with the assistance of the Manufacturing Extension Partnership
(MEP) programme administered by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and funded by the Department of Commerce. The
kôsetsushi3 acting as technology transfer centres all over Japan are taking
a similar approach to their US ‘counterpart’, and common for both coun-
try cases is that the transfer centres are in transitory phases, which is
mainly induced by the challenges of globalization to which even the SMEs
feel themselves increasingly exposed. These transitions were the core sub-
ject of the research conducted. Details on the strategies to cope with the
changing situations will be given in subsequent sections of this report.
Some short remarks on sampling
The research concept basically complied with the principles of cross val-
idation; therefore the research design strived for methodological and
investigator triangulation (cf. Denzin 1989; Denzin and Lincoln 1994).
The core empirical research was based upon semi-structured interviews,
which were conducted in the respective native languages and carried out
in mixed teams (whenever possible). Additionally, participant observation
was taken into account. The average duration of the interviews was about
two hours.
The fieldwork in Japan was made up of three sequential steps. On the
first go, which was meant to open up the field and to provide some first
cases, 12 experts of universities and ministries were interviewed and six
kôsetsushi centres were visited. The second round produced a second
Japanese sub-sample, covering five kôsetsushi centres and one subsidiary
(in each case, interviews with the directors and one or two advisors, and
in three cases, additional accompanying advisors to client companies),
14 client companies (interviews with presidents/owners or general man-
agers), interviews with researchers (2) and experts from the prefecture
administrations (2) and SMEA/METI (2).
Furthermore, the results of an empirical survey conducted during
1999/2000 by the author on Japanese SMEs and their cooperation with
each other and with universities/research institutes were useful as
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additional empirical backing. Finally, in a third stage the Japanese
research partners of both projects conducted a follow-up in 2002 with
selected kôsetsushi and some particular SMEs, and integrated the results
into this report.
The sample taken in the United States is comprised of four MEP cen-
tres (in each case, interviews with the directors and one or two advisors),
two MEP locations (field offices), two client companies (interviews with
the general managers), two consultants collaborating with MEP centres,
one SME support centre not funded by the MEP programme and inter-
views with researchers (four) and independent consultants (two).4
Since an international comparative research approach is truly challenging
and brings up some serious methodological questions as well as questions
concerning the contents, some considerations regarding the underlying
research framework concept will be discussed before the comparative
analyses and evaluations can be developed. The institutions and actors,
developed under the concept of industrial culture, were the basis of
empirical research (Ruth 1996). If industrial culture is used as a frame-
work for empirical research, methodological issues must be considered.
Since these are of particular importance for comparing Japanese phenom-
ena with similar patterns in the United States, the following section on
the framework of research will address the difficulties with international
comparisons.
Theoretical framework
Various theoretical and empirical approaches have pointed out the signif-
icance of SMEs for innovation and innovation systems (Whittaker 1997;
Storz 2000; Shapira 2001; Lindman 2002). Particularly the research
approaches focusing on regional economies and regional innovation net-
works emphasize the increasing importance of SMEs in emerging
regional innovation systems (Heidenreich 1997; Braczyk et al. 1998;
Cook 1999; Hassink 2000; Doloreux 2002; Kitagawa 2004). The common
assumption of these concepts lies in the idea that SMEs’ role in economy
is changing from dependent actors in supplier chains towards pro-active
players within innovation networks. Plenty of research has provided
examples of successful regions, which heavily rely on SMEs as important
actors of equal value, e.g. Silicon Valley, Baden-Württemberg or Tuscany
(many examples given in Braczyk et al. 1998). But despite the success
stories of certain regions’ outstanding economic performance, founded
upon SMEs, only a limited number of SMEs can keep up with the pace
and scope of innovation nowadays. A considerable number of SMEs
are characterized by structural deficiencies in comparison to large com-
panies. Thus in many countries, governments have initiated policy support
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structures, which aim particularly at the small companies. At the same
time many efforts have been made to support small companies at the
regional and municipal level by developing local infrastructure and
improving economic performance.
These efforts can be analyzed as a means of contributing to regional
innovation systems or economic milieus (Camagni 1995), but they can
also be interpreted in terms of innovation actor networks (Latour 1999) or
institution-based and evolutionary innovation approaches. Following the
evolutionary concept, companies (or organizations) are learning organiza-
tions, which develop their input factors, particularly knowledge (technol-
ogy and processes etc.) by learning through their own or others’
experiences. Since the endogenous learning and knowledge creation capa-
bilities are limited, networking among companies and other innovators is
a means of developing innovation capabilities. Through this interaction,
the involved innovators can improve their competences, the networks can
develop a higher level of expertise, and eventually through their coopera-
tion, modify their (regional) innovative environments – or innovative
milieu or their regional innovation system. These inter-organizational rela-
tionships can take various forms regarding power or resource distribution
(Duschek 2004). Even though theory seems to favour heterarchic network
relationships (discussed as the mode two of knowledge production in
Gibbons et al. 1999; Nowotny et al. 2001), which are, besides others,
characterized by trust and high levels of reciprocity and reliability, hierar-
chic networks are widespread and not at all negligible. Eventually, both
network types contribute to and are simultaneously part of the regional
innovation systems. From a knowledge production perspective, state
policy, R&D (universities and research institutes) and industry are the
components of an institutional configuration labelled as the Triple Helix
of innovation in university–state–industry interaction (Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff 1998; Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 2001). Rather than assign-
ing basic and applied science to different institutional spheres, the Triple
Helix model emphasizes the increasing inter-relatedness of theoretical
and applied problem solving, which more and more requires boundary
crossing between the institutional actors. Thus, the formerly clearly distin-
guished university–state–industry actors are now crisscrossing: universities
are acting like companies and companies are increasingly resembling
universities (cf. Leonard 1998). As pointed out by Baber (2001), Japan
used to have a more clear-cut separation of the three institutions, compared
to many other societies. This affords an insight into why Japanese univer-
sities hardly conduct any applied research and why applied research and
development is placed at state/public supported technology transfer
centres. The conditions under which the Triple Helix is emerging in Japan
is the question backing all analyses presented in the following sections.
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The three sketched pillars of research in technological knowledge
production and dissemination (resource based approach to SMEs’ innova-
tion capabilities, regional innovation approach and the Mode 2/Triple Helix
concept towards knowledge production) are amalgamated in the industrial
culture approach (Rauner and Ruth 1990) which guided the empirical
research. Therefore the following paragraph will sketch the research
concept that was developed with the purpose of conducting international
comparisons on innovation subjects.
Industrial culture
The following paragraphs shall give some comparisons between Japan and
the United States. It is therefore useful to give some brief explanations of
the research concept on which these comparisons can be theoretically and
methodologically based: the industrial culture approach (Rauner and Ruth
1990; Ruth and Rauner 1996). For the purpose of international compar-
isons, an industrial culture is understood as a dynamic object which takes
shape on various interdependent levels: the macro or national level, the
meso or regional level, institutional or organizational level and last, but not
least, the micro or individual level. Thus, industrial culture is developed as
a multi-layer model of an ‘actor-driven institutionalist system approach’
towards innovation. This approach was designed for overcoming the innova-
tion systems approaches’ fallacy of an ‘institutionalist overdeterminination’
of innovative actors, that is, the failure to consider actors and their actions
as undetermined – though possibly bounded by various rationalities –
rather than determined by institutions. On the systems level, the industrial
culture approach further develops the concepts of National Innovation
Systems and their overemphasizing the forces of coherence being effec-
tive within national systems of innovation by reinforcing the ‘forces of
incoherence’, thus centrifugal forces (which interfere with economic equi-
librium). These conflicting forces form the basis of industrial cultures’
dynamism towards change. A continuing challenge to systems stability is
cross-cultural adoptions of single innovation factors that have attributed to
improvements of national innovation systems elsewhere in the global
economy. In progressing the argument, the effects of these ‘perturbations’
on the development of industrial cultures are further discussed later in this
section in terms of cross-cultural learning or borrowing as it took place in
the case of the kôsetsushi. The following interdependent dimensions have
been developed and proved to be significant constituents of industrial
cultures: social institutions (covering common cultural values and atti-
tudes as well as industrial relations, technical styles and role models etc.),
industrial organization (the structure and organization of industry or indus-
trial sectors), general and vocational education and training, industrial
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(and R&D) policy and last but not least, psychology. To sum it up, the
research concept of industrial culture is devised as a multi-layered, actor-
oriented approach, which means that (i) the relevant dimensions and their
operational variables are located at various societal levels and (ii) that
industrial culture is a coherent and dynamic system of mutually stabiliz-
ing dimensions, which as an integral complexity, serves as an action
orienting framework for individuals, groups, organizations, networks or
for regions and nations.
Since this chapter is committed to the concept of international compar-
ison rather than ‘point to point’ comparisons, it makes the context factors
themselves a subject of comparison, that is, the interaction or global
coherence between ‘text’ (which are the variables like technology transfer)
and ‘context’, that is, the structural, social and cultural background
(Grootings 1986). The guiding image for this approach is Geertz’ concept
of ‘thick descriptions’, which tries to make the meaning behind the
data/phenomena understandable, by working out the complex interdepen-
dency and intermingled overlay of phenomena (Geertz 1973). Thus, a
comprehensive description of the contexts under which the technology
transfer centres are acting is needed. As indicated in the heading of the
following section, it is not only policy but also cultural and social aspects,
which are addressed and utilized as the framing concept for comparative
interpretations.
Policy and culture contexts
In accordance with the insights of the preceding paragraphs and with this
chapter’s goal to compare innovation policy in Japan and the United States
it makes sense to consider the broader social, institutional and cultural
contexts that interact with policy actions. Since an international compari-
son always requires the construction of contextual knowledge in order to
conduct an appropriate comparison, it is necessary to provide information
on the contexts which some readers might not have. Thus, short sketches
of Japanese and US social, cultural and political peculiarities will be
worked out.
Japanese industrial organization, policy structure and
industrial culture
The most important structural characteristic of Japanese industry, and
particularly of the manufacturing sector, is the large portion of SMEs.
Evidently, this is true for almost all developed economies, but the
Japanese manufacturing sector shows a comparatively high amount of
very small enterprises (with 20 or less employees), which for decades
SME and technology transfer centres 63
SFAI-04.qxd  25/11/05  2:40 PM  Page 63
were the forerunners of a structure now labelled as supplier chains or
supplier networks.
By the re-definition in the most recent amendment of the ‘New Small
and Medium Enterprise Basic Law’ (1999) SMEs in manufacturing and
related industries (excluding wholesale, retail and service sectors) are
classified as employing 300 or less regular employees or with an invested
capital of 300 million yen or less (SMEA 2000). According to the 2000
census, the number of business establishments in the manufacturing sector
in 1999 was 689,194, of which 685,312 were small and medium-sized
companies. The number of small-scale companies, a sub-set of the SME
class, amounts to 584,365 establishments, which covers approximately
85 per cent of the SME category (JSBRI 2002).
These very small companies gained a doubtful reputation as the bottom
of the Japanese manufacturing sub-contracting system during the post-war
phase. Historically, small companies used to serve the local markets with
food, craft goods and services. But after the Second World War, in accor-
dance with Japan’s accelerated ‘catching up’ industrialization, the small
companies were gradually transformed into ‘servants’ in the supply chains
which were rapidly spreading out in the manufacturing sector in the 1960s
and 1970s (Storz 1997; Whittaker 1997). Though this seems to be an
acceptable description of the situation in the past, it is no longer adequate
for the 1990s. Most of the ‘subcontracting studies’ up to the 1990s perceive
small companies as passively obedient to their parent companies. But since
the burst of the bubble economy, most of the small and medium sized com-
panies follow a new policy of reducing their dependency to one single
major company. This striving for the reduction of financial risks is very
widespread among SMEs and, since it implies a reduction of collaboration
with major companies, it cuts off the formerly ‘direct and automatic’ access
to technological know-how from the large (parent) companies. Though
some SMEs were able to improve their position in innovation relationships
under the new policy of SMEs to diversify their customer bases, an increas-
ing number of small companies found it increasingly important to coop-
erate with other – preferably independent – sources of technological
expertise. Regarding the R&D cooperation preferences, there are some
pronounced differences between small and large enterprises’ behaviour.
While the majority of large manufacturing companies, which are engaged
in R&D, maintain cooperation with universities, the number of small and
medium companies cooperating with universities is much smaller (only
one-fifth of SMEs engaged in R&D activities). About a fourth of SMEs
doing R&D are not cooperating at all, while only 10 per cent of the large
companies do not cooperate with other organizations. The interviews con-
ducted with SME presidents disclose that for many of them the services
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provided by public or national research institutes do not match their needs.
The preferred cooperation partners of SMEs are other SMEs operating in
the same industry, and public research institutes (SMEA/JSBRI 2001).
Besides the voluntary networking among independent SMEs, the most
vital means of support in technology development and improving innova-
tion capabilities for SMEs are the public policy’s various initiatives to pro-
vide technological support as well as HRD and business improvements to
SMEs. The most important actors in these public support schemes are the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), particularly through its
Small and Medium sized Enterprise Agency (SMEA), furthermore, the
universities and public R&D institutes and laboratories, and, above all, the
public testing centres kôsetsushi. This chapter will focus its attention on
the latter.5 The following analyses and interpretations focus first and fore-
most on the public testing centres, that is, their services and relationships
to SMEs as well as their relationship to other innovation actors like uni-
versities and institutes and their contribution to a technology transfer
infrastructure (Hassink 1997). This is mainly because the kôsetsushi are a
Japan-wide network of regional support centres. Run under the auspices
of the prefectures they offer a variety of services to SMEs in all prefec-
tures of Japan. The services provided are especially tailored towards the
needs of the SMEs, which in particular means considering regional and
local peculiarities.
The social and cultural organization of innovation in 
US manufacturing
Still very often, the major insight of researchers analysing innovation or
technology transfer in the United States is that ‘America is a big country’.
This statement is used for justification of at least two difficulties in doing
research in the United States. First, it is undoubtedly very difficult to pro-
vide typical findings (not to mention statistical means). And second, in
empirical investigations the sample is almost never big enough to meet the
standards of representation and validation.
Keeping these general difficulties in mind, there are good reasons to
conduct a highly selective investigation on innovation policy addressing
SMEs in the US manufacturing sector.
Similarly to the Japanese case, the US economy also has a huge number
of SMEs operating in the manufacturing sector. The number is 362,829
establishments (US Census Bureau 2001 #709). It has to be considered
that small and medium-sized companies in the United States are defined
as those with fewer than 500 regular employees. Obviously this definition
does not match the Japanese classification, but the difference can be
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ignored since this report is not applying statistical procedures. Actually
the empirical findings in both countries show that the definitions are not
strictly followed in the transfer centres’ daily operations; and in both
countries the majority of client companies lie within the cluster of
100 employees or fewer.
In a general view, the US SMEs share the problems of their Japanese
‘partners’. The burning issue is the problem of under-capitalization and
above all the lack of (advanced) technological expertise and access to cut-
ting edge technological know-how. At first glance the technology transfer
and innovation support policy in the United States is facing pretty much
the same problems as the Japanese, and the implemented technology and
innovation policy is – superficially observed – very similar: a nation-wide
network of approximately 70 regionally embedded technology transfer
centres run under the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) pro-
gramme. Beside these centres, there is a variety of other organizations
providing similar services such as the NASA Technology Transfer
programme for SMEs, the Small Business Administration (SBA) and a
number of decentralized state activities/initiatives such as the Thomas
Edison Programme in Ohio.
The kôsetsushi centres in Japan6
All over Japan a network of approximately 170 public testing centres
(kôsetsushi) is operating in the field of technology transfer, advice,
enabling product innovation, networking and last but not least in provid-
ing testing facilities and services for small and medium-sized companies.7
The possible clients of these kôsetsushi preferably belong to the manufac-
turing industries. According to the 1999 Establishment and Enterprise
Census of Japan, the Japanese manufacturing industry is comprised of
689,194 establishments of which 3,882 are considered large enterprises.
This means that 99.4 per cent of all the enterprises in manufacturing are
small and medium-sized companies (the approximate number is 685,000).
Around 85 per cent of all enterprises can be assumed to be small-scale
establishments with less than 20 employees (quoted by JSBRI 2002).
There is a huge heterogeneity among these SMEs regarding their techno-
logical level, their market performance, their human resources structure
etc., which makes it difficult to assess their competitive performance and
thus the arising needs. But what remains without doubt is that there is a
considerable number of small enterprises with structural deficiencies in
the fields of technology, human resources or competitiveness.
Given that these deficiencies generate a ‘demand’ for services to
compensate and improve the performance level of small and medium-sized
companies, it is easy to understand that policy established a nation-wide
system/structure for technological support of SMEs. The above-mentioned
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public testing centres form such a structure. But it has to be considered
that many of these centres have a long history dating back to the early
twentieth century.8 At that time, a considerable number of centres were
founded, but many were first established as agricultural extension centres
and later on transformed into industrial centres. During the decades of the
last century a continuous flow of founding new establishments (sometimes
they were the result of mergers) was taking place. From the early days,
these centres were actually established and run by local prefectures or city
governments and were only supervised by METI’s (formerly MITI’s) Small
and Medium Enterprise Agency (SMEA). In general, the largest share of
the kôsetsushi funding is provided by the prefectures, a little is sponsored
by the METI and some income is attained through commissioned
services. The accumulated budget of all kôsetsushi in FY 1994 was about,
750 million dollars (Bass 1998) and according to various interviewees’
estimations surpassed the sum of 1,000 million dollars in FY 2003.
What remains to be stated – independent of assessing the financial
resources spent to establish and maintain the kôsetsushi system all over
Japan – is that during the last decades the kôsetsushi undoubtedly con-
tributed to the increase of single SMEs’ efficiency and, even more impor-
tant, the kôsetsushi system supports the improvement of Japan’s industrial
organization as a whole – and thus boosts Japan’s global competitiveness.
The kôsetsushis’ services
Today in Japan every prefecture maintains at least one kôsetsushi and
additionally there might be a limited number of subsidies, which generally
are located in or nearby industrial clusters within the prefecture. This sums
up to approximately 170 technology transfer centres over all prefectures in
Japan. Being located at arms’ length to the potential clients is the dedi-
cated policy of the kôsetsushi.
The service portfolio provided by the kôsetsushi is uniform and can be
understood as standardized, but regarding the contents tailored to the
regional peculiarities. In detail the services cover the following:
● Technical assistance. The centres respond to requests by SMEs, con-
tacting them via phone or personally (including factory site visits).
These inquiries can range between a three-minute phone call and a
consultation lasting several days. Generally the subjects are technical
matters, but beside the traditional material, machinery, production
process problems increasingly combined with technological, business
and managerial advice is called for.
● Testing and use of equipment. This used to be – and still is – an
important service provided by the centres. Manufacturers bring proto-
types or manufactured parts for analysis of material or surface qual-
ity, for measuring of tolerances and the like. The kôsetsushi provide
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test protocols, which generally are accepted by the regional industry
and often serve as quasi certification. Additionally, some kôsetsushi
offer supervised use of machinery and equipment for testing of the
SMEs’ own products, and for manufacturing purposes (production
test runs etc.).
● Cooperative research and development. The transfer centres offer the
conduct of joint research and development projects with SMEs, either
on a bilateral basis or as a network activity in which several compa-
nies as well as universities or other research institutes can be involved.
These collaborations often are set up in the so-called ‘exchange
plazas’ run by almost all kôsetsushi – though labelled with varying
names. These institutes offer SMEs the opportunity to meet and
explore opportunities for cooperative product development and
the like.
● Networks of innovation. These networks and permanent working
groups often start with discussions on technological, business and
market issues (e.g. through expert guest lectures), and then proceed
towards more practical issues like developing joint business plans,
manufacturing partnerships or cooperative product innovation.
● Information and training. This is a service addressed to a broad audi-
ence of regional SMEs. Technical libraries and databases serve as
information pools to be used either directly by the SMEs or through
the kôsetsushi’s personnel. The latter sometimes covers the service to
conduct Internet inquiries in patent databases. The offered training
courses address a wide range of topics – preferably IT-related courses,
CAD etc. The courses are either held as full-day seminars or as
evening courses; the latter can last several weeks.
The most popular services provided, are testing and technical assis-
tance. Testing, a highly appreciated service, is principally offered free of
charge. The client companies generally are satisfied with this service, but
the quality and scope of testing facilities varies. Some kôsetsushi have
specialized equipment (according to the region’s traditional specialty), but
in general there have been no significant purchases of equipment since the
early 1990s. Thus, it is only a matter of years until technological progress
makes the testing facilities outdated – if this is not already the case. Most
of the directors and managers of the examined transfer centres are aware
of this problem, but there are no signs for an improvement of the situation:
first, the bubble burst and then the fiscal crises have emptied public
budgets since the 1990s, while the 1999 revision of the Small and Medium
Enterprise Basic Law re-directed a considerable share of available fund-
ing to support start-up companies and to maintain well-performing firms
(SMEA 2001).
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The ranking list of services looks like this: as already mentioned, the
most popular services are technical assistance and testing activities, fol-
lowed by cooperative research and development. Finally, networking and
information and training activities are not really unpopular services but
the demand is not as strong as it is for technical assistance and testing.9
Rather than trying to explain theoretically how the services are used, I will
give a brief example derived from the empirical survey. But beforehand
some remarks on pricing policy need to be made. The strategy for charg-
ing for the services offered is very easy: only symbolic prices have to be
paid, thus they are factually free of charge. This evidently is a strong
incentive for very small enterprises to get in contact with the kôsetsushi
and use their services. We will see that despite this positive incentive only
a small portion of the regional SME population is a client of the kôset-
sushi. On the other hand, the fact that no business revenues are produced,
drives the kôsetsushi into a strong dependency on public funding.
A typical example
To give some impression of how SMEs use the kôsetsushi’s services,
a typical example shall be given: Nakamura Seisakushô10 is a small
enterprise located in Niigata, employing 45 regular employees and a small
number of part time employees (eight). The company produces crank-
shafts for motors, punching dies, and dies and moulds. A long history of
cooperation, dating back almost to the founding of the company in 1992,
exists with the kôsetsushi (which is within a 10 minute car ride). In the
beginning, the most needed service was testing. The company was able to
manufacture parts at a high level of accuracy but could not measure them
and provide testing protocols. The Niigata kôsetsushi was well equipped
with measuring devices and was able to deliver the service, and this turned
out to be the starting point for an ongoing continuous and trustful collab-
oration. Today the company uses the full range of services provided by the
kôsetsushi. Nakamura Seisakushô plays a leading role in one of the local
product innovation networks. These networks are also found in other pre-
fectures. The main purpose is to support those companies, which want to
develop new products for new markets. This explains why these networks
often begin with discussing new product perspectives either with person-
nel of the kôsetsushi or with invited experts from institutes, universities or
successful entrepreneurs. In the case reported here, the network developed
a very ambitious plan to launch a local automobile industry in Niigata
(where there is none). During a period of six to seven years this plan was
downscaled to the project of developing a small-sized unmanned vehicle,
which can be used for transporting people (also elderly and handicapped)
at fairs or other localities.
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The sketched innovation network assembles presidents of 11 companies
that are in some cases direct competitors, but nevertheless it was possible
to establish a high level of trust among the participating presidents. A ‘cul-
tural’ explanation for establishing trustful and favourable communication
and cooperation structures is the penchant for cooperative individualism,
rather than Western ‘rugged’ individualism, an idea based on Yamazaki’s
‘contextual’ approach (Yamazaki 1994). Evidently, there is no automatic
cultural mechanism establishing an atmosphere of trust and a high level of
communication and information sharing among the network actors, but
through mutual preparedness to take trust building measures it can be
easily achieved – and can be extended to further collaborations in other
contexts.
Similar mechanisms are in effect between the kôsetsushi’s advisors and
the company presidents: once they have established a common communi-
cation basis, they can achieve a high trust level, which guarantees a long
lasting cooperation.
The kôsetsushi’s competence building
The kôsetsushi’s personnel are dominantly comprised of technical staff,
which is in accordance with their (still prevailing) mission of providing
technological, rather than business and managerial, services. In five of six
visited technology transfer centres (including one branch office) close to
80 per cent were university graduates (bachelors or masters) in engineer-
ing. Most of them were recruited directly from university. Two kôsetsushi
had a considerable share of staff who were transferred permanently from
the prefecture administration. An interviewee from the SMEA confirmed
this as a general problem of the technology transfer centres in Japan,
because these transferred employees were usually at the end of their
careers and the chances of them developing into fully fledged advisors are
low. This is mainly because the time required for getting acquainted with
the matter and becoming accustomed to the specific problems of SMEs
takes years, which is perceived as a negative incentive for the end-of-
career transfer employees.
In contrast to these ‘fossilized’ structures, there were two technology
transfer centres in the sample which employed an extraordinarily young
staff of technical people, none of whom were transferred from prefecture
administrative bodies. Settling into new jobs and familiarizing themselves
with the specific subjects took the ‘freshmen’ a couple of years. This
process, far from being incidental, was well structured by a system of
‘work in tandem’ which meant accompanying a senior advisor during his
client meetings, etc. Eventually, the junior advisors were capable of doing
the job appropriately.
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Interestingly, over time, strong personal relationships between the
technical advisors and ‘their’ clients are emerging. These informal rela-
tionships guarantee a long lasting cooperation between the SMEs and the
kôsetsushi, and a high level of mutual trust, which is important for further
activities like launching innovation networks etc.
Summing up the findings it can be stated that, in general, the SMEs are
highly satisfied with the scope and the depth of services; some companies
wish to have more detailed and in-depth technical assistance. All of the
companies appreciated the ‘symbolic’ pricing. But some of the visited
companies formulated the wish for extended services, which go beyond the
mainly technical assistance provided by the kôsetsushi. The clients could
(1999/2000, 2001 and 2002) not fulfil these needs yet, when the interviews
were conducted, but almost all of the directors of the kôsetsushi were aware
of these expectable changes in the demands shifting from ‘pure technol-
ogy’ towards integrated technical and business advice. Additionally, the
shift from a provider of a huge variety of services towards a broker of
information and services was clearly seen as an emerging issue.
Despite the kôsetsushis’ great and widely appreciated achievements in
improving the Japanese industrial organization and global competitive-
ness, one problem to be addressed is the fact that the centres can only
reach between 5 and 10 per cent of the local SME population. The reasons
given by the kôsetsushi’s staff are lack of time of the SME presidents, lack
of information about the kôsetsushi and its services etc. What was not
mentioned, but addressed during company interviews with SMEs not
cooperating with technology transfer centres, was the poor standing the
kôsetsushi suffer from – at least in those parts of the SME population that
are engaged in high technology areas like semi-conductor and IT indus-
tries or nanotechnologies. Companies operating in these fields usually are
equipped with a high level of specialized knowledge accumulated over
time, which goes beyond the more broad and general capabilities rather
than the in-depth technological capabilities of the kôsetsushi’s staff.
Among the interviewed directors and advisors of the kôsetsushi centres
there was, in some respects, an atmosphere of fear. Around 2001, it was
quite clear that some systems for evaluating the kôsetsushi would be
implemented and the centres were not able to estimate the arising conse-
quences of this ‘innovation’. These being whether they will suffer severe
cuts in their budgets (provided their evaluation is negative) or whether
they will be forced to change their pricing policy to the detriment of the
SMEs. The dominating attitude was reserved – only a few people saw the
inherent chances of improving the operation and services of the kôsetsushi
through the implementation of evaluation systems (first insights on the
consequences of evaluating the kôsetsushi are presented in Shapira and
Furukawa 2003).
SME and technology transfer centres 71
SFAI-04.qxd  25/11/05  2:40 PM  Page 71
The MEP centres in the United States
The American counterpart of Japan’s kôsetsushi is the MEP programme,
which operates in all federal states across the United States. This network
affiliates approximately 70 manufacturing extension centres and around
400 field offices located all over the United States. The centres and field
offices work directly with the local small and medium-sized manufactur-
ers. Picking up the thread of the above sketched structural and industrial-
cultural peculiarities characterizing the US manufacturing sector we
can state a lot of similarities between Japan and the United States. There
is a large number of SMEs in the US manufacturing industry: approxi-
mately 350,000 enterprises are the back bone of industrial production.
Though increasingly important for the national production and global
competitiveness as suppliers for large companies, there is a widening pro-
ductivity gap between large and small companies. Thus, there is a similar
scenario of problems and deficiencies as in the case of Japanese SMEs. To
close the gap and to improve the SMEs’ performance, support via tech-
nology and know-how transfer is needed. These are the general tasks of
the MEP centres (and field offices). Looking closer at the services offered
by the MEP centres it turns out that by and large they offer the same ser-
vice portfolio as the kôsetsushi in Japan. The most striking difference
is the low importance of testing. The interviewees estimated that less than
5 per cent of the MEP activities are related to testing and measuring. Only
those centres cooperating with other more technology based and better
equipped programmes or with engineering departments of local universi-
ties carry out these testing services on a larger scale. The major fields of
activities are the following:
● Integrated technical and business assistance. Labelled with lean
enterprise and includes kanban and kaizen systems, business process
restructuring/improvement, total productive maintenance etc. These
services are offered as one-day workshops held at the MEP centre. An
additional, more technical service is manufacturing cell and plant lay-
out; it is always delivered on site. A further field of technical assis-
tance was the so-called e-business-readiness, which was a prominent
single service at the time the interviews were conducted.
● Quality assurance. The development, implementing and maintaining
of quality systems and the preparation of SMEs for an ISO certifica-
tion (ISO 9001 and ISO 14000) are the core of the quality assurance
activities. These are delivered as workshops or courses held at the cen-
tres and attended by the clients, and as a more advanced in-company
advisory service.
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● Human resources development and training. The assistance in this
field ranges from collaborative job design and analyses for develop-
ing and offering training and development units.
● Cooperative applied research and development. This activity is very
similar to the Japanese case. The subject of these joint activities is the
search for new products and ‘paving the way’ for bringing them into the
market. Cooperative R&D is in most cases bilateral, sometimes a third
party (mostly specialists in the respective subject field) is included.
● Networks of innovation. All MEP centres that were researched offered
their clients the opportunity to join permanent working groups with
the chance of further developing into innovation networks, which
eventually might launch tangible innovation; currently there are no
innovation networks.
It needs to be noted that in the face of the huge variety of services and
given the limited internal human resources in the MEP centres, a consid-
erable share of the services involves the inclusion of external experts, for
example, consultants, universities and specialized providers. Thus an
important role played by the MEP centres is that of an expertise broker.
The most prominent services provided, were quality assurance and lean
manufacturing or lean enterprise. These services were part of a standard-
ized package that was offered by all MEP centres – nevertheless it was
adapted to the customer’s specific needs and to the particular industrial
contexts. In many cases, it led to a complete reorganization of business
processes. These services are not limited to technical advice nor are they
restricted to one dimension of the business processes. On the contrary, the
advisors/consultants of the investigated MEP centres maintained pro-
nounced holistic approaches. Certainly, they accepted the clients’ initial
(technical or quality) problem and worked on this, but whenever it turned
out that solving the problem required a broader approach considering
organizational and managerial issues, they tried to convince their clients
to follow the more comprehensive business-restructuring path. Even if
this might look like ‘increasing turnover’ from the MEP centres’ point of
view, it was reported that there were no cases where clients were dissatis-
fied with the service enlargements. On the contrary, these customers all
belong to the pool of long-standing clients.
Depending on the particular situation (local industrial structure and
local availability of technical facilities and know-how), there were some
MEP centres, which had a comparatively large share (up to 40 per cent of
turnover) of technical assistance. In these cases, the main focus was on the
customization of automated machinery and design, developing and
improving automated production processes.
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Human resources development and training courses ranged behind the
integrated technical, business and quality assistance. Interestingly, the
training courses and seminars acted as entrance gates to collaboration with
MEP centres.
Cooperative product innovation always ranged behind the above-
mentioned services – even though developing future-oriented products for
emerging markets would be the best way to secure staying in business. The
interviewees’ responses unanimously indicate that these activities require
a high level of mutual trust. At the same time this explains why the MEP
centres have enormous difficulties establishing local or regional innova-
tion networks. Since these activities are closely tied to competitiveness,
hardly any SME feels challenged to participate and run the risk of losing
competitive advantages.
In accordance with their mission statements, the MEP centres prefer-
ably serve SMEs, but if there is a large local company asking for service,
the large company will also be served. There were two cases reported in
which a large manufacturer, together with some of his suppliers, asked for
technical and quality assistance from the MEP centre.
As already indicated, the number of client companies being served two
or more times is very high. At the time the interviews were conducted, the
share of new (first time) clients was around 25 per cent. The accumulated
number of clients served by each MEP centre is, on an average 5–10 per
cent of the regionally accessible SME population. Thus, there is a huge
potential for more activity. One reason why it is difficult to get into busi-
ness relations with these ‘hidden reserves’ is that the average company
size of MEP centres’ clients is above 100 employees. This is not acciden-
tal, but rather related to the pricing policy of the MEP centres. In clear
contrast to the kôsetsushis’ policy of symbolic prices, the MEP centres
charge market prices comparable to those of commercial consulting com-
panies. Thus the services of the MEP centres are hardly affordable to the
very small enterprises with less than 20 employees – given their chronic
scarcity of financial resources. This structural bias will be discussed and
evaluated in the following chapter on comparative conclusions.
A look at the budgets of the MEP centres shows that most of the cen-
tres were build on various sources of public and private funding: the share
of federal funding is about one-third, the remaining two-thirds originate
from state support (through state programmes like Thomas Edison
Centres in Ohio) and from clients’ revenues. This mixed financing truly
reduces the dependency on public funding and makes the MEP centres
less vulnerable to federal budget cuts, such as the budget cut in FY 2004
from 105.9 million dollars down to 12.6 million dollars. It remains to be
seen how far this development affects the operation of the MEP centres,
but because of the financial structure sketched above, it seems likely that
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they will continue their work. If a 100 per cent publicly subsidized system,
such as Japan’s, was facing similar drastic cuts, it would break down.
The MEP centres competence building
The visited MEP centres and field offices all showed a similar qualifi-
cation structure among their personnel. Unlike Japan, the staff was not
predominantly comprised of engineers, but rather 50 per cent of the
personnel were technical people – mostly bachelors of engineering. The
remaining half was people with a business, economy or psychology back-
ground. Generally, only people with prior industry experience were
recruited by the MEP centres.
As indicated earlier, there was a circle of freelancers and independent
consultants around the MEP centres who collaborated on a project basis. It
is noteworthy that all MEP centres which were surveyed employed coop
students. It was a good opportunity, at least in some cases, to be employed
at the MEP centre after returning to the university and finishing the studies.
In general, the interviewees emphasized that for job seekers, there were
comparatively high incentives to work at an MEP centre, because the
wages are good (it competes with salaries at middle-sized consulting
enterprises) and MEP centre staff have a big advantage over employees of
nation-wide operating consultants: there is only client visiting ‘at arm’s
length’, that is, no extensive travelling activities. These two factors
contribute to low turnover and thus relatively stable personnel.
Evaluation
In pronounced contrast to the Japanese kôsetsushi system, the MEP
programme has implemented an internal evaluation system, which is con-
ducted by the NIST. Additionally, there are some external evaluations that
are not conducted regularly (Shapira 2001). NIST’s evaluation efforts
target at quantifying the arising benefits for the SME. A one-page ques-
tionnaire is sent out asking for the quality of the service, the performance
of the staff and for quantification of project-induced cost savings, job
creation/retention and the like. Evidently, this is only a limited impact
evaluation, which presumably serves the purposes of the programme
administration. Though there is a considerable uncertainty regarding the
reliability of data, it allows some assessment of the regional impacts of the
MEP centres’ work.
During the interviews here, one case was reported of a process-inherent
evaluation conducted by the MEP centre staff targeted at evaluating the
project performance. It is highly informal, not standardized and is carried
out as self-supervision meetings, which are held during the project and
right after finishing a project. These meetings include people directly
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involved with the SMEs and staff from the MEP centre. Once established,
this ‘informal self-evaluation’ is of great value for the MEP staff in order
to improve their concepts, processes and services.
Comparative conclusions
In the following, some detailed conclusions will be presented followed by
a general conclusion tied up with a recommendation.
1 When comparing the funding structures of the Japanese kôsetsushi –
all of which are financed by their respective prefectures and local
governments – with the funding of the MEP centres, it becomes clear
that the Japanese way of single-source funding in combination with
the marked policy to deliver cheap services and, therefore, not pro-
duce any business revenues, on the one hand makes the services
affordable to all SME, but, on the other hand, creates a high depen-
dency upon the sponsoring authority. It makes them vulnerable to
policy changes like those in the wake of the latest revision of the
Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in 1999, which launched a
shift from broad SME support towards an ‘elitist’ support of the best
performing SMEs. Despite the potential risks and dangers, the biggest
advantage of the Japanese system is still the fact that services are
almost free of charge and thus even the very small SMEs can afford the
services. On the contrary, the US MEP centres are less dependent on
federal funding and are thus more robust towards policy changes,
because there are other public (state sponsored) sources available and
business revenues are produced by charging market prices for the deliv-
ered services. The price paid for the emerging greater independency
of MEP centres is the exclusion of very small SMEs as customers,
because they cannot afford to pay the high prices charged. The positive
side of the relatively high prices is a corresponding high appreciation
of the delivered services, which contributes to a better reputation.
2 Both countries’ technology transfer centres share a comparatively low
rate of success when considering their access to the local and regional
SME population. In neither case surveyed or found in literature is the
ratio above 10 per cent. This clearly indicates that different pricing
strategies generate neither advantages nor disadvantages. Though the
US system of charging the SME clients market prices explains why
very small SMEs are kept out, the reverse strategy of delivering
services almost free of charge followed in Japan does not guarantee
high demand. Explanations for why so few SMEs use the kôsetsushi’s
services range from lack of knowledge to the mismatching of needed
services and services actually supplied.
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3 The kôsetsushi centres focus very narrowly on technical assistance
while the MEP centres develop a broader integrated business-oriented
service. Although a considerable number of SME clients appreciate
the services of the kôsetsushi and consider them to be appropriate to
their current needs, the Japanese kôsetsushis’ technology transfer con-
cept is falling short of the challenges raised by the transition from the
supply-chain model that influenced the SME strongly towards the new
role of self-supporting innovator. The former phase was primarily
characterized by technological deficiencies of SMEs, which pre-
vented their escape from supplier relationships. But if the transition
towards innovators is to be fully realized, broader competencies are
needed (marketing, organizational expertise, managerial resources
etc.). The kôsetsushi centres still do not provide these services on a
broad scale and thus are not as progressive as their US counterparts.
The MEP centres offer a broad set of integrated business services,
which makes them more sustainable.
4 The Japanese system of kôsetsushi centres is more successful in net-
working with local clients. A considerable variety of different network
types exist: production networks, innovation networks, dissemination
networks and strategic innovation policy networks. These networks
were usually launched by the kôsetsushi utilizing their infrastructure
(exchange plazas), but after a while, they run without major input
from the kôsetsushi. A crucial success factor for networking is the
Japanese communication culture and an easily maintained high trust
level. In the US, the MEP centres’ attempts to establish client net-
works have failed because of the clients’ fear of losing competitive
advantages, know-how, etc.
The question as to how far the technology transfer centres con-
tribute to improving the regional economies has to be answered cau-
tiously. In general, the contributions are difficult to measure. In the
case of the MEP centres, which are strongly geared towards single
companies, the impacts on the regional economy can only be under-
stood as the result of these projects. The NIST’s evaluation efforts try
to measure these impacts in terms of jobs created. In Japan, it is the
excellent local networking that bears some potential for regional
development. Some of these networks explicitly intend to improve the
regional economy through their activities.
5 The Japanese kôsetsushi have only very recently (since 2002) started
to launch evaluation systems – mainly as a consequence of METI’s
Guideline for Technology Evaluation, which was established in 1997
and amended in 2001. So far, no comprehensive data on the quality of
these evaluations is available. Compared with this, the US MEP pro-
gramme established an evaluation system early on in the programme.
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As mentioned earlier, the main purpose is to quantify the success. This
evaluation concept calls for further development and refinement and
could be amalgamated with the informal in-process self-evaluation
conducted by some MEP centres.
All in all, the research findings indicate that technology transfer centres,
which provide a specialized service for small and medium-sized enter-
prises, are a useful institution. The major reasons for specialization are the
SMEs’ distinctive needs, which technology transfer centres that offer gen-
eral services (not addressed to a specific target group) cannot adequately
fulfil. Additionally, the common, non-specialized R&D service providers
like universities, R&D laboratories and general technology transfer cen-
tres have very little incentive to specialize in the technological problems
of SMEs, because they are not challenging for them, and in the case of
universities, not suitable to build a career on.
The described sketch of problems is true for both countries inquired –
probably more for Japan than for the United States. Even when considering
the different operation modes of MEP and kôsetsushi centres, we find that
in both cases, benefits for the targeted customers are generated. The differ-
ent approaches arise from different social, institutional and cultural contexts
in which the respective centres are embedded. If this chapter draws the gen-
eralizing conclusion that the US MEP centres are more future-oriented in
comparison to their Japanese counterparts, this indicates that the United
States have a lead over Japan. But there are emerging signs that the Japanese
system will be reformed and thus adapt to the changing needs of SMEs.
If the broadest conclusion of this chapter is that running a national tech-
nology transfer system for SMEs makes sense, then other countries which
have not yet established such a system should do so. Even if measuring the
contribution of such systems to regional economies or to regional innova-
tion systems is a difficult task, it remains without major doubts that by
improving the technical and business bases of SMEs, the supply chains of
production improve and thus the regional, national and global competi-
tiveness is increased. When accepting the general recommendation to
establish a national technology transfer system for SMEs, the remaining
questions are: how and what can we learn from the given examples?
Which is the role model for learning – Japan or the United States? Which
policy, institutional, social and cultural structures can be built upon?
If we want to answer these questions in Germany, we need to
thoroughly re-think the prevailing policy, institutional, social and cultural
contexts and develop ideas for how new structures, routines and institu-
tions can be implemented in the German industrial culture. The idea of
cross-cultural borrowing (van Buskirk and Takeuchi 1984) focuses on the
creative adaptation and integration of management or business concepts
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into the existing structures by developing them further. This might be a
useful approach. In Germany, there are technology transfer structures to
build upon. On the one hand, the regionally focused Steinbeis centres have
a clear SME orientation. On the other hand, the Fraunhofer Institutes
have a technological rather than an SME focus, but could play a role in
establishing a national network of technology transfer centres for SMEs.
In conclusion, more research and constructive concept development is
needed to get a clear idea of what innovation policy for SMEs in Germany
could look like.
Notes
1 This issue will be developed further in Chapter 3 of this volume.
2 Carried out between 1999 and 2002 at the University of Applied Science in
Bremen, funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research (FKZ
1703899). The project was directed by Cornelia Storz who did the first part of
empirical work. The second phase of research was conducted by the author in col-
laboration with Japanese and US research partners.
3 Kôsetsushi is an acronym derived of the Japanese words for public kô, establish-
ment setsuritsu, and testing lab shikenjo.
4 The scheduled interviews with the MEP administration were cancelled because of
the unexpected incidents of September 11, 2001.
5 The internationally well-recognized Technopolis programme is widely neglected
in this article, because it has different goals and was not specifically geared
towards the SME clients Abe, S. (1998) ‘Regional Innovation Systems in Japan’,
in H.-J. Braczyk, P. Cooke and M. Heidenreich (eds), Regional Innovation Systems.
The Role of Governances in a Globalized World (pp. 286–318), London: UCL Press.
6 The findings presented in the following portray a selection of the extensive empir-
ical material. The presentation focuses only on those findings which above all
contribute to the comparison with the US case of MEP centres.
7 Originally, an import from the United States by the end of the nineteenth century
as agricultural centres, they were rapidly transformed to industrial centres after the
war Shapira, P. (1992) ‘Modernizing Small Manufacturers in Japan: The Role of
Local Public Technology Centers’, Technology Transfer, 40–57.
8 The oldest centre’s founding is dated to 1873.
9 Note that there is no quantitative measuring as in the United States where the
charged prices can be taken for establishing a ranking.
10 The name is fictional, though the descriptions are not.
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Introduction
In 1956, the Dutch Nobel Prize winner Tinbergen was still able to assert
that the regulation of economic systems could be achieved by creating a
specific concentration of economic knowledge. Correspondingly, rules for
an optimum on political design based on a structural model of economics
were continually developed. This optimism vanished as it was discovered
that economic systems are too complex to be steered in a goal-directed
way. The disappointing experiences of the Eastern European countries in
their transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy,
the decline of economic growth in Germany before and especially after
reunification and the severe depression in Japan in the 1990s coined the
‘lost decade’. Flagrant accounting scandals despite new international
accounting standards and the defection from international environmental
standards are just some examples of the difficulties of implementing eco-
nomic reforms. The assumption that basic structures of economic systems
are known and that political target definitions can be based on efficiency
criteria exclusively, is no longer valid today, although it often still appears
in political practice, as the political conception toward transformation
states has recently shown (Tinbergen 1956; Eggertsson 1997).
The theory of institutional economics in particular, draws attention to
three important aspects which have been neglected hitherto: (1) incentives
through institutional settings, (2) information shortages and (3) prefer-
ences of politicians. Without wanting to criticize these positions in detail,2
they, too, exclude essential aspects: they only look at the parts of the
process of economic policy which come after the identification and
admission of problems, namely target definition, programme formulation
and evaluation, and neglect the role of cognitive models existing before
the whole process of formulating economic policies starts. Thus, the ori-
gin and treatment of problems always depend on a specific perception of
reality, which differs between societies.3
5 Cognitive models and
economic policy
The case of Japan1
Cornelia Storz
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Cognitive models and economic policy 83
Influenced by cognitive psychology, economists are slowly acknowl-
edging the importance of cognitive models in economic policy since they
can act as a break even to reforms, an assumption which seems to be
appropriate. Such an analysis normally takes place on a very abstract
level. This contribution tries to give empirical evidence for the thesis that
cognitive models indeed do influence political processes considerably. A
selected field of Japanese economic policy, namely Japanese small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) policy, is used as an example since
reform efforts in this field are especially drastic, pleaded for by reform-
oriented policy-makers: SME policy should become more rule oriented,
less supportive for less productive SMEs and a pillar of the new innova-
tion policy. The influence of cognitive models on political processes is
analysed for the most important phases of problem identification, target
definition and evaluation. It becomes clear that reforms in Japanese SME
policy are being pleaded for on the surface, but on a deeper layer, estab-
lished cognitive models tend to persist: SMEs are perceived as being weak
in contributing to the genesis of innovation and employment, and as play-
ers that need to be protected by economic policy. The strategic manage-
ment deficiencies of Japanese SMEs are embodied in specific Japanese
terms such as ‘weak player’ ( jakusha) or ‘problem of SME’ (chûshô kigyô
mondai). Thus the dominance of established cognitive models results in a
weak implementation of new political concepts, and in defection from and
dilution of the aspired reforms. It is right that economic policies in gen-
eral are ‘muddle through’ solutions; however, for Japan this tendency
seems to be especially strong since the specific preference for decisions
by consensus makes it even easier to push alternative concepts through the
political process. The contribution comes to the conclusion that the role of
cognitive models in political processes has indeed often been underesti-
mated. For the success of reforms it is necessary to take the general per-
ception more into account, but also not to overlook the rationality behind
the stability of cognitive models.
The contribution mainly aims at giving empirical evidence for the
importance of cognitive models in the political process. It starts from the
general question why and to what degree economic policy is influenced by
cognitive models and which consequences should be taken of this. Thus,
the contribution is structured as follows: in the first section, I will intro-
duce the general relevance of cognitive models in the political process. In
the second section, I will analyse to what degree the Japanese SME pol-
icy has changed, and why changes on a deeper layer take place so slowly.
Certain cognitive models towards SMEs have been identified as one
important reason. In the last concluding section, I summarize the results,
the rationality behind the incrementality of change and discuss what could
be done in order to foster change in SME policies.
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Cognitive models in the process of economic policy
Identification and admission of problems
Cognitive models were only recently introduced into economics. The
introduction of cognition into economic theory goes one step further
than the introduction of informal institutions, which also support the
theory that institutions do not exist per se, but depend on the way they
are perceived, that is, how they are constructed by certain social entities.
Cognitive models thus structure the perception of reality from the
beginning.4 Hereby, actors become able to act within a world that is
filled with a chaotic mass of data (Hodgson 1994: 59; compare Koch in
this volume).
Unlike the assumptions conventional descriptions of problems in eco-
nomic policy are based on, taking cognitive models into account means
that knowledge does not exist per se in the sense of a reflection of reality,
but that reality is always based on a subjective perception – in the case of
this contribution, for example, the political entrepreneur. Consequently,
cognitive models within a group are relatively similar, whereas they differ
between social groups. The consequence for the identification of prob-
lems is that different social entities assimilate different information and
see different problems. They also differ in their choice of action, that is,
which solutions they consider feasible, and in their choice of instruments
to achieve their goals. Just like cognitive models, problems as well as
instruments are selected and perceived as ‘important’ or appropriate. In
the phase of identifying a problem, societies therefore perceive those
problems as problems that match their respective cognitive models. For
example: an economy in which the directive scheme of individual respon-
sibility and the superiority of the free market dominate will define a high
number of market exits as an efficient process of selection, but not as a
problem in terms of social policy. By contrast, a society that takes the
responsibility of the community for the individual for granted and builds
up relevant social security networks, may view a high number of market
exits as a problem. At the same time, however, entities are not homo-
genous. They consist of various heterogeneous groups and sub-entities
which have different perceptions of problems and which are in a dynamic
process of competition. This competition selects the problems that are
perceived as relevant for the economic policy.
For the admission of a problem, only one problem among the large
number of identified problems is selected. In this phase not only
resources, threatening potential leadership qualities and the information
that is available within a group play a central role, but especially the
specific informal institutions of a society are important. Depending on
given informal institutions, for example, preferences towards decision
84 Cornelia Storz
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styles, the speed of change is influenced. In societies with a preference for
consensus-oriented solutions, it takes more time to steer political
programmes in a particular direction. Especially in homogenous societies,
institutional change in policies is then expected to be even lengthier
(Eisenberg 1999).
Target definition and programme formulation
The phase of target definition and programme formulation5 follows the
phase of identification and admission of problems. Here, two scenarios
are imaginable. In one scenario an admitted problem is the result of a
standardization of different identifications of problems within a society. In
another scenario a problem is admitted without the society actually hav-
ing to come to a consensus beforehand. In the latter case the competing
individuals will attempt to prove the validity of their model, further trying
to get ‘their’ problem accepted by attempting to influence the process of
target definition and programme formulation. This scenario describes the
reality of political processes more accurately. In other words, it is more
often not the case that a problem is recognized as such and then automat-
ically definition, target and programmes are determined. Instead, different
perceptions of problems and different views on target definition and
programmes are in constant competition with each other.
This means that the probability of inconsistent and non-transparent polit-
ical programmes is higher, the more alternative perceptions and solution
models are admitted institutionally. Therefore, in societies with a certain
level of openness, political programmes are not uniform but rather a brico-
lage, as Lanzara (1998) calls it. The consequence is a general lack of trans-
parency and consistency. Economic policies in open societies have at least
this aspect in common – the fact that they are ‘muddle through’ solutions.
This definitely also applies for the Japanese economic policy. Nevertheless,
due to the variation of informal institutions, changes in societies that pre-
fer consensus-oriented decision-making are brought about even more
incrementally than in societies which accept majority decisions. Therefore
informal institutions are decisive for the direction and speed of change.
Evaluation
The phases that were mentioned in the preceeding pages are followed by
the evaluation phase. There are various methods designed to evaluate eco-
nomic policies (see OECD 2000). Often, evaluations concentrate on the
criteria of consistency and transparency. In its weakest definition consis-
tency means the compatibility of different problem fields and the suit-
ability of the chosen instruments in relation to the defined problems. In its
strongest definition it stands for the correctness of the defined problem
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and the achievement of the intended effect. Transparency in its weaker
definition is the comprehensibility of the process by the user. In its
stronger definition it means that the process of evaluation for the imple-
mentation practice, that is, the efficiency of the processing of a pro-
gramme, is reviewed (Klemmer et al. 1996: 20–24; see also Ôkuma 1999:
43). Even if these criteria are plausible it is necessary to consider, based
on the explanations given earlier, that the evaluation phase is also
influenced by cognitive models. For example, these can be reflected in the
definition of specific evaluation criteria, implying a normative relation.
In summary: cognitive models may stabilize existing structures. Using the
case of Japanese SME policy, Chapter 6 discusses in which phases of the
economic political process cognitive models influenced the speed of change.
Cognitive models in Japanese economic policy:
the case of SME policy
A great amount of literature is available on processes of economic policy
in Japan. Often, specific structures and decision patterns in target defini-
tion within politics, bureaucracy and industry (the ‘iron triangle’) have
been analysed. Nevertheless, while the literature focuses on the process
of target definition and programme formulation, the role of cognitive
models in general, and questions of evaluation in specific, have been
neglected.6 Similar deficits in research can be ascertained for SME poli-
cies, which are mostly limited to exploratory explanations.
In the following pages, the role of cognitive models in the process of
economic policy is discussed by using Japan’s SME policy as an example.
In the section on ‘Identification and the admission of problems in SME
policy,’ the perception of SMEs in Japan will be discussed. The following
section deals with target definition and programmes in the Japanese policy
for SMEs, and the section on ‘Evaluation: the case of regional technology
centres,’ uses a specific range of support measures for SMEs to show how
specific informal institutions lead to the fact that different cognitive mod-
els are taken into account, and how they influence the dynamics of change.
Identification and admission of problems in SME policy
The tradition of ‘weak’ SMEs
Japan has a long tradition of viewing SMEs as lifeboats for unemploy-
ment, extended production facilities or as company segments with little
chances of growth. In a word: they are regarded as being technologically
inferior and disadvantaged in comparison with large enterprises. This
view was already ascertainable in the early phase of industrialization in
Japan at the end of the nineteenth century. The term ‘SME problem,’7
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existing since that time, signifies the economic disadvantage of SMEs for
the entire economic welfare of the country, meaning that losses in economic
welfare are caused by the low productivity of SMEs. The term ‘weak enter-
prise’ refers to the sub-optimal enterprise size of SMEs and their deficits in
innovation, technology, funding and management; in other terms, it refers
to the weak contribution of SMEs to innovation and employment. The
expression ‘too many enterprises’ expresses the necessity for reducing
competition (Storz 1997: 16; CKC 2000: 2; Arita 2001).
What is the background of this specific perception? From an empirical
point of view one can say that industrialization in Japan was basically
undertaken by large enterprises as they had access to Western technology.
SMEs’ performance concerning productivity and innovation was, by
contrast, low – a difference that was attributed to their limited access to
factor markets and their size structure, which was considered to be sub-
optimal. The large number of SME bankruptcies as a result of the reces-
sion after the Russian–Japanese War (1904–1905) and the First World War
led to the first government programmes for SMEs. They were basically
social programmes and not as much measures promoting innovation or
productivity. External shocks and the buyout of small and medium-sized
regional banks by the enterprise group’s major banks made the situation
worse and finally led to a loss of financial autonomy for the SMEs.
Additional soft loans and programmes for SMEs, as well as state promo-
tion of cooperatives and credit guarantee associations, were supposed to
alleviate the difficulties of entrepreneurs in the 1920s and 1930s.
This perception of SMEs and SME policy in the style of social policy
had a revival after the Second World War, a policy that was confirmed by
empirical data on productivity and income in SMEs. In 1957 Arisawa
called Japan’s economic structure a ‘dual structure’. After the introduction
of this term in the Economic White Paper of that year it became common
language usage, and was used as an argument for conceptualising SME
policy in the way of social policy (Storz 1997: 16; Teraoka 1997: 36–38;
Arita 2001).
Besides empirical data, the view of SMEs and their inability to play an
important economic role on their own was encouraged by a long-term
dominance of economic research influenced by Marxism approaches.
According to representatives of this school, the ‘SME problem’ was
mainly caused by Japan’s specific industrial organization and specific
power structures: ‘The object of research concerning small and medium
enterprises is the “small and medium enterprise problem”. . . . The ques-
tion of specific quality features of small and medium enterprises cannot
be discussed without asking why these companies are a problem and
where their difficulties lie’ (Arita 1982; quoted from Storz 1997: 16).
Until the 1970s, this opinion dominated Japanese research on SMEs and
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their public perception. Due to limited linguistic reception possibilities in
Western science, local studies in Western countries were also based on this
model (critically comp. Pascha and Storz 2000).
The influential contributions of Birch (1981), Piore and Sabel (1984) or
Acs and Audretsch (1990), who proved that SMEs contributed to innova-
tion and employment, also fell on fertile ground in Japan. Starting from the
1980s, a completely different branch of research, whose representatives
were, for example, Nakamura Hide’ichirô or Kiyonari Tadao, attributed
new functions to SMEs as central pillars in a nation’s innovation system
and thus developed a new paradigm of SMEs. In contrast to hitherto exist-
ing research, SMEs were not seen as a cause of problems, but a solution to
the new economic problems of insufficient innovation and (to a lesser
degree) rising unemployment. Research on Japanese hidden champions
and venture businesses showed that in some sectors innovative processes
were strongly stimulated by smaller companies. Since then, economic pol-
icy in Japan has seen itself as a creator and initiator of dynamics in the mar-
kets, while the protection of SMEs is arousing more and more disapproval.
The emergence of a new concept for SMEs
The starting point for the new perception of SMEs was the new economic
situation in the 1970s, when Japan had basically caught up with the West.
More and more demand had been placed on Japan as a global player to
participate in the generation of international knowledge. Internally, the
differences in income, productivity or non-cash capital provision between
SMEs and large enterprises were getting less. Simultaneously, the prob-
lem of insufficient innovative activity was not solved, as the persisting
deficiencies in the trade balance of high-end technology clearly showed
and, for the first time, unemployment began to appear on a larger scale.
The realization that American SMEs created highly innovative goods and
new employment opportunities and that Japan did not have this form of
young, dynamic risk ventures, was a shock for the political class in Japan.
Since the 1970s, numerous delegations of politicians have travelled to the
United States to learn from the American model. The fact that the United
States became a leading model for Japan’s SME policy also found its
expression in a changing terminology; for example it became common to
phrase agglomerations of innovative enterprises as ‘. . . Barê’, imitating
the English pronouncation of (Silicon) ‘. . . . Valley’, as, for example, the
Sapporo Barê or Bit Barê in Tokyo’s Shibuya district.
Irritated and confronted with best practices – ‘windows of opportunity’,
as North calls them (1997: 13–14) – the view of weak SMEs began to
change and resulted in a preference for a more innovation-oriented SME
policy. Following Schumpeter’s model of creative destruction, the impor-
tance of the entrepreneur, an individual looking for new technological
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solutions, was stressed as being essential for the process of technological
change. The ‘Vision for Medium Enterprise in the 1980s’, published by
the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency8 in 1980, shows the new role
that was attributed to SMEs:
Small and medium enterprises must be positively recognized as
numerous energetic entities. Small businesses as a whole provide,
through their vitality, a major impetus for changes in industrial struc-
ture, progress in technology, and the actualization of human potential.
Without exaggeration, they are the source of socio-economic progress
and development.
(JETRO 1986: 23)
The White Paper by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency from
1995 mentions the new opportunities for SMEs which result from
changed institutional and technological conditions; Birch or Piore and
Sabel have referred to these as well:
The former attitude of small and medium enterprises, that they were
holding out until the situation had improved, is dangerous . . . . Small
and medium enterprises also have strong points which they often used
and which enabled them to adjust to changes in the environment,
namely flexibility and mobility . . . . The small size of these enterprises
also has advantages over large enterprises and puts them in the posi-
tion to be able to use change as a chance. In fact, it can be observed
that many SMEs ventured into new branches.
(trans. the author, Storz 1997: 73–74)
The change in official terminology signals this change as well: terms
indicating SME weaknesses such as ‘modernization’, which was a cate-
gory in the ‘Basic Law for SMEs’ of 1963, have been avoided since the
1970s. Instead, terms stressing their competitive potential by describing
them as ‘information oriented’, ‘dynamic’ or ‘challenging’ and equalizing
them with ‘new development possibilities’ and ‘entrepreneurial spirit’
dominated. The subtitles of White Papers also provide an accumulation of
changed terms since the end of the 1970s.9 The term ‘dynamics’, for
example, was chosen five times in the years between 1979 and 1986, the
term ‘new’ nine times in the years 1983–1995, the term ‘structural
change’ six times in the years 1987–1996, and the terms ‘foundation’ and
‘entrepreneurship’ three times between 1998 and 2000. In the last few
years the creation of innovative potential and new employment possibili-
ties obviously gained importance.
The changed perception is also made clear by the choice of words in
policy programmes for SMEs, as for example in the annual ‘Compendium
of Economic Policy Measures for the Medium Enterprise’. Until 1986,
the Compendium used words suggesting that SMEs were weak, such as
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‘modernization and structural improvements’, ‘compensation of disad-
vantages through size’, ‘programme for the stabilization of companies’, or
‘special programmes for very small enterprises’. In 1989 new terms were
chosen. The negative sounding aims of the ‘Basic Law’ of 1963, such as
‘modernization and structural improvements’ or ‘compensation of dis-
advantages through size’ are now positively described as ‘strengthening
of the enterprise base’ or ‘promotion of structural change’ (Chûshô
Kigyôchô 1994b, quoted from Storz 1997).10
In accordance with this new perception, the entrepreneur was also often
portrayed as an important agent of technological change in the Japanese
media or in other publications. Since 1986 the renowned publishing house
Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha has been publishing a monthly magazine on the
entrepreneurs’ contribution to technological and economic progress, and
started releasing reports on venture businesses in its leading economic
newspaper Nihon Keizai Shinbun three days a week in 1996. Textbooks
and non-fiction books for young people provide information on self-
employment and animate young people to become self-employed.11 The
‘producers of world views’ have new expectations of SMEs, which can
produce new attitudes in their readers.
The other side of the medal: the persistent 
perception of SMEs as ‘weak’
If one analyses the public perception of entrepreneurs more deeply and
leaves the official platform of opinions, it soon becomes clear that the
entrepreneur in Japanese society is still not perceived as an innovative cre-
ator and destructor, as Schumpeter describes him; on the contrary, he is
seen as a person with a high degree of dependence. Definitely, he is not
associated with a young, venturous type of entrepreneur, but with distinct
weaknesses in generating more than incremental innovations.
One well-known result from the low degree of competitiveness is
the bad working conditions in SMEs, which are described as ‘dark and
tiring, dirty and dangerous’. Examples are popular series like ‘Men are
Tough Fellows’ (Otoko wa tsurai yo) or ‘Tanpopo’, which refer to the dual
structure of incomes, and portray the entrepreneur as pitiful. Based on
these observations the research institute of the former Daiwa Bank came
to the conclusion that ‘there is no other country, where the employees of
a large enterprise are considered that much better than their colleagues in
small and medium enterprises. The influence of the mass media plays
an important role here’ (trans. the author; see Storz 1997: 109–111).
In school education, SMEs are at the best of marginal interest too, a fact
which further encourages traditional expectation models. Even if one finds
innovative connotations, they are often accompanied by a depiction of the
‘problem of SMEs’, while others only concentrate on the description of
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this ‘problem’.12 In university education, the topic of entrepreneurship is
not very important either. Although courses like the Anglo-American
MBA are offered for founders, and graduate schools for practical jobs
have been established, and despite the fact that especially private univer-
sities put emphasis on new research on this topic, the acceptance of their
graduates in the markets and the reputation of their research projects are
considered relatively low (Miyata 2001; Teraoka 2002).
Definitely the negative public attitude towards entrepreneurs is not a
specific Japanese problem and exists, for example, in Germany too.
However, the critical perception of SMEs has a more ‘real core’, at least
in comparison to Germany: all statistics show that the discrepancy of pro-
ductivity between different sizes of enterprises is especially high in Japan,
which leads to the conclusion that the innovative performance of Japanese
SMEs cannot be too high. Another indicator is the discrepancy in
incomes, which is not only generally much lower in Japanese SMEs than
in larger enterprises, but in very small enterprises (up to 20 employees)
only about half of the income in larger companies (more than 300 employ-
ees). The perception of these differences is made easy by the high pres-
ence of SME entrepreneurs in everyday life and the high importance of
Japanese SMEs for employment. It is even more important that Japanese
SMEs in secondary industry (e.g. transport, electronics) are, in contrast,
for example, to German SMEs, less directly active on the domestic mar-
ket and in exports, but have more of a supportive function for the Japanese
enterprise groups.
As a result, there are conflicting perceptions of reality. The ways in
which these prevail within the process of economic policy will be
discussed in Chapter 6.
Target definition and programme formulation in SME policy
Programme formulation for ‘weak’ SMEs: the past
In the 1950s and 1960s the policy for SMEs in Japan was coined by the
view that the Japanese economy is dualistically structured. Japanese
SMEs had to be modernized as their backwardness in productivity
and innovation activities reduced the efficiency of the whole Japanese
economy. This view strongly influenced the ‘Basic Law for Small and
Medium Enterprises’ of 1963, which denoted the following targets for the
policy for SMEs (Storz 1997: 72–73; Arita 2001):
1 modernization and structural improvements,13
2 compensation of disadvantages through size,
3 programmes for the stabilization of companies as well as
4 special programmes for very small enterprises.14
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In order to realize an increase in productivity, economies of scale were
supposed to be achieved by cooperation and a reduction of the so-called
‘over-competition’. In consequence, the number of legally established
cartels in the 1960s increased to over 1,000 legal cartels in 1966, most of
them constituted by SMEs.15 These cartels were excepted from the anti-
monopoly law. Additionally, co-operations and recession and rationalization
cartels were admitted by administrative guidances (Teraoka 1997: 253;
CKC 1998: 258, 270; Storz 2003a,b,c).
New approaches and new politics
The success of the American model in the 1970s led to a change in target
definition and programme formulation. The ‘Vision for Medium
Enterprises in the 1980s’, published by the Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency, for the first time differentiated between ‘entrepreneurial’ and
‘stable’ SMEs and saw their target group in the former. Moreover, in con-
trast to the previous practice, SME policy was understood as a framework-
oriented policy geared at enabling companies to help themselves (CKC
2001: 216).
The new perception of SMEs was extended to official statements, as in
the ‘Vision for the 1990s’ which, inter alia, defines the support of enter-
prise foundations, the support of change from previous branches to new
and innovative fields of activity, extension of the infrastructure and the
promotion of internationalization as central targets of the new SME pol-
icy. It was pointed out that overcoming dualism – the normative base of
the ‘Basic Law’ of 1963 – was no longer the target of political actions. On
the contrary, it was stressed that the changed environment had created new
chances for SMEs which required an alternative design of programmes,
namely a policy that refrains from direct intervention and seeks for better
rules and rules implementation, especially in the area of financing. The
‘Research Council for Medium Enterprises’ within the Small and Medium
Enterprise Agency writes in its final report that:
it is inappropriate to call SMEs as a whole ‘weak’. SMEs in the
21st century are mobile, creative and a source of dynamism for the
Japanese economy. They promote free development and the creation
of employment and in this sense fulfil an active role.
(trans. the author, Shinoharao 2000: 23; see Arita 2001: 17)
The changing perception can also be seen in the main aims of the
revised Basic Law of 1999, which were:
1 promotion of start-ups, promotion of innovative enterprises,
2 extension and consolidation of the management and
3 adjustment to changed socio-economic basic conditions (CKC 2000:
2–3; Shinoharao 2000: 22).
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In contrast to the previous Basic Law for SMEs, the promotion of start-
ups and the building-up of an adequate infrastructure for consulting,
financing and research play an important role. This change has to be
understood against a background of changes in innovation policy, which,
since the 1990s, aim at strengthening the innovative potential of Japanese
companies more than before. Also the changes in economic policy, which
aim at a more rule- and framework-oriented policy, have to be taken into
account. As a result, a selection of SMEs was accepted, at least implicitly,
and it can be observed that, for the first time since the 1990s, the number
of SMEs is shrinking. Especially the number of exits is high, which
supports the thesis that SME policy has indeed changed its leitmotif.
The interesting aspect is that the formulation of new goals and
programmes can only be attributed to changed economic indicators to a
limited degree, at least in the 1990s. To put it differently: new problems
are admitted, although the important economic indicators demonstrate a
more difficult stance for SMEs in the 1990s: between 1992 and 1999 the
relative income in very small companies (5–29 employees, compared to
companies with more than 500 employees  100) shrunk from 60.3 to
53.9 per cent. In small companies (30–99 employees) it decreased from
69.4 to 61.2 per cent and in medium-sized companies (100–499 employ-
ees) from 81.3 to 76.0 per cent (CKC 2000: 30; supplementary material).
Moreover, as the decreasing number of enterprises show, SMEs obviously
lost their ability to create employment. The danger of a new dualism,
namely a dualism that runs right through SMEs was therefore stressed by
several authors (CKC 1997: 151). As a result, the cognitive frame of
‘weak’ SMEs persisted and found relatively easy access to the programme
formulation as the following discussion will show.
The other side of the medal again
On the first glance, it seems astonishing that traditional concepts of SMEs
found entrance into programme formulation: not only the success of the
American model, but also the high amount of bad loans from public finan-
cial institutions for SMEs16 or the restricted possibilities of Japanese
SMEs to influence the political process17 do not support the expectation
that the traditional perception of SME can effect the policy-making
process. The following list of counter-running political measures indicates
that this is not the case, though. Obviously, the selection of enterprises is
accepted only up to a certain degree:
Institutional framework: tolerance of defection and re-regulation
● Formal requirements for the founding of a joint-stock company are
still low, despite a legal reform in 1990. Therefore, the more attractive
legal form of a joint-stock company is the predominant form among
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SMEs.18 It allows advantages in fund raising (higher acceptance of
this legal form), advantages in decision-making (stronger position of
the managing director), and also advantages in tax law (favourable
taxation, e.g. from a certain income). Apart from the few formal
requirements, the lax way of dealing with formal regulations favours
the choice of this legal form. For example, regulations such as the
convening and holding of annual, general shareholders meetings can
be avoided (Kliesow and Musahl 2000: 214–219).
● The fact that the violation of regulations is politically tolerated also
applies for taxation practice. According to older studies, tax assess-
ment for gainful employment is lowest with self-employed persons:
apparently 88.4 per cent of salaried employees, but only 39.5 per cent
of all owner–managers paid tax. Also, smaller trading companies were
able to use the existing leeway. According to a report by the leading
Japanese economic newspaper Nihon Keizai Shinbun, around 60 per
cent of the SMEs reported losses in the books. Therefore, as loss mak-
ing companies, they were not required to pay taxes.19 The mild tax
administration, which was confirmed in later studies, is supposed to
also be supported by corresponding regulations in commercial law.
They are not unequivocal, due to various new regulations (see as well
as Storz 1997: 65–79; Kliesow and Musahl 2000: 214–219).
● In order to reduce the effects of deregulation in the retail industry by
abolishing the hitherto necessary licence for the sale of alcohol, its
sale will be re-regulated. Now it is planned that as from September
2003 at least one person especially trained for the selling of alcohol
has to be employed. This favours already existing small alcohol shops
(Japan aktuell, April 2001; see also Jung 2000: 35).
New policies: supporting programmes for ‘weak’ SMEs
● Public institutions specialized in the funding of SMEs, such as the
National Life Finance Corporation or the Japan Finance Corporation
for Small Businesses, try to avoid a selection of less competitive com-
panies by – in contrast to private institutions – either raising their
credit volume in weak economic periods or periods of restrictive fund-
ing by the banks, or at least by reducing it to a lesser extent.20
● Further resources are granted for the allocation of guarantees and
securities because, among other things, one wants to establish safety
measures for failed enterprises (Shinoharao 2000: 26; MoF 2001).
● Since October 1998 additional loan guarantees for SMEs have been
granted under a state credit guarantee programme. This programme was
prolonged from 2000 to 2001 over a second supplementary budget.
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● Until that point, guarantees were allotted almost without conditions,
which might explain the relatively large percentage of SMEs that had
been granted a state loan guarantee before going bankrupt among all
the SME bankruptcies (Bosse 1998, 1999, 2001a,b).21
Why does re-regulation and ongoing protection of SMEs still take
place? One explanation is the obvious lack of social policy in Japan. SME
policy can be interpreted as a functional equivalent to labour market
policy, and, in this interpretation, follows the same rationality as the well-
known Large-scale Retail Store Law or other industrial policy measures,
namely to protect working places. Especially since the 1990s the increase
of unemployment was the highest in Japanese younger economic history,
and since Japan possesses almost no social net which could absorb the
unemployed, functional equivalents for the lacking social policy schemes
seem to be more urgent than before. Nevertheless, it is astonishing
that neither the high budget pressure nor the possibility of losing inter-
national competitiveness by protective policies leads to drastic change.
One reason why the perception of SMEs as weak (in the sense of low
contribution to innovation and employment) is pushed into the political
process in a relatively easy way, may be found in a specific preference
for consensus-oriented decision-making. This again has its origin in a
preference for long-term relationships, which has been proved in sev-
eral comparative social psychology research papers (comp. Pascha 2002;
Storz 2003a,b,c, 2005). Another reason beside the functional equivalent
argument may be seen in different opinions how innovation systems
should be designed and reformed. Concretely, it is questioned whether
it makes sense to give up traditional strengths of the Japanese innova-
tion system with its specific role attached to SMEs (that is: long-term 
co-operation, market-oriented research), and whether it would not make
more sense to develop the strengths of the Japanese system, instead of
trying to radically reform it (compare Lynn/Kishida in this volume too).
This question will be taken up in the next section.
Evaluation: the case of regional technology centres
The most noticeable fact from a ‘Western’ perspective is that hitherto
there has been no publicly accessible evaluation of Japanese policy for
SMEs by a third party, in contrast to other OECD countries. This could be
due to the following special characteristics of the decision-making process
in Japan:
● Apart from the field of policy, control is a general problem in the
Japanese economic policy system.
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● The self-image of the central bureaucracy makes evaluation by a third
party difficult. It can be seen in the political practice of staff transfer
to subordinate branches or affiliated institutes. Another example
would be the strategy of sangakukan, meaning a cooperative research
within the triangle private sector – industry – bureaucracy and not, as
more known in Europe, a private-sector strategy which can then be
accompanied by political measures, if necessary. Another sign is that
a law on the publication of information was only issued just lately
(Köllner 1998a, 1998b).
● The fluid organizational structure within the ministries complicates an
evaluation of individual organization units (Ôkuma 1999: 39).
In this chapter, the effectiveness of prefectural technology centres
(kôsetsushi) and their functions in the future will be discussed from the
view of local staff and central bureaucracy.22
Technology transfer centres, as they exist in Japan, are not known in
this form in the United States nor in Germany. Formally, they are mostly
financed by the regions, and only a small percentage of the budget comes
from central ministries and private sources.23 In actual fact this means
that – because of the centralized tax system – the centres are financed by
the central government, so that their conception has to follow the actual
strategy of national innovation policy.
Basically, the centres fulfil three functions: conducting examination
and conformity tests, providing a technical advisory service and coopera-
tive research. Half of the centres were founded before 1950 (Abe 1998),
many of them even in the beginning of the last century.24 Their most
important task is to conduct examinations and tests as well as giving rel-
evant technical advice. They examine the conformity of products regard-
ing special quality grading (e.g. breakage risk of materials) that are
defined by manufacturer standards, national standards (Japan Industrial
Standards) or other technical regulations. There is open access to testing
machines. The fees are relatively low in comparison to private suppliers.
Major centres execute around 12,000 tests as well as 1,800 consultations
per year (Nagano-ken 1997). The usage intensity is relatively high, with
one enterprise out of 10–15 using the centres. The success initiated
learning processes in other countries. In 1992, within the framework of
the so-called MEP programme (Manufacturing Extension Partnership),
170 Manufacturing Extension Centres were opened in the US. Their basic
task of providing a comprehensive technical advisory service makes them
similar to the Japanese technology centres.
Were the political targets of modernization, stabilization and dynamics
(‘consistency’) reached from the viewpoint of the local staff and the
central bureaucracy? What are the tasks for the centres in the future?
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The local staff and the central bureaucracy agree that the centres’ tech-
nical advisory service is comprehensive and the technical infrastructure of
high quality. (This statement does not deny that there are areas where defi-
ciencies in technical equipment exist.) There is also consensus on the
appraisal of user-friendliness: the degree of familiarity of local SMEs with
the centres is estimated at 50–80 per cent, while the degree of usage is
estimated at 10–15 per cent.25 The reasons for the centres’ relatively high
degree of familiarity, which is not reached in other countries as, for exam-
ple, in Germany, are seen in their comprehensive range of services and their
long-term local involvement. In addition, the geographical dispersion
shows a constant close neighbourhood of automobile manufacturers, their
suppliers and the centres. Later relocations, such as the building of new
production plants, are accompanied by a new construction or a reorganiza-
tion of the centres.26 From different perspectives the centres first and fore-
most have a classical function within a framework-oriented economic
policy: they try to compensate for disadvantages in the procurement of
information. Their function extends to counselling suppliers with regard to
(technical) quality control. From this point of view, the high quality of sub-
contracted components in Japan is not only achieved through group inter-
nal consultations (e.g. cooperative associations between producers and their
suppliers), but probably also to a relatively high extent through public sup-
port, namely technology centres. This can be compared to the government-
owned credit institutions’ important role for the provision of credits.
Within the last decade, however, different opinions have begun to
develop. The central bureaucracy criticized the centres’ low capability to
adapt to changed economic and technological conditions and to bring
forth more radical innovations, for example, by venture business. In the
future the centres should focus more heavily on research and innovation,
and become a part of the new national innovation policy. In order to pro-
mote this re-orientation, a stronger co-operation with venturous SMEs as
well as a stronger orientation toward applied basic research is called for.
In terms of terminology this can be seen in the renaming of the centres.
Their central service, the testing has been taken mostly out of the name.
They are now called Research Institutes or Technology Centres instead.27
The local staff and local users, especially the centres’ scientists, see the
necessity for reforms, but emphasize the danger of an increasing dualism
in SMEs and argue that co-operation in research necessitates long-term
personal relationships and therefore makes the long-term employment of
scientists a precondition. More important, though, is their warning not to
gamble with the specific Japanese strength of the Japanese innovation
system in the area of more incremental innovations.
Between the central bureaucracy and the local staff the perception of
problems is obviously different. While the central bureaucracy wishes to
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fit the policy for SMEs into the new concept of innovation policy, the
centres themselves insist on a stronger perception of realities, or, to put it
more clearly, on their version of reality; they see the strength of SMEs
more in networking (and thus, weak in generating radical innovations),
and less in independent, risky operations. The slow change we can observe
in the centres strategy can again be explained by peculiar structures in
the communication between both parties, which lead to a highly permeable
political process:
● Communication between the parties is made easier by long-term
employment on part of the locals as well as central bureaucracy.
● Communication between different technology centres is promoted
through formal and informal mechanisms (e.g. regular meetings).
● Communication between central and local bureaucratic entities is
improved through staff transfer. The centres, financed by the prefectures,
absorb bureaucrats from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
This form of communication results in incremental change, and addi-
tionally requires a relatively high input of work and capital. One could
argue that this pattern of communication hinders political reforms, but
there might be even some economic rationality behind this approach: the
communication structure means that both sides have the chance to com-
municate their different perception of realities, to converge their cognitive
models, and to establish a common and new cognitive model of how the
centres should work in the end. This may raise implementation success in
the long run. Independently from this possible advantage, a problem of the
system definitely is its high degree of centralization, which impedes the
realization of trial and error processes with different concepts of innova-
tion policies. There have been efforts to decentralize the system for several
years, but hitherto changes have been – at the most – incremental.
Conclusion: cognitive models and reforms
This contribution analysed why institutional change often takes place
incrementally, and much slower than expected. One central reason for the
incrementality of change was identified in cognitive models, which exist
in the political process prior to the later phases of target definition, pro-
gramme formulation and evaluation, and influence the whole political
process. Since cognitive models are a basic orientation structure, they
have to be stable – otherwise, they would not be able to offer orientation.
Necessarily, in the case of political reforms, the stable nature of cognitive
models, and the fact that they exist before the political process starts,
lead to a slow speed in political reforms. Taking cognitive models into
account when analysing economic policy is a relatively new approach in
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economics, and when it is done, then it is mostly on a rather abstract level.
This contribution aims at giving empirical evidence for the importance of
cognitive models in the political process, using a selected field of eco-
nomic policy, namely SME policy, and the problems of implementing spe-
cific reforms in this field. The case of Japanese SME policy is especially
interesting since the aims of the reforms are drastic, radically establishing
a new concept of SMEs and SME policy. Hitherto, in Japan SMEs have
been perceived as being weak in their contribution to innovation and
employment, and were by no means seen as entrepreneurial venturous
actors. In this contribution, this perception of SMEs was identified on the
level of economic policy, in education and science, in the media and in the
general public for the 1950s and 1960s. Starting from the 1970s, but more
strongly since the last decade, political concepts towards SMEs and the
functions of SME policy have changed to a large extent, ascribing SMEs
a completely new role in the Japanese innovation system as creative, inno-
vative players, and interpreting SME policy as being part of a more rule-
oriented innovation policy than being part of social policy, as it had been
so far. But despite the efforts to implement corresponding reforms, this
contribution makes clear that the traditional perception of SMEs still
easily gains entry to the later political phases. On the first glance this is
astonishing since the political power of SMEs is restricted, especially
in Japan, and was attributed to the fact that the specific preference of
consensus-oriented decisions in Japanese society lead to unfinished,
inconsistent solutions, more than in other permeable societies. As a
result, it took 30 years to revise the central ‘Basic Law for Small and
Medium Enterprises’ with its objective to change SME policy to an
entrepreneurship policy. Now, after the revision, the law is impeded by a
political practice that allows deviation and re-regulation, and issues new
programmes that tend to avoid a stricter selection of SMEs. The Japanese
SME policy is obviously not able to leave its traditional pattern of an at
least partially-oriented social policy, and to change into a more strictly
innovation-oriented policy.
One central reason for arguing that Japanese SME policy should be
changed is that the traditional dominance of incremental innovation is
a problem as it is risky to decouple basic research and applied research. The
unsuccessful implementation of reforms may therefore reduce the prospec-
tive competitiveness of Japan. That is the reason why the central govern-
ment is making considerable efforts to change the perception of SMEs
from being weak to being highly innovative and venture-business-like
actors, and to change the respective policies. One reason for the low suc-
cess of reforms might be that cognitive models cannot be easily changed
top-down, as it has obviously been tried in the last years. Thus, a more
appropriate approach could be to decentralize the hitherto centralized SME
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policies more – even the here discussed technology centres, financed by
prefectures, are central organizations in the end, as the prefectures’ income
largely depends on central tax resources. A stronger decentralization and
an admission of trial and error in SME policy could stimulate more vari-
eties in political solutions and the selection of more appropriate SME
policies. Since one can expect rational actors to reflect which cognitive
models are the ‘right’ ones, and to realise how they influence the long-
range utility, such a competition between policies could change cognitive
models too. It is possible that this insight had actually found consideration
in innovation policies where change much speedier took place.
At the same time, however, one needs to ask whether the incremental
change of SME policy really is a problem, since it might be rational to
avoid high changing costs and to give people more time to learn new
behavioural strategies: if one bears in mind that SME policy has so far
worked as a functional equivalent for the lack of social policy, that regu-
lations especially in the sectors of retailing and building industry have
been reduced, and that the former rather closed labour markets are open-
ing, it may indeed be rational to avoid an overly radical change in order to
give actors a chance to learn and to adapt. Another argument why incre-
mental change must not be seen as a problem, is that the Japanese inno-
vation trajectory possesses not only weaknesses, but also specific
strengths that should not be overlooked: in contrast to other innovation
systems, it is able to generate incremental, speedy and highly successful
market-oriented innovations; and in this system, SMEs with their dense
networking and market orientated research, play an important role, which
is not easy to imitate. Indeed, given paths of innovation must not be a
problem, if sufficient varieties in the paths are given. It might be more
risky to give up the specific strengths of a system and to establish a new
regime with an uncertain success. Thus, the incremental change of SME




Fukuoka Prefecture Industrial Fukuoka-ken Kôgyô Gijutsu 
Technology Research Centre Sentâ
Prefectural technology centres Kôsetsu Shiken Kenkyû Kikan;
Kôsetsushi
Research Council for Medium Chûshô Kigyô Seisaku 
Enterprises Kenkyûkai
Technology Research Institute Osaka-furitsu Sangyô Gijutsu
of Osaka Prefecture TRI Sôgô Kenkyûsho
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Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Tôkyô-toritsu Sangyô Gijutsu
Technology Research Institute Kenkyûjo
Laws
Basic Law for Small and Chûshô Kigyô Kihonhô
Medium Enterprises
Law for the Promotion of SMEs Chûshô Kigyô Kindaika 
Sokushinhô
Law on the Organization Chûshô Kigyô Dantai no 
of SMEs Soshiki ni kansuru Hôritsu; 
Chûdanhô
Law on the Stabilization of SMEs Chûshô Kigyô Anteihô
Other terms
adjustment to changed socio- keizaiteki shakaiteki kankyô no
economic basic conditions henka e no tekiô no enkatsuka
aid programmes kyûsai seisaku
challenging chôsen
Compendium of Economic Chûshô Kigyô Seisaku no 
Policy Measures for the Aramashi
Medium Enterprise
compensation of disadvantages jigyô katsudô no furi no zesei
through size
conducting examination irai shiken
conformity tests jishu kenkyû
cooperative associations between kyôryokukai
producers and their suppliers
cooperative research kyôdô kenkyû
danger of a new dualism shin nijû kôzô mondai
dark kurai
dual structure nijû kôzô
dynamic katsuryoku
entrepreneurial spirit kigyôka seishin
entrepreneurial vision for kigyôteki hatten shikô
medium enterprises
extension and consolidation keiei kiban no kyôka
of the management
foundation and entrepreneurship sôgyô; kigyôka seishin
hidden champions chûken kigyô
information orientation jôhôka
loss making companies kesson geisha
modernization and structural kindaika; kôdoka
improvements
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new shin; atarashii
new development possibilities shinbunya
non-cash capital provision shihon sôbiritsu
over-competition katô kyôsô
programmes for small entrepreneurs shôkibo kigyô taisaku
promotion of start-ups, promotion of keiei no kakushin oyobi sôgyô
innovative enterprises no sokushin
providing a technical advisory service gijutsu sôdan/shidô
quality control hinshitsu kanri
research institutes kenkyûsho
SME policies chûshô kigyô seisaku
SME problem chûshô kigyô monadi
stabilization of companies keiei no antei
stable vision for medium enterprises seigyôteki antei shikô
strengthening of the enterprise base keiei kiban no kyôka
structural change kôzô henka
technology centres gijutsu centâ
testing shiken
tiring, dirty and dangerous kitsui, kitanai, kiken
too many enterprises kigyôsû no katasei
weak enterprise jakusha
Notes
1 The contribution is a result of a research project sponsored by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (1999–2002).
2 Cf. Eggertsson 1997.
3 The terms ‘entities’ or ‘groups’ would be more exact. In this contribution, the
Japanese society is understood as one social entity.
4 Koch (1998) discusses the role cognition plays in economic policy processes in
elementary and convincing terms. See also Meier and Slembeck 1998. On the
relationship between cognitive models, emotions and preferences see Herrmann-
Pillath 1993.
5 Programme formulation is understood as the choice of instruments here.
6 One exception on economic policy in Japan is Pascha 2000. On the policy of SMEs
see Teraoka (1997: 251–259), who at least touches the question of the emergence
of problems. See also one of the latest publications of Miwa and Ramseyer (2001)
critically.
7 For the respective Japanese terms, see the glossary at the end of this contribution.
8 The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency is a department of the METI (Ministry
for Economy, Trade and Industry). Within the METI, the Small and Medium
Enterprise Agency with the Patent Office is the only department that was not re-
organised during the re-structurization of the central ministries. About 1.6 per cent
of the Japanese METI’s employees work in the Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency (Shinjo 2000: 4, 15).
9 White Papers are being published since 1963. In 1969, no White Paper came out.
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10 A third pillar is the ‘Programmes for small entrepreneurs’ (shôkibo kigyô taisaku),
which already signals that some leeway was left for other than entrepreneurial,
venturous enterprises.
11 See, for example, Teikoku Shoin (2001) with information on enterprise founda-
tions and procurement of risk and venture capital, or Nihon Bunkyô Shuppan
(2001) also with the focus on innovative companies and their tribute to the
economic development of Japan.
12 See Nihon Bunkyô Shuppan (2001) for a report on venture businesses and dual-
ism in SMEs or Juken Kenkyû Shuppansha (2001).
13 The included ‘Law for the Promotion of SMEs’ is considered an especially exten-
sively used instrument of Japanese policy for SMEs (Arita 2001: 9). For the most
important laws concerning SMEs see CKC (1998: 256–270) as well as Teraoka
(1997: 34–35).
14 Many of the included concrete political measures are borrowed from industrial
policy, for example, trying to achieve modernization and structural improvements
through the promotion of small industry agglomerations or specifically industri-
ally organized cooperatives.
15 Their admission fell under the ‘Law on the Organization of SMEs’ and
the ‘Import-Export Law’, which are part of the ‘Law on the Stabilization
of SMEs’.
16 The average rate of bad loans in the public sector is worst for the Japan Finance
Corp. for Small Businesses, which is about 8 per cent, and for the National Life
Finance Corp. where it is about 9 per cent. The rate of bad loans in the public sec-
tor is supposed to be strongly underestimated due to a lack of external controls.
The official average rate of bad loans for public institutions is about 3.3 per cent,
while up to about 9 per cent in the private sector (NW, 5 August 2002).
17 Their economic resources are limited because of their small size – most of them are
below the average of companies in other OECD-countries; their reputation is low
as the expression ‘3-K-industries’ shows, and they have little knowledge how to
choose adequate communication structures. Moreover, they are strongly tied to
their respective parent company, which supports the feeling of sharing a common
destiny. The Japanese Chamber of Commerce only represents the political interests
of SMEs to a certain extent. Its committee members come from larger enterprises
and, since membership is voluntary, hardly any small enterprises are represented at
all. A special clause for very small enterprises or companies operating at a loss,
such as in Germany, does not exist. Therefore, the representation of interests within
and between associations is asymmetrical: the Chamber, at the most, symbolically
meets the requirement of pursuing a complete and pluralistic representation of
interests. Moreover, the local chambers are not very effective because of their
structure, which only covers small areas. In 2001, there were 526 local chambers.
18 Most of the joint-stock companies remain family property and are not listed in the
stock markets. Of the approx. 6.4 million SMEs, about 1.3 million are joint-stock
companies (Storz 1997: 65).
19 Data is from the beginning of the 1980s.
20 While private institutions reduced their credit volume by 4.3–5 per cent from the
first to the second quarter of 2001, public institutions were only able to reduce it
by 1.3 per cent. In 1998/1999, public institutions increased their credits by up to
5 per cent compared to the previous year, while private institutions decreased their
credits by up to 7 per cent for the same period. This trend can be observed since
1994 (Chôsa Kihô 2001: 109).
21 Furthermore, the ninth package for the stimulation of economic activity allotted
financial help to SMEs. This represents nearly 40 per cent of the complete package
(Bosse 2001a).
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22 The following arguments are based on interviews conducted in Japan in 1999.
Central and local bureaucracy, users of the centres and scientists working there
were interviewed.
23 An example: 76 per cent of the funds for the Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial
Technology Research Institute come from the city of Tokyo. 12 per cent come
from research co-operations with private companies, 5 per cent from the budget
of the MITI and related associations, and 7 per cent of the funds it raised itself
(Kagaku Gijutsuchô 1992: 108–109; Shapira 1992; see also Kagaku Gijutsuchô
1997: 25, 56). Due to the specific, prefectural funding in Japan, this means that
the usage of funds follows central goals, for example, currently this is the
orientation towards more intensive research activities.
24 There are, for example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research
Institute (Tôkyô-toritsu Sangyô Gijutsu Kenkyûjo) founded in 1921, the Fukuoka
Prefecture Industrial Technology Research Centre (Fukuoka-ken Kôgyô Gijutsu
Sentâ) founded in 1925 and the Technology Research Institute of Osaka Prefecture
(TRI; Osaka-furitsu Sangyô Gijutsu Sôgô Kenkyûsho) founded in 1929. The major
part of the older foundations was realised in cooperation with local cooperatives
(Yamazaki 1969). See also Sangyô 1997.
25 According to a centre in Nagoya, an interview of the Nihon Fine Ceramics Centre
among venture businesses resulted in a degree of familiarity of 50 per cent, while
other investigations among SMEs reached results of up to 80 per cent (Sangyô
1997). According to employees, an often long-term acquaintance between centre
employees and entrepreneurs results in a relatively high willingness to cooperate.
With 25.9 per cent the centres are the second most important partner for external
cooperation (e.g. research cooperation, etc.) for SMEs (SMEs of the same branch
are in the first place with 27 per cent). Although large enterprises use the centres
much more often with 31 per cent, the relative significance for large enterprises
is relatively lower since other institutions are used much more often (universities:
64.5 per cent; cooperations with large enterprises of the same branch: 35.5 per
cent) (CKC 2001: 300; see also Sangyô 1997).
26 The centres in Kanagawa and Tochigi, for example, were founded after Nissan set
up its production site there and the centre in Hiroshima after Mazda moved there.
(then Tôyô Kôgyô; see Ruigrok and Tate 1996).
27 In fact, R&D expenses for SMEs are very low in comparison to the United States.
In the years from 1983 to 1997, the Japanese government’s R&D expenses for
SMEs only amounted to the tenth to twentieth part of the American expenses.
The difference is even increasing (CKC 2000: 162).
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The Japanese “national innovation system” has attracted the attention of
both scholars (e.g. Nelson 1984; Freeman 1987; Odagiri and Goto 1993)
and policy makers (e.g. OTA 1984; Holdridge 1994) for a number of
reasons. First of all, since Japan was forced to open its economy to the
outside world in the 1850s, and the Meiji government introduced a new
political system in 1868, Japanese policy makers have strongly believed
that Japan’s national security, indeed its national survival, was highly
dependent on technology. If anything, this belief was reinforced by Japan’s
defeat in the Second World War. As a consequence, perhaps more than any
other country, Japan has made consistent top–down efforts explicitly to
develop a national innovation system. While similar efforts have sporadi-
cally been made in Europe and the United States, in Japan they persisted,
often with the same policy makers in charge, through war, peace, eco-
nomic crisis, and changes in government for well over a century (Johnson
1982; Samuels 1994).
Second, until recently there was a strong sense that the Japanese
national innovation system has been highly successful. After all, Japan
was the first non-Western society in modern times to “catch up” with, and
often out compete, the West. The Japanese national innovation system has
often been held up as a model for the United States and Europe, as well as
developing countries (e.g. Ouchi 1984; Vogel 1985; Anchordoguy 1989).
Third, however, and somewhat paradoxically, the apparent success of
the Japanese system has seemed inconsistent with academic theory about
what is needed for success in national innovation systems. Writings on
national innovation systems commonly focus on government and business
(Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992), and sometimes universities as well
(Nelson 1993). Even when the Japanese economy was doing well, critics
pointed to weaknesses in all three elements of the Japanese system.
Japan’s government was widely seen as overly focused on picking winners
and as favoring entrenched interests. Japan’s business sector was com-
monly seen as dominated by arteriosclerotic networks of large firms. And,
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Japan’s universities have seemed largely irrelevant to the development and
commercialization of new technology. A few scholars have argued that
Japan’s successes occurred not because of the coordinated guidance of
government and big business, but rather in spite of these top–down poli-
cies. Others have seized on Japan’s apparent failures in computer soft-
ware, biotechnology and other areas to suggest that the Japanese
innovation system was well-suited to catching up, but is poorly suited to
developing frontier technologies (for a sampling of critical views of the
Japanese system see Trezise and Suzuki 1976; Patrick 1986; Friedman
1988; Callon 1995; Dick 1995).
Notwithstanding such criticisms, Japan’s earlier successes led observers in
Japan and around the world in the late 1980s to believe that Japan, relying on
a national innovation system dominated by the largest established firms and
coordinated by government, was on its way to establishing world leadership
in biotechnology. By the early 1990s, however, it was beginning to seem that
the American model, which strongly supported university research and new
business ventures, was more conducive to strength in biotechnology.
Japanese policy makers began consciously reshaping their national innova-
tion system in this area. In this chapter we look at how this restructuring has
impacted Japanese small firms, universities and the biotechnology industry.
We are particularly interested in the following questions: Why did the
Japanese model apparently fail in the case of biotechnology, even though
it had earlier apparently led to success in semiconductors and other
advanced technologies? What changes were made in the Japanese system?
How closely does the “new” Japanese system replicate the US system? To
the extent evaluation is possible, is the new system working? What pitfalls
might there be with the new system?
The first section on “The original Japanese national innovation system in
biotechnology” describes the rise and fall of the reputation of the Japanese
model of high technology commercialization in biotechnology. It indicates
why so many people believed that this model was suited to the emerging
biotechnology industry. It then goes on to discuss why the Japanese model
apparently did not work in biotechnology. Some of the faults attributed to
the Japanese model also seemed applicable to the biotechnology systems
in major European countries. The following section on “The US national
biotechnology innovation system as a model for Japan” describes how
Japanese policy makers concluded that Japan needed to restructure its
biotechnology system to create an environment that encourages the forma-
tion of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and that addition-
ally encourages the transfer of technology and skills from universities to
these enterprises. Much of this was based on perceptions of the reasons
for the success of biotechnology in the United States. The penultimate
section on “Restructuring the Japanese innovation system” gives some early
data allowing a tentative evaluation of the results of the new policies.
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Finally, a concluding section speculates about the prospects for Japan’s
new innovation system in biotechnology.
The original Japanese national innovation system in
biotechnology: from model for the world to the “little
engine that couldn’t”
In the 1980s it was widely believed that Japan was on a path to dominate
the global biotechnology industry (see Lynn and Kishida 2004 for a more
extended review of the literature on this). This was the conclusion of at
least two major US government supported studies, one by the US
Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) (US Congress Office
of Technology Assessment 1984) and the other by the Japan Technology
Evaluation Center (reports summarized in Holdridge 1994). Both studies
concluded that the Japanese system was more suited to the biotechnology
industry than the US system. In the Japanese system large firms led in
developing and commercializing new biotechnology. In the United States,
university researchers and new, financially weak start up firms led in
developing new technology. The large Japanese firms entering the
biotechnology industry were extremely strong in process development,
which the OTA believed would be crucial in commercializing biotechnol-
ogy, and they were backed by huge financial resources. If a US startup
firm developed a promising technology, the Japanese could simply buy
them out to acquire the technology. Many Japanese managers also were
confident that the biotechnology industry would soon be dominated by
Japan. In a 1981 survey, nearly half of the 128 Japanese firms responding
said that Japan could catch up with the United States in the commercial
development of biotechnology within 5 years – about a quarter thought it
would only take two or three years (cited in OTA 1984: 77).
An article in the New York Times during this period (Lohr 1983) said that
while Japan still lagged the United States in advanced areas of biotechnol-
ogy, “most” analysts believed the gap was closing. Large numbers of
Japanese chemical, pharmaceutical, and food companies were described as
moving into biotechnology. Other articles in the US business and science
press also pointed with alarm to the apparent loss of the biotechnology
industry to Japan. The US was advised to borrow aspects of the Japanese
approach (e.g. Dibner 1985) and warned about surrendering its technology
via Japanese/US collaboration in biotechnology (Yoshikawa 1989; Forrest
1996). In 1990 Business Week expressed a clear view of what many
observers thought was happening. It quoted the editor of Nikkei Biotech, as
saying: “It’s the typical tale. The front runners are all American, until Japan
steps in with improvements.” As Business Week summarized the situation
“With characteristic hubris and drive, the Japanese are charging into
biotechnology. Starting from scratch a decade or so ago, they licensed
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sophisticated techniques from US and Japanese partners. Then, they
poured Japan Inc.’s resources into building a biotech industry.”
By the mid-1990s, however, the conventional wisdom had made an
about face. Economist (November 18, 1995) pointed out that despite all of
Japan’s putative advantages in biotechnology, Japan had not only failed to
develop a competitive industry, but had even become a huge importer of
biotechnology products. As Fortune (1996) put it: “Today the [Japanese
biotechnology] dynamo seems like the little engine that couldn’t.”
Academic researchers reached a similar conclusion (Callan 1996; Forrest
1996; Bartholomew 1997; Darby and Zucker 1999).
The US national biotechnology innovation 
system as a model for Japan
Since the United States was so conspicuously successful in the biotechnol-
ogy industry, academics and policy makers in Japan have used the US
model in diagnosing the weaknesses of the Japanese biotechnology indus-
try. Similar critiques have also been made of the national innovation systems
for biotechnology in such European countries as Germany (e.g. Giesecke
2000; Casper and Kettler 2001; Prevezer 2001; Lehrer and Asakawa 2004),
France (e.g. Mangematin 2000; Lemarie et al. 2001), Italy (e.g. Orsenigo
2001), Sweden (Carlsson 2001), and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom
(e.g. Casper and Kettler 2001; Prevezer 2001).
Figure 6.1 compares the US and Japanese biotechnology commercial-
ization systems. Although we have not studied the systems in major
European countries as carefully, we believe (with the possible exception
of the United Kingdom) that they would more closely resemble the
Japanese system as depicted here (e.g. Lehrer and Asakawa 2004; though















Figure 6.1 Network structure in US and Japanese biotechnology industries.
Source: Lynn and Kishida (2004).
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Muller et al. (2004) say large firms were not important in the German
biotechnology industry until recently). The large black circle at the center
of the diagram representing the US model is intended to suggest that
biotech startups are more important in the US than in the Japanese
biotechnology innovation system. Large, diversified firms are important
in both systems, but in the United States the large firms specialize in
commercializing technology developed by startup firms. Thus the lines
connecting the biotech firms with large firms, venture capital and academia
are in bold for the US model, but not for the Japanese.
Various empirical indicators support this characterization. In 1997, for
example, there were similar numbers of large firms in the US and
Japanese biotechnology industries (300 in the US compared to 260 in
Japan). The US, however, had about twenty times as many start up
biotechnology firms as Japan (1,274 compared to 60). Other data further
support and extend the characterization in Figure 6.1. In studying firms
newly active in the biotechnology industry, Darby and Zucker (1996)
found that 77 percent of the US firms were started as biotech firms, while
88 percent of the Japanese firms were started as divisions of firms in other
industries. Darby and Zucker (1999) also found that only about 10 percent
of the Japanese firms active in biotechnology (between 1975 and 1989)
were newly established, compared to about two-thirds of the US firms
(between 1976 and 1990).
Japan Patent Office data (2001) also support the idea that large US
firms rely on smaller firms for technology, while large Japanese firms
develop their own technology. Between 1990 and 1997, large firms were
responsible for 76 percent of the biotechnology patents filed by Japanese,
while large US firms accounted for only 17 percent of the patents filed by
Americans. In the US, venture firms accounted for 30 percent of the
patents filed, while universities and public institutes accounted for the
rest. This also reflects the greater importance of universities as a source of
biotechnology in the United States. As was mentioned earlier, until the
early 1990s the Japanese model portrayed in Figure 6.1 was believed to be
much stronger than the US model. The reasoning at the time was that
while the United States would continue to be stronger at developing new
technologies, this strength would support the Japanese, not the US
biotechnology industry. The large Japanese firms would simply buy tech-
nology developed in the US by taking over US start ups. After all, the
Japanese had taken over numerous US Silicon Valley firms in electronics,
and had ended up profiting more than Americans from such US inventions
as the transistor (Lynn 2000).
As it became clear that the Japanese model was not performing well,
interpretations changed. Greater attention was paid to systemic aspects of
the US biotechnology industry. Scholars pointed to symbiotic relationships
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between large firms and small venture-capital-backed firms, and also
between the small venture-capital-backed firms and universities.
A number of scholars argue that large firms are weaker than small
entrepreneurial firms at developing technological breakthroughs in
biotechnology for two reasons. A rich literature in technological innova-
tion suggests that large well-established firms in general are good at incre-
mental, but not paradigmatic innovation (Tushman and Anderson 1986;
Anderson and Tushman 1990; Henderson and Clark 1990; Christensen
1997). Aside from the general advantages new firms have because they
are not constrained by bureaucratic inertia, in the case of biotechnology
(and possibly other high technology industries) there is a more specific
advantage. These firms need to attract and motivate star scientists.
Venture-capital-backed firms are better able than large established firms
to do this because they can offer star scientists substantial equity stakes,
and thus the chance to become very wealthy (see, e.g. Audretsch and
Stephan 1996, 1999; Darby and Zucker 1996; Zucker and Darby 1997;
McMillan et al. 2000; Audretsch 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2001). On
the other hand, regulatory compliance requirements often mean that it
takes years for new biotechnology products to come to market. The startup
firms do not have the patient capital behind them to wait. This is the key
advantage of the large, well-established firms. So, the small startup firms
are better at developing new biotechnology, while the large established
firms are better at handling the final stages of commercialization.
The linkages between universities and venture-capital-backed firms are
also crucial to the US system. Academic scientists not only develop new
technology, but are also prominent in founding biotechnology start ups.
One study found that nearly half the founders of US start up firms in
biotechnology in the early 1990s were from universities (Audretsch and
Stephan 1999). Aside from this, existing biotechnology firms find they
need to be near US universities with strong biotechnology programs
(Zucker et al. 1998; McMillan et al. 2000).
As was noted earlier, until the early 1990s it was widely assumed that
large Japanese firms could as easily commercialize biotechnology devel-
oped in the US as their American counterparts. Indeed, some thought that
Japanese firms could do a better job of commercializing biotechnology
developed in the US than American firms because of their superior
process capabilities and stronger backing by banks and other keiretsu
partners. Japanese firms such as Kikkoman (with centuries of experience
producing soy sauce) and Kirin (one of the world’s largest brewers of beer)
were identified in a report by the US Congress Office of Technology
Assessment (1984) as emerging leaders in biotechnology.
It has not, however, proved to be as easy for Japanese firms to establish
linkages with US start up firms and universities in biotechnology. The
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reasons for the Japanese inability to effectively tap into the US innovation
system have not been systematically explored, but we would offer the fol-
lowing. Some research (Link and Rees 1996) suggests that small firms
are more efficient than large firms at commercializing university-based
research, thus by their very size the large Japanese firms may have been
handicapped at drawing on US universities as a source of technology.
Audretsch and Stephan (1996) suggest that proximity is crucial in the
case of the transfer of tacit knowledge. It may be that tacit knowledge is
unusually important in the case of biotechnology. It may be, as well, that
biotechnology is not as easily, “handed off ” as other technologies from
creators to developers. Substantial adjustments based on ongoing streams
of scientific research may be required during commercialization. Clearly,
the Japanese large firms would have the same problem as US large firms
in offering high-powered incentives to US star scientists, indeed, given
their higher degree of pay equity Japanese firms find this even more dif-
ficult than their US counterparts. The Japanese innovation system is much
stronger in engineering than in science. Japan graduates far more engi-
neers on a per capita basis than the US, but far fewer scientists and far
fewer technical people from post graduate programs (Lynn 2002). Finally,
US firms may have major advantages over Japanese firms in coping
with the various regulatory processes involved in getting approval for
biotechnology products.
Given the apparent inability of Japanese firms to tap into the US biotech-
nology system, Japanese policy makers sought to identify aspects of the
Japanese system that might be changed to increase Japan’s international
competitiveness in biotechnology. Several areas drew special attention.
One was the relatively small number of start up firms in Japan. Two points
might be made about this. First of all, it is not just in biotechnology that Japan
does not have many start up firms. As Figure 6.2 shows, Japanese are far less
likely than Americans to start or close down firms in any industry. Over the
last twenty years around 14 percent of all operating firms in the United States
were new entrants. In Japan the percentage was less than 4 percent.
As Figure 6.3 shows, Japan has also been less likely than most of the
large European countries to start and close down businesses (though the
gap is not large in the case of Italy – see Orsenigo (2001) on the poor
performance of the Italian biotechnology system).
A second apparent weakness of the Japanese biotechnology innovation
system is that Japanese universities have been weak in developing new
research programs, particularly in areas related to biotechnology. And, when
the universities have developed new technology, regulatory and other barri-
ers have made it difficult for them to transfer it to industry (Callan 1996;
Forrest 1996; Bartholomew 1997; Darby and Zucker 1999). A Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) official (Fujisue 1998) contrasted
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the situation in Japan with that in the United States. He pointed out that in
1994 US universities received about fifteen times as many patents as
Japanese universities (1,862 compared to 129) and that more than 1,000
high technology start ups had originated at US universities.
The Japanese patent system may also have inhibited the development of
biotechnology. All patent systems seek a balance between promoting the
diffusion of technology and protecting intellectual property. In its efforts
to catch up technologically after Second World War, Japan developed
a system that gave priority to the diffusion of technology (Wineberg 1988;
Maskus and McDaniel 1999). This is a particular problem in the case of
biotechnology, because in this industry new ventures must invest heavily
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Figure 6.3 Startup rates based on common definition, 1988–1994.
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Figure 6.2 Startup and closure rates in Japan and the United States.
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2001).
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in R&D. They have little incentive to make these investments unless they
are sure their intellectual property can be protected. Strong intellectual
property protection also makes it easier for scientists to communicate with
each other and for firms to collaborate (Chambers 2002). The US system
not only provided better protection for intellectual property rights than the
Japanese system, but was further strengthened in 1982 when the Court for
Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was formed and given exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals (Shapiro 1990).
Restructuring the Japanese innovation system
In the 1990s, Japanese policy makers were determined to restructure the
Japanese biotechnology innovation system. There was nothing new about
the interest in biotechnology. In the 1980s Japanese government policy
had also given priority to biotechnology. MITI published a “Vision for the
Biotechnology Industry” in 1988, and almost every Japanese cabinet-level
agency established some sort of biotechnology project. MITI, the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Health and
Welfare all set up cooperative research projects for major firms (JEI 1986,
1990; Yoshikawa 1989; Fransman and Tanaka 1995). None of these
projects, however, seem to have involved heavy spending by government,
particularly in comparison to the US government. Over a period of ten
years MITI, perhaps the most prominent ministry involved in biotechnol-
ogy, spent about $40 million per year on its widely-heralded cooperative
programs. In a single year during this period the US government spent
some $3.5 billion (Fransman and Tanaka 1995). Government’s role in
Japan was primarily to coordinate the activities of large firms.
By the 1990s many Japanese were becoming disillusioned with the indus-
trial and technological policies of the past. The conspicuous successes in
shipbuilding, steelmaking, auto production, consumer electronics, and semi-
conductors seemed increasingly remote. The Japanese economy seemed
unable to recover from the collapse of the stock and real estate markets. In
its annual White Paper in 1998 (MITI 1998), MITI repeated what was
becoming the conventional wisdom in Japan, saying the old system was no
longer working. MITI called for Japan to develop systems to supply venture
capital similar to those in the United States. In the case of biotechnology,
the Japanese government developed new policies in the mid-1990s to
encourage new bio-ventures, strengthen basic research in universities, and
facilitate knowledge transfer from universities to industry (Arita 1990, 1997;
Aoyama 1999; Collins and Wakoh 2000; Audretsch 2001).
Encouraging the development of new ventures
Until the 1990s Japanese SME policies generally focused on the role of
SMEs as subcontractors to major firms. In the 1930s, for example, the
Japanese national biotechnology innovation system 119
SFAI-06.qxd  25/11/05  2:40 PM  Page 119
main policy goal was to help SMEs produce more and higher quality
inputs for the large firms, and thus contribute to Japan’s military strength.
There was a shift during the years of the US occupation in the late 1940s and
early 1950s to strengthening SMEs as instruments of a more democratic eco-
nomic structure. After the end of the Occupation in 1952, however, the goal
changed back to enhancing the ability of SMEs to support major firms, and
thus to help improve Japan’s international competitiveness (Aoyama 1999).
In the mid-1990s new SME policies were introduced with a different
purpose – to help create a climate for entrepreneurship (see Table 6.1).
Some of these policies eliminated barriers for entrepreneurs trying to start
and grow their firms, others provided subsidies and incentives to encour-
age entrepreneurship (Callan 1996; Darby and Zucker 1996, 1999; Forrest
1996; Bartholomew 1997; Eshima 2003).
In 1994 MITI established a New Business Promotion Office to help start
ups explore new business opportunities. In 1995, the Small and Medium
Enterprise Agency (SMEA) launched an initiative to promote and assist
innovative SMEs. Various local areas also established programs to help start
ups. The Law Facilitating the Creation of New Business (New Businesses
Law) was passed in December 1998. This established the Japanese SME
Technology Innovation System, a Japanese version of Small Business
Innovation Research Program. Among other things, the Law gives subsidies
to SMEs for the development of technologies that will lead to the creation
of new businesses. The subsidies totaled more than $100 million in 2000.
Under one of these programs SMEs can receive half the cost of materials,
machinery, and technical guidance needed for R&D. The law also provides
for tax reductions for SMEs conducting research.
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Table 6.1 Japanese policies to facilitate the creation of new ventures, 1994–2000
1994 Establishment of New Business Promotion Office by MITI
1995 Law Facilitating Creative Activities of Small and Medium Enterprises
1997 Tax Treatment for Angel Investors
1998 Law Facilitating the Creation of New Businesses
Tax Treatment for Stock Options
1999 Amendment of Law Facilitating Creation of New Businesses
Amendment of Tax Treatment for Angel Investors
Law to Support Management Innovation for Small and Medium 
Enterprises
Law to Establish Japanese Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation 
(JASMEC)
Establishment of Japan Association of New Business Incubation 
Organizations (JANBO)
2000 Amendment of Tax Treatment for Angel Investors
Sources: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; Small and Medium Enterprise Agency
(various year).
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The laws regulating stock markets and venture capital funds were
changed to make it easier to start firms. Other new policies were intended
to improve the support structure for new firms. Based on the New
Businesses Law, for example, the Japan Association of New Business
Incubation Organizations (JANBO) was established in 1999 to serve as a
system of “incubators” for the creation of new businesses and to establish
“regional platforms” offering “one-stop” service for those developing new
businesses (JANBO 2002).
Increasing government spending on biotechnology R&D
One reason Japan’s basic science base has been relatively weak is that the
Japanese government spends far less on basic science than does the US
government (Callen 1996). Recently, there have been some efforts in
Japan to close the gap in government spending on biotechnology (the
Japanese budget for biotechnology areas increased from 170 billion yen
in 1997 to 305 billion yen in 2000. The project budget for 2004 was 500
billion yen (about $4.5 billion at current exchange rates – around the US
level of a decade ago). While it is difficult to find completely comparable
statistics for current United States federal government spending on
biotechnology, US government spending on the life sciences has also
increased rapidly, doubling in the last ten years, to reach about $30 billion
in 2004 (NSF various year).
Enhancing the role of universities in the Japanese
biotechnology innovation system
Japanese universities were seen as being a very weak component of the
biotechnology innovation system, both in the creation of new technology,
and in the transfer of it to industry. Here again, a parallel contrast has been
made between the German and the US systems (Giesecke 2000).
Evidence of the relatively small role played by Japanese universities in
biotechnology research is offered in Table 6.2. While universities
accounted for nearly a quarter of the US patent family filings, they
accounted for less than 3 percent of those in Japan. It might be noted that
the patterns for Germany and France were more similar to that of Japan,
while that of the United Kingdom was more similar to the United States.
As was noted earlier, other evidence, such as royalties received and
number of new venture spin-offs, further underscores the point that US uni-
versities have played a much more significant part in their national innova-
tion system than has been true of their Japanese and European counterparts.
As an official from MITI points out in criticizing Japanese universities,
while 36 percent of Japan’s researchers are in academia, universities only
contribute 0.04 percent of Japanese patents (Fujisue 1998).
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One aspect of the effort to strengthen the contribution of universities to
the Japanese national innovation system has involved reforms in how
intellectual property is handled by universities. When corporate scientists
make a discovery, they naturally keep it secret within the firm until the
firm is able to find a way to profit from it. When academic scientists make
a discovery, their incentives are to publicize it as quickly as possible to
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Table 6.2 Organizations filing patent families of human DNA sequences, by
organization type and priority country, 1980–1999
Country 1980–1984 % 1985–1989 % 1990–1994 % 1995–1999 %
United States 77 100.0 215 100.0 441 100.0 736 100.0
Corporations 52 67.5 116 54.0 241 54.6 412 56.0
Universities 13 16.9 53 24.7 108 24.5 163 22.1
Not-for-profits 7 9.1 23 10.7 48 10.9 59 8.0
Government 1 1.3 7 3.3 13 2.9 20 2.7
agencies
Individuals 4 5.2 16 7.4 31 7.0 82 11.1
Japan 31 100.0 88 100.0 130 100.0 150 100.0
Corporations 27 87.1 65 73.9 93 71.5 117 78.0
Universities 0 0.0 3 3.4 6 4.6 2 1.3
Not-for-profits 2 6.5 4 4.5 6 4.6 7 4.7
Government 1 3.2 5 5.7 6 4.6 9 6.0
agencies
Individuals 1 3.2 11 12.5 19 14.6 15 10.0
Great Britain 15 100.0 32 100.0 80 100.0 107 100.0
Corporations 10 66.7 29 90.6 45 56.3 63 58.9
Universities 2 13.3 0 0.0 18 22.5 27 25.2
Not-for-profits 3 20.0 1 3.1 7 8.8 9 8.4
Government 0 0.0 1 3.1 8 10.0 4 3.7
agencies
Individuals 0 0.0 1 3.1 2 2.5 4 3.7
Germany 4 100.0 9 100.0 25 100.0 93 100.0
Corporations 4 100.0 9 100.0 14 56.0 33 35.5
Universities 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 12.0 9 9.7
Not-for-profits 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 16.0 8 8.6
Government 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.0 5 5.4
agencies
Individuals 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 12.0 38 40.9
France 1 100.0 14 100.0 26 100.0 35 100.0
Corporations 1 100.0 6 42.9 16 61.5 20 57.1
Universities 0 0.0 3 21.4 2 7.7 3 8.6
Not-for-profits 0 0.0 2 14.3 3 11.5 7 20.0
Government 0 0.0 3 21.4 4 15.4 5 14.3
agencies
Individuals 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.8 0 0.0
Sources: National Science Foundation (NSF); Division of Science Resources Statistics (SRS)
02–333 (2002).
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gain reputation, tenure, and promotions. The sponsors of university
research are often governments and others who insist that the findings of
the research they have paid for be made public. For these reasons, acade-
mic science has been called “public science” (Narin et al. 1997).
Research suggests that the biotechnology industry draws more heavily
than others on public science (McMillan et al. 2000). The utilization of
public science by business, according to some analysts, poses a special set
of problems. On the one hand, it means that companies have little incen-
tive to invest in university research, since the findings of this research
would be in the public domain. On the other hand it means that universi-
ties lack incentives to advertise the technologies they develop to industry,
with the result that companies often do not know about promising tech-
nology available from university laboratories. This dilemma, of course, is
not unique to Japan. It was, however, identified and responded to much
more quickly in the United States.
The United States response was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. The Act
allowed universities to patent technologies and to assign the patents to
firms. This gave universities new incentives to develop technologies of
interest to industry and to make sure industry is aware of the new technolo-
gies. It also gave firms incentives to invest in university research. By sev-
eral indicators the Bayh-Dole act had an immense impact. Universities
rushed to establish technology licensing offices (TLOs) to take advantage of
the new law. By year 2000 virtually every American research university had
one. The number of patents issued to US universities more than doubled
from 1979–1984, more than doubled again between 1984–1989, and more
than doubled yet again during the 1990s. University revenues from licens-
ing shot up, increasing from $221 million in 1991 to $698 million in 1997.
In the late 1990s the Japanese government introduced a number of new
policies designed after Bayh-Dole and other US policies (Fujisue 1998).
Table 6.3 lists some of the more important of these new measures. Under
the new policies universities submit technology transfer plans to the
Ministry of Economics, Technology and Industry (METI, the successor to
MITI after a Japanese bureaucratic reorganization) and the Ministry of
Education and Culture. The plans include the establishment of TLOs to
manage university patents and promote the sale of technology licenses to
companies. The government subsidizes 50 percent of the expenses of the
TLOs, and guarantees the debts incurred in establishing them. The TLOs
are exempt from patent registration and maintenance fees (Fujisue 1998),
and the government provides funds to advertise the results of university
technology transfer plans.
One reason Japanese academics are less involved in the establishment of
new technology-based firms than their American counterparts, has been
regulations preventing this involvement (Bartholomew 1996; Callan 1996;
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Darby and Zucker 1999). According to one survey, there had been a total
of only 128 university-initiated ventures between 1958 and 2000 (News
Nikkei 2001). New policies have been introduced to allow professors at
national universities to work as officers of companies using their research
results. The government expressed the hope that its various new policies
would lead to the establishment of some 1,000 university-initiated start
ups over the years 2002–2005.
Other policies to reform the Japanese innovation system
In the United States, biotechnology centers have developed in clusters,
generally centering on universities. For some time Japan has experimented
with the creation of technology centers (see, e.g. Vogel 1985; Tatsuno
1986). The Japanese government has specifically been encouraging the
development of regional centers of biotechnology strength. The centers
include incubators for biotechnology start ups. New biotechnology centers
have been established in Chiba Prefecture (near Tokyo), Yokohama, and
Kansai (by Osaka and Kyoto). Altogether nine prefectures have so far
agreed to develop clusters that will link science parks, universities,
research institutions, corporate laboratories, and start ups.
Finally, the Japanese government has been persuaded that the increased
protection of intellectual property rights is needed to further encourage
innovative research and development. Japanese patent law was amended
in 1998 to strengthen patent protection and to accelerate the acquisition of
intellectual property rights (Ishimura 1999).
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Table 6.3 Japanese policies to improve flow of technology from universities to
industry, 1995–2000
1995 Science and Technology Basic Law Office for the Promotion of 
Academia-Industry Cooperation established in MITI’s Industrial 
Policy Bureau
1996 Basic Science and Technology Promotion Plan approved by Japanese 
cabinet. Called for reform of system of cooperation between industry 
and academia
1997 Amendment of Special Law for Education Personnel
1998 Law Promoting Technology Transfer from Universities
(requires universities to have technology transfer plans approved by 
MITI and Ministry of Education – see Fujisue for details)
Amendment of Law for Facilitating Governmental Research Exchange
2000 Law to Strengthen Industrial Technical Ability National Personnel 
Authority Regulation 14–18, 14–19
Sources: Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry) (various year).
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Results of the new policies
Clearly the Japanese have embarked on an unusually comprehensive effort
to redesign their biotechnology innovation system. They have made
changes in their systems of government support, university regulation and
governance, patent systems, and institutions facilitating the formation of
start ups. There are signs of progress, but also reasons for concern.
New bioventures
The number of bio-related new ventures increased from 60 firms in 1998
to 334 firms by the end of February 2003 (JBA 2003). Press reports
suggest that at least some of these ventures were started as a result of
the new government policies. New policies allowed professors at national
universities to work as officers of companies using their research results,
for example, professors started such new biotechnology ventures as
GeneticLab, Gene Techno Science, and AnGes MG. GeneticLab was
founded by university professors in 2000 and was able to raise some
425 million yen (about $4 million at the time) from venture capitalists and
METI subsidies. AnGes MG was established in 1999 by a small group
including an Osaka University Professor. Within three yeas this company
had made a successful initial public offering at the ‘Mothers Market’ of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (News Nikkei, January 26, 2002). The total
number of new ventures based on university research for all technologies
reached 799 by the end of 2003 (reasonable progress towards the govern-
ment goal of 1,000 by 2005). Of the new firms 293 were in the biotech-
nology and medical areas (METI 2004). While the number of firms and
the amounts of money involved may not be impressive by US standards,
they may represent a starting point for Japan. Germany, which was intro-
ducing changes to its biotechnology innovation system that somewhat
paralleled those in Japan, increased the number of its biotechnology firms
(not necessarily new ventures) from 75 in 1995 to 222 in 1998 and 379 by
the end of 2002 (Ernst and Young annual survey data cited in Lehrer and
Asakawa 2004).
Another possible, though admittedly tenuous, indicator of increased
university faculty involvement in new biotechnology firms is that the
average number of PhD/MD holders amongst Japanese biotechnology
firms established since 1999 is greater than that in older firms. We
obtained information about 141 biotechnology firms in Japan from the
BIOScan database (July 2002), the 2002 Bio Business White Book
(Daiwa Soken 2002), and company websites. The 50 firms formed after
1999 had an average of 1.2 key managers with doctoral degrees, compared
to an average of only 0.73 for the 91 firms formed before 1999.
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Policies to foster development of start ups and SMEs
Many new business incubators have been established in Japan, suggesting
that the Law Facilitating the Creation of New Businesses is having some
impact. A survey conducted in 2000 identified 203 incubators housing
2,247 residents in Japan. This compares to 850 incubators housing 6,458
firms in the United States. Compared to their US counterparts, however,
the Japanese incubators have been characterized as being understaffed
and providing weak service. Unlike the US incubators, which are gener-
ally led by universities and have strong ties with industry, the Japanese
incubators are led by local government and tend to have weak ties with
both universities and industry (METI 2001). The Japanese, then, may have
been more successful at adopting the form than the substance of these
organizations.
The Japanese government has not yet conducted a rigorous assessment
of the results of its Small Business Innovation Research program, but
Eshima (2003) found that firms receiving awards grew faster than com-
parable non-awardees. Oddly, though, firms receiving multiple awards did
worse than those receiving a single award. The author does not discuss this
apparent anomaly. Perhaps it suggests that the awards encourage firms to
become dependent on the awards. Nor does Eshima address the possibil-
ity that the firms receiving awards were more promising than comparable
firms and would have grown faster anyway.
Flows of technology from universities to industry
The measures designed to increase the flow of technology from universi-
ties to industry in Japan have also been trumpeted as showing early suc-
cesses. As of November 2004, 32 TLOs had been established nationwide in
Japan. In the first two years after “The Law for Facilitating Technology
Transfer from Universities” was enacted in 1998, more that 700 patent
applications were made by universities. By the end of 2003, more than
5,000 patent applications had been made through TLOs to the Japanese
patent office, and 1,256 had been made to foreign patent offices (Japan
Patent Office 2004). The number of joint and commissioned research pro-
jects in biotechnology at universities increased six-fold over a decade.
More than two thousand researchers were sent by companies to be trained
in university laboratories. In 2001, 28 of Japan’s 80 national universities
offered entrepreneurship courses for graduate students, and 21 of them had
courses for undergraduates. Again though, if comparisons are made with
the United States these numbers are not impressive. As was noted above,
for example, by 2000 virtually all US research universities had TLOs.
It might further be noted that the value of the Bayh-Dole Act, the pri-
mary model for many of the Japanese reforms and also a model for
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Germany and France (Giesecke 2000; Corrolleur et al. 2004; Lehrer and
Asakawa 2004), has been challenged. Nelson (2001) suggests that not all
of the increase in university patenting should be attributed to Bayh-Dole
and, more importantly, that the increase itself does not necessarily indicate
an increase in the diffusion of technology to industry. The years after Bayh-
Dole was enacted were a period when new fields of university-based
research, including biomedical research, computers, and software, were
rapidly developing. At the same time, patent laws were changing to make
technology in these areas more patentable. So the number of patents would
probably have increased somewhat even without Bayh-Dole. In any case,
increased patenting may actually have slowed the diffusion of new tech-
nology to industry. The new TLOs may simply be collecting royalties from
firms that would have used the technology anyway (and discouraging firms
at the margin because of the royalty fees). Nelson is also concerned about
the impact of Bayh-Dole on the universities. He notes that only a few have
actually collected significant revenues through their TLOs. So the positive
impacts may have been overstated. More importantly, the Bayh-Dole poli-
cies may cause university researchers to shift from fundamental research as
they increasingly depend on royalty income from business firms. Also, col-
legeality at universities may deteriorate as some university researchers
make far more money than others. Finally, the new monetary incentives
could make professors less committed to contributing to public science.
Nelson raises other issues as well. Should companies, for example, have to
pay royalties or license fees to universities for technology that was devel-
oped at US government expense? The increased protection of intellectual
property rights may curtail research in certain areas since researchers will
not be as free to use research tools, techniques, and conceptions of a line
of attack, all of which have become patentable (Nelson 2001).
The noted authority on Japanese technology policy, Akira Goto (2000)
has expressed somewhat parallel reservations specifically about whether
the Japanese reforms are moving in the right direction. He is concerned,
for example, that the increase in government funding for universities will
reduce the incentives of university researchers to cooperate with industry –
thus working against a closer university–industry relationship. He also
suggests that a major problem in the university component of the Japanese
national innovation system is not being sufficiently addressed. This prob-
lem is that Japanese universities have been slow to change curricula to
reflect the changing nature of science and the increasing need for inter-
disciplinary approaches. Goto also complains that, even now, not enough
is being done to increase financial support for graduate and post-doctoral
students. As for the new emphasis on universities obtaining patents and
becoming incubators, he is concerned that this will lead universities away
from their role as repositories of advanced knowledge. Goto also worries
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that in pursuing increased control over intellectual property rights,
universities may become reluctant to publicize their research findings.
Finally, Kneller (2003) found that there is much less reliance by major
Japanese pharmaceutical companies on university research than is true of
their US and European counterparts. A major reason for this had nothing
to do with intellectual property rights. In his interviews with managers
and scientists at Japan’s eight largest pharmaceutical companies, he noted
that respondents generally made disparaging comments about Japanese
university research. It may be that the important need is to improve the
quality of Japanese university research, rather than finding ways to funnel
more university research to industry.
Other aspects of role of government
Commenting generally on the various policies intended to enhance Japan’s
technology strength, Goto (2000) notes that the large US government role
in the US national innovation system has been much more to create a pool
of knowledge, for example, via NIH spending, rather than to support spe-
cific commercial projects. Interestingly, Giesecke makes similar com-
ments in explaining the relative lack of success of the German
biotechnology system compared to that of the US, and Orsenigo (2001)
notes the poor return from heavy targeted spending in Italy. Further, as
was noted earlier, it seems Japanese government spending on biotechnol-
ogy R&D will continue to be far lower than that in the US. Goto also
points out that the various Japanese policies of providing subsidies to
firms by offering tax credits in recent years leave out many firms that are
doing research, because so many Japanese firms recently have been
unprofitable. He cites a 1999 study by the Japanese National Institute for
Science and Technology Policy that found that only about 10 percent of
large and medium-sized enterprises in Japan had benefited from these tax
breaks. One might suppose that this would be particularly problematic in
industries like biotechnology that are slow to generate profits.
While Goto (2000) notes that there were problems with the Japanese
patent system before the recent reforms, he is worried that the reforms
might take Japan too far towards a ‘strong patent’ system, which (for rea-
sons similar to those in Nelson’s argument outlined earlier) he thinks
would discourage innovation. He also mentions another problem with the
Japanese system that has not been resolved yet, the length of time it takes
to settle intellectual property rights disputes.
Conclusions
At the beginning of this chapter we presented the following questions:
Why did the Japanese model apparently fail in biotechnology, even though
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it had earlier apparently worked very well with semiconductors and other
advanced technologies? What changes were made in the Japanese system?
How closely does the ‘new’ Japanese system replicate the US system? To
the extent evaluation is possible, is the new system working? What possi-
ble pitfalls might there be with the new system?
It seems that those anticipating a Japanese triumph in biotechnology
were underestimating the degree to which success in this technology would
require close linkages to the scientific sources of the technology. The com-
petitive strength for biotechnology turned out not to be the ability incre-
mentally to refine technology, or to offer more efficient production
systems, or to offer higher quality. Indeed, it seems that even in these areas
Japanese leadership has eroded (e.g. Porter et al. 2000). Perhaps, because
of the nature of biotechnology, it turned out that Japanese firms were not
able efficiently to tap into the US sources of new technology. Often this
technology seems unusually tacit and embedded in people. Interestingly,
the classic works on national innovation systems by Europeans (Freeman
1987; Lundvall 1992) paid for less attention to universities than did the
parallel work by an American (Nelson 1993).
The conventional wisdom emerged that Japan needed to borrow ele-
ments of the US innovation systems: including closer linkages between
universities and industry, a more favorable environment for start up firms,
and a different treatment of intellectual property rights. Less note has been
taken of the huge amounts of US government spending in support of bio-
science. It seems in this regard, for better or worse, Japan has developed
only a partial replication of a US style national innovation system in
biotechnology. We also noted doubts that have been raised about aspects
of the US system, particularly the aggressive mechanisms designed to
transfer university technology to companies, and the strong protection of
intellectual property rights. The pitfall for Japan and others seeking to
learn from the US model, is that the functioning of the US model is by no
means well understood ( just as the reasons for the success of the Japanese
system in the past were not completely understood).
Since the efforts to reform the Japanese biotechnology system are new,
it would be premature to assess their success at this point. It is also unclear
what the criteria for success should be. Japan may not seem strong in
biotechnology compared to the United States, but compared to other
advanced industrial economies, it is fairly strong by some indicators.
Japanese were granted more patents in biotechnology than the citizens of
any European country in both 1990 and 2000. In the years 1986–1998 the
United States had a huge lead in its share of the world’s publications in
biotechnology and applied microbiology, accounting for nearly a quarter
of all these publications. Japan was second, however, with 12.1 percent of
all publications. Amongst the European countries, the United Kingdom
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was first (9.3 percent), Germany was second (6 percent), and France was
third (5.9 percent) (Beuzekom 2001). There are signs, however, that the
Japanese biotechnology industry lost ground during the 1990s. Japan’s
share of patents granted in the United States, for example, dropped
(OECD 2001). Perhaps more telling, a 1999 survey of 151 Japanese firms
involved in biotechnology found that respondents believed they lagged
behind both the United States and Europe in most areas of biotechnology
in terms of technological competitiveness.
It could be argued, however, that Japan’s relative competitiveness in
biotechnology should not be taken as problematic. As Table 6.4 shows, in
1992 although Japan has an economy and population only about half as
large as those of the United States, it accounted for 17.0 percent of all
advanced technology exports, compared to 25.2 percent for the United
States. Indeed, Japan had a larger share of world exports than the United
States in the case of four of the ten “advanced technologies.” In three of
the technologies – weapons, aerospace and nuclear – heavy US defense
spending presumably accounts for the US lead. In biotechnology, however,
the Japanese share of world exports was only 4.3 percent compared to 37.0
percent for the United States. It was not only in comparisons with the United
States that Japan seems weak in biotechnology. The table shows that Japan,
while stronger than Germany in its overall share of world exports of advanced
technology products (17.0 percent compared to 11.7 percent), was substantial
weaker in the case of biotechnology (4.3 percent compared to 19.1 percent).
While a major theme in this book is that Japan needs to change its
national innovation system so as to foster its ability to develop cutting
edge technology, the data in Table 6.4 might be taken as suggesting some-
thing different. One scholar (Jin 2001) argues that different countries are
characterized by different “knowledge regimes” that encompass very
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Table 6.4 Share of world exports of advanced technology products in 1992 (in %)
Technology US Japan Germany
All technologies 25.2 17.0 11.7
Biotechnology 37.0 4.3 19.1
Life Science technology 27.5 13.8 20.4
Optoelectronics 13.7 22.8 24.0
Information technologies 18.5 23.0 8.3
Electronics 20.3 25.5 9.4
Manufacturing technologies 16.2 21.5 21.9
Advanced materials 28.6 9.3 15.1
Aerospace 44.2 1.4 11.3
Weapons technologies 34.3 4.6 12.1
Nuclear technologies 20.8 0.2 9.6
Source: National Science Foundation, National Science Board (1996).
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different cultural, social, political, and economic systems. He suggests
that the Japanese knowledge regime is just not very well-suited to the
biotechnology, just as the US knowledge regime is not well suited to
certain other industries.
Indeed, some scholars have suggested that one reason for the weakness
of the Japanese biotechnology industry is that the Japanese socio-cultural
system inhibits risk-taking (Callan 1996; Darby and Zucker 1996, 1999;
Forrest 1996; Bartholomew 1997; Muller et al. 2004). We suggest caution
in making such interpretations, particularly when glib conclusions are
made that Japanese norms and values inhibit entrepreneurship. The
current small number of start ups in Japan is only a recent phenomena
(e.g. Odagiri and Goto 1993). Goto (1997) reports that the economic
growth of Japan before the Second World War, was strongly supported by
entrepreneurs. On the face of it, there seems little reason to assume that
Japanese values and norms are less conducive to risk-taking than might
have been true two or three generations ago.
But if the evidence for a Japanese cultural aversion to risk-taking seems
dubious, some aspects of the Japanese social system do seem to inhibit
certain forms of risk-taking. Most notable amongst these is the relative
immobility of labor under Japan’s career-long employment system. It is
riskier to leave a Japanese “lifetime” job to start a new venture than it
would be in the United States It is more difficult, as well, to build a
qualified workforce by hiring employees from established firms. Further,
the Japanese employment system relies much more on seniority in deter-
mining wages than does the US system. This greatly reduces the incen-
tives for employees to obtain graduate education. The Japanese
employment system is changing now, as many Japanese firms are forced
to carry out large-scale job cuts and other reforms to respond to more
intense global competition. These changes may produce more profes-
sional people who are willing to be involved in new venture businesses.
Another weakness of the Japanese biotech industry has been a lack of sci-
entists. Japan’s education system has traditionally emphasized engineering
over pure science (Forrest 1996; Bartholomew 1997). This also may be
changing as the Japanese government undertakes new reforms to emphasize
scientific knowledge.
If Jin is right, Japanese efforts to reform the Japanese innovation sys-
tem to bolster its strength in biotechnology may be misguided. Perhaps
Japan should concentrate on advanced technologies where it has a natural
comparative advantage. It may be, however, consistent with a major theme
of this volume, that this is not an option. In his study of the Japanese phar-
maceutical industry Kneller (2003) also speculates that, partly because of
its employment system, Japan has most often enjoyed technological suc-
cess in industries where innovation can occur effectively in-house. He
Japanese national biotechnology innovation system 131
SFAI-06.qxd  25/11/05  2:40 PM  Page 131
suggests that more recently the most important technical advances are
taking place in areas where this technological autarky is less effective.
So, if the goal is to give Japan a new, more American national innova-
tion system, how is Japan doing? One question is whether or not the
Japanese have gotten the US model right. If the real source of US strength
in biotechnology is strong, well-funded sources of the technology, down-
stream improvements in the Japanese system simply making it easier for
universities to transfer their meager stock of technology to entrepreneurs
may not go very far. There may be greater need for government funding
in basic research and a concerted effort to strengthen universities.
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Introduction
Small and medium enterprise (SME) policy in Japan has changed
significantly since the 1980s. A central step was the substantial revision of
the ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law’ in 1999. The revised law aims
at supporting venture businesses, hereby giving up the stance that SMEs are
weak business entities. Moreover, a new expectation towards SMEs was
expressed, namely their support of the Japanese economy by creation of
employment and innovation. Concretely, the revised law mentioned four
aims: the creation of new industries, the increase of job opportunities, the
promotion of market competition and the vitalization of the regional econ-
omy. An important reason for the change of expectations towards SMEs, was
the ongoing globalization starting in the 1980s, which led to a reorganiza-
tion and change of the hitherto keiretsu (enterprise groups) structures.
This contribution will discuss the change of SME policy in Japan,
especially the increased attention that is paid to innovation. Based on the
change of SMEs’ functions, the change in SME policies will be described,
because we mainly understand SME policies as a reaction to changes in
the industrial organization. We see a general shift from a policy that has
been fostering stabilization in SMEs to an innovation policy that stresses
the importance of SMEs for the economic welfare.
Characteristics of the Japanese supplier system:
dense networking in inter-enterprise relations 
(dense networking between enterprises)
In Japan, most SMEs in the manufacturing industries work as subcon-
tractors. As subcontractors, they are mainly engaged in producing parts
on request of their parent enterprises, not for the market, which results in
a relatively strong dependence. At the same time, the subcontracting
system is regarded as a competitive advantage for Japanese enterprises.
Williamson (1975) called the subcontracting system an intermediate
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organization between hierarchy and market. Because of its long-term
relationships this intermediate organization creates competitive advan-
tages in process innovation and enables new organization technologies,
such as effective management, increased co-operation between R&D and
other departments or techniques like Just-in-time logistics to be applied;
all these elements were learnt from foreign countries. The global compet-
itiveness of leading industries, such as automobiles or electronics can be
traced back to the characteristics of the supplier system (Imai et al. 1984;
Itami et al. 1993).
The Japanese subcontracting system has a long history, which leads to
a Japanese-specific supplier system. It started at the end of the nineteenth
century in the manufacturing industries. After the Second World War, it
diffused in all major assembling industries. Since numerous micro-
enterprises with low-wage workers existed at the same time, resorting to
SMEs was a natural reaction to the underdeveloped external labour market.
Therefore, at the very beginning, the establishment of a subcontracting
system was just seen as a means of saving capital, of low-cost-production
and finally as a buffer to fluctuating demand by the parent enterprises.
Labour force could easily be dismissed. For subcontractors, who typically
did not posses marketing capabilities of their own and did not have access
to modern technological know-how either, building up a subcontracting
system was attractive, because it guaranteed them relatively stable orders –
at least for a certain time.
After this first phase two other important phases followed. The second
one, which we would like to determine as the period from the mid-1950s
to the 1980s, was followed by a third phase, starting from the 1980s up to
today. In the second phase, Japanese enterprises aimed at catching up with
technologies especially developed and applied by American enterprises.
However, a discrepancy between equipment, technology and know-how
not only existed between the United States and Japan, but inside Japan as
well, namely between Japanese large enterprises and Japanese SMEs,
respectively subcontractors. Since large enterprises had to rely on SMEs
because of the restricted markets, they promoted different strategies to
improve their subcontractors’ position in the 1950s and 1960s: training for
their engineers or dispatchment of trainers for technical guidance, for
example. This support became an important precondition for the later co-
operation in the innovation process. Moreover, parent enterprises offered
financial support and consulted their suppliers in financial matters, for
example, in the case of investment for the introduction of new equipment.
Nevertheless, in this phase the use of subcontractors and the co-operation
with them was mainly seen as a strategy for cutting costs. Certainly qual-
ity and precision were important preconditions for co-operation, but the
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overall strategy was a reduction of costs. This becomes obvious in surveys
from the 1960s, where customers (the so-called parent enterprises) stated
their suppliers’ specific technical knowledge and equipment and, also
ranking on first position, the low production costs (SME 1973) as the
most important reasons for outsourcing their production.
In the 1980s, this relationship began to change. Subcontractors gained
more and more importance in the innovation process as it became obvious
that the specific characteristics of the Japanese supplier system were a
competitive advantage. The competitive advantage can be seen in the so-
called relational skills (Asanuma 1997)1 which refer to long-term commit-
ment by both parties – parent enterprises as well as subcontractors – and
result in a general readiness on both sides to invest in this relationship in
order to be able to carry out risky innovation processes together. Parent
enterprises anticipated this long-term relationship and provided their
subcontractors with technological guidance and information transfer.
Owing to the innovation process’ success, this Japanese model was
adapted in the United States and in Europe – one of the most famous
books on this topic is The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of
Lean Production by Womack et al. (1990). It should be added that certain
mechanisms were introduced to induce a ‘regulated’ competition in these
networks of stable long-term relationships, especially by means of the so-
called kyôryokukai. Kyôryokukai are clubs, made up of suppliers supply-
ing the same parts, where information from large enterprises is transferred
to supplier groups. In summary it may be said that this specific structure
not only resulted in a reduction of costs in the 1980s, but also in a
high quality of supplier parts, flexible delivery times and a contribution
to the parent companies’ process innovation by the suppliers (Fujimoto
et al. 1998).
One example for such a relationship is the die and molding industry.
Here subcontractors introduced new equipment and were active in process
innovation, strongly following their customers’ specific needs. As the
production in the die and molding industry was strongly geared to the
buyers’ needs, the subcontractors’ equipment was also oriented towards
the customers needs. Therefore some authors call the subcontractors
‘branch factories’ (bun’kôjô) (Egashira 2001). By using methods like VA
(value analysis: kachi bunseki) or VE (value engineering: kachi kôgaku)
suppliers were one main driving force in rationalizing and increasing effi-
ciency in the production process, and they also made active suggestions
for product development (Ueda 2004).
At the same time, SMEs lost the ability to access markets directly and
to perform product development of their own. This is the weakness SME
policies are supposed to change.
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Changes in the Japanese supplier system
The 1990s are often described as a phase of radical changes in the
subcontracting system. In quantity, suppliers lost their importance: in
1981, 65.5 per cent of all SMEs in the manufacturing industry were
working as subcontractors. In 1998, the share dropped to 47.9 per cent.
These figures show a tendency that can be observed in all industries.
The structural reasons for the decreasing share of subcontractors lie in
the internationalization of the Japanese economy. Since 1985, when the
so-called Plaza Accord induced a rapid appreciation of the Yen, Japanese
parent enterprises have been reorganizing their domestic production sys-
tem and are shifting production sites, especially to East Asia, from where
material and parts are re-imported to Japan. As a result, the ratio of man-
ufacturing industries’ overseas-production (overseas subsidiary sales/all
domestic corporation sales) rose from 9 per cent in FY 1995 to 17 per cent
in FY 2002 and the share of overseas subsidiary sales, compared to head-
quarters corporate sales rose from 25 per cent in FY 1995 to 41 per cent
in FY 2002 (MITI 2004).
This development had an enormous impact on the subcontracting system.
The overseas production systems resulted in a reduction of costs and an
increase in efficiency, but pre-supposed the standardization of parts and
the modularization of design, development and production. Seeing that
the traditional, long-term relationships had led to specific investments
with highly specific solutions, unique to one single enterprise group, it
was a difficult, relatively cost-intensive and time-consuming process to
establish common standards. Other problems arose which influenced the
contents of SME policies:
● the financial institutions’ bad-loan problem drew attention to the fact
that the venture capital market was underdeveloped. SMEs strongly
depend on loans and do not have the chance to procure capital directly.
● one realized more and more that the catching-up phase had definitely
ended. That made it important for the Japanese government to find
new sources from which innovation could grow.
● for the first time the number of business start-ups decreased rapidly,
whereas closures increased (SME, each year edition). In comparison
to other OECD countries, Japan is almost the only country with a
decrease in start-ups and a shrinking number of enterprises.
Moreover, in the 1990s the problem of unemployment arose. The suc-
cess of start-ups in the US and especially of venture businesses with
respect to employment and innovation stood in sharp contrast to the
Japanese situation.
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The other side: long-term relationships
We have already described the changes in the Japanese supplier system in
the previous pages. One indicator for these changes was the decreasing
share of subcontractors in relation to all SMEs. Nevertheless, a more dif-
ferentiated analysis shows that changes in the Japanese supplier system
cannot just be identified in a decrease of suppliers among SMEs in the
production sector, where mainly small-scale suppliers were affected. At
the same time, significant changes also took place among medium- and
large-scale suppliers, who mainly worked as primary suppliers for their
customers (Takada 2002). Small-scale suppliers are often not well
equipped with sophisticated technological knowledge and other resources
and often mainly produce standardized parts. As a consequence of interna-
tionalizing production processes, the selection pressure on this group has
become very strong. In contrast to the small-scale suppliers, the group of
primary suppliers can be characterized by having sophisticated technical
knowledge, a fact which is essential for their customers’ competitiveness.
Furthermore, they often manufacture products of their own and are there-
fore called ‘independent’ (dokuritsugata) SMEs in Japanese literature.
Another important change, which is taking place in the Japanese supplier
system, is the breaking-up of exclusive transaction relationships and the
diversification of transaction partners. Hereby, the Japanese supplier system
is transforming itself towards becoming a more open system. According to
surveys the Shoko Research Institute of the Shoko Chukin Bank conducted
in the 1980s, the rate of exclusive suppliers was 32.9 per cent in 1988
(Shoko Chukin Bank Research Division 1989: 43) and had decreased to
22.4 per cent by 1999 (Shoko Research Institute of the Shoko Chukin Bank
Research Division 2001: 22). Meanwhile, ‘autonomy-oriented’ companies
increased to 44.1 per cent (1999) from formerly 23.4 per cent (1988).
While there is obviously a strong tendency of breaking up closed
enterprise group structures on the one hand, on the other hand long-lasting
transaction patterns still persist. According to a survey by the Shoko
Research Institute of the Shoko Chukin Bank Research Division (2001:
28), 72.2 per cent of the questioned companies responded that they had
not changed their major clients during the last five years (1994–1999).
What are the reasons for the persistence of long-term relationships? In
the Japanese literature the idea of production architecture – here defined
as a system of standards and rules which build up the core of production
processes and their periphery in order to enable the overall working of the
system2 – has become a dominant explanation factor. The characteristics
specific to the Japanese supplier system – termed ‘intermediate organi-
zation’ (Imai et al. 1982) or also ‘semi-vertical integrated system’
(Nakamura 1983) – create competitive advantages as well as competitive
disadvantages. Two types of production architecture can be classified,
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namely ‘modular and open’ and ‘integral and closed’ architecture
(Aoshima and Takeishi 2001: 33ff.). In an influential contribution
Fujimoto (2001) describes the Japanese architecture, especially in the
assembling industry, as integrated and closed. An integral and closed
architecture attaches importance to coordination processes, but hinders
original innovation in new industries as it only allows incremental, path-
dependent innovations to take place in existing paths. In an integral and
closed architecture it is not possible for suppliers to operate indepen-
dently, because open intra-firm standards do not exist. Moreover, all impor-
tant information regarding product development, design or production is
exclusive and production processes cannot be modularized. The problem of
integral and closed architectures is that they are not compatible with the
needs of new technologies, such as information and technology industries,
which need open, modularized architectures. Moreover, competition is
restricted, a fact that may hinder innovations, too. A change from integral
and closed to modular and open structures is difficult because of path
dependencies (keiro izon) and difficulties in adaptation (chôsei) to the new
needs, especially the lack of corresponding knowledge on development,
design and production. New rules for all these functional dimensions have
to be learnt. The shift to a new mode of coordination – from a vertical
organization to a horizontal organization – is obviously so costly that it can
only be realized to a limited extent, namely at the level of small suppliers.
To put it in other words: a more open modular structure could be realized
in the lower parts of the former pyramid where smaller suppliers are using
more and more standardized interfaces. This makes it possible that, for
example, Japanese manufacturers shift their production to China where
they are supplied by independent suppliers from China, Taiwan or Japan,
who produce standardized products, parts and materials. At the same time
the structure at the upper level of the former pyramid has not changed
significantly, so that we currently have a mix of a relatively integrated
structure with bigger suppliers at the top and a relatively open structure
with smaller suppliers at the bottom. The difficulty in changing the closed,
integral structure to a more open structure is described as a ‘modularity
trap’ (Kusunoki and Chesbrough 2001), which hinders the innovative
potential of SMEs.
SMEs and innovation policy
SME policies up to the 1980s: SMEs as ‘too small enterprises’
The following section gives a short historical overview of SME policies
during the phase from the 1950s to the 1980s. In this time the common
approach of SME policies in Japan was that SMEs were regarded as weak
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in all important functional aspects, such as marketing, financing and
R&D. Especially their weakness in technology gained political attention.
In the 1950s instruments for stimulating R&D and technology diffusion
were established. These instruments, for example, public financing, tax
incentives or guidance by public research laboratories (e.g. the so-called
kôsetsushi, compare Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume), are still in use
today. The interesting point is that in many cases the sub-contractors’
adherence to an enterprise group was a precondition for public support.
One example is the Enterprise Consultation System (Kigyô Shindan
Seido), which is strongly connected to the Equipment Modernization
Fund (Setsubi Kindaika Shikin), according to which it had been necessary
for the applicant to be a member of an enterprise group since 1952. Other
instruments encouraged the organization of sub-contractors’ associations
(kyôryokukai) which was referred to earlier (Miyake 2000).
Public support, which led to the formation of SME cartels, co-operations
and other forms of networking, was often directed towards special indus-
tries. From this point of view, SME policy can be seen as part of the tradi-
tional industrial policy, in which the diffusion of technological knowledge
was more important than the genesis of original knowledge. Laws under
which SMEs received special support were for example the ‘Provisional
Law on the Promotion of Machinery Industry’ (Kikai Kôgyô Shinkô Rinji
Sochihô) (1956), the ‘Provisional Law on the Promotion of Textile Industry’
(Sen’i Kôgyô Shinkô Rinji Sochihô) (1956) and the ‘Provisional Law on the
Promotion of Electronic Industry’ (Denshi Kôgyô Shinkô Rinji Sochihô)
(1957). In 1963 the SME Basic Law (Chûshô Kigyô Kihonhô) was enacted,
which was the basic framework for all later SME policies formulated until
the revision in 1999. This law acknowledged the existence of the so-called
dual structure as becomes clear in the target formulation: ‘correction of
various differences in productivity and other factors among enterprises.’
Therefore the policy was constituted for enterprises that were weak in
management, financing and innovation (see also Storz in Chapter 6, this
volume). Its central task was understood as a promotion of SMEs by increas-
ing their productivity. The dual structure of the Japanese economy, that is the
high discrepancy in productivity and technological know-how between large
and small enterprises, was seen as a barrier to an increasing international
competitiveness of the Japanese industry. From this point of view, SME
policy played a central role in the economic policy and can be interpreted
as an innovation policy, which indirectly supports large-scale enterprises.
Based on the Basic Law, several, more specific laws were formulated,
for example the ‘SME Modernization Promotion Law’ (Chûshô Kigyô
Kindaika Sokushinhô), which was enacted in 1963. Its main target was to
support SMEs in catching up with large enterprises. Based on this law,
certain industries, in which the formation of cartels was allowed and
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supported, were specified. The aim was to achieve economies of scale for
SMEs – to be small was seen as a competitive disadvantage and the solution
was to create bigger entities. An over-intensive competition between SMEs
was even seen as an obstacle towards an increase of welfare. The formation
of cartels aimed at stabilizing the economic development and at avoiding 
so-called overcompetition (katô kyôsô). The ‘Law on the Promotion of
Subcontracting SMEs’ (Shitauke Chûshô Kigyô Shinkôhô) of 1970, based
on the SME Basic Law of 1963, was one instrument for stimulating the for-
mation of cartels. In order to get access to this programme, SMEs had to
formulate so-called ‘structural improvement plans’ (kôzô kaizen keikaku).
The law also formulated the following aims and instruments:
● policies are generally formulated on a sectoral level; enterprise asso-
ciations are responsible for implementing the Structural Improvement
Plans.
● rationalization takes place in several forms, for example, via mergers
and acquisitions, co-operations, alliances etc.
● the development of new products and new technologies takes place in
co-operations.
In 1973 and 1975 there were first revisions of the SME Basic Law, which
were directed towards the final revision of 1999. In the revision of 1973,
the necessity of an intensified use of knowledge was stressed for the first
time, and management guidance for SMEs was introduced. In order to
strengthen a company’s knowledge base, financial support was offered for
the management of research and design, for an improvement of product
marketing and for an improvement of the accumulation and selection of
information. For the first time, the second revision in 1975 promoted the
support of the new businesses and the development of new products and
industries (‘Law on the System of Advancement to New Business
Fields’)3 (Chûshô Kigyô Shinbunya Shinshutsu Enkatsuhô). Another new
development was that SMEs were encouraged to help themselves (in
Japanese: jiritsuka). This referred especially to the fact that even in the
case of high-tech know-how, most subcontractors did not possess market-
ing capabilities since all marketing was realized via their parent compa-
nies, or marketing had not been necessary, because the companies had
stable customers. Therefore the new policies stimulated the transfer of
management know-how.
Revision of the Basic Law on SMEs
Starting with the end of the 1980s, SMEs were assumed to be the seedbed
of new industries and new technologies. The term venture business
became extremely popular in this time – in other words: not the supplier
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system, but independent venture businesses became the focus of SME
policies in order to create new industries and to foster new technologies.
Important instruments were the ‘SME Creative Activity Promotion Law’4
(Chûshô Kigyô Sôzô Katsudô Sokushinhô) (1995) and the ‘New Business
Creation Promotion Law’5 (Shin Jigyô Sôshutsu Sokushinhô) (1999), and
especially the new SME Basic Law from 1999, a revision of the former
SME Basic Law of 1963. In our opinion, the revision of the SME Basic
Law was based on incremental changes in the policy in the 1980s and
1990s which we have described earlier.
Why can the reformulation of the Basic Law be seen as a political par-
adigm shift? A significant policy shift is, first, that SMEs are no longer
seen as weak entities which make a co-operation towards bigger entities
necessary. In contrast, the revised law stresses that SMEs are self-reliant
and autonomous companies and a source of innovation. The innovation
potential of a company was mainly seen as a result of individual purposes
and capabilities. This may sound somewhat strange for non-Japanese ears
but refers to the tradition that not only established companies, but start-
up companies too, were often supported by their mother companies.
Therefore the foundation of an enterprise was not just an individual deci-
sion in the past, but depended on support for capital, free consultancy by
parent companies and guarantees for stable trading. Second, the new law
stresses the importance of R&D. It is the ultimate object to build up a
strong, research-intense and innovative venture business culture. In order
to realize this aim, article 15 of the new SME Basic Law formulates that
SME policy should promote an alliance between SMEs and the national
government, between SMEs and prefectural testing and research laborato-
ries, and between SMEs and universities. This definitely signals an
upgrading of SMEs since until then such co-operations were ‘reserved’ for
large enterprises (compare Chapter 3).
Change of the Japanese supplier system and 
responses by local politics
Until the revision of the SME Basic Law in 1999, the Japanese SME
policy took place in a centralized way: policies and instruments were ini-
tiated by the central government, and the local governments’ role was just
to implement them. Thus, policies were uniform across Japan. For a devel-
oping nation, centralization was seen as the most effective strategy for
SME policy. The pressure of internalization, the ‘hollowing-out’ of Japans
regions (kûdôka) and the necessity to create innovations of their own,
meant new challenges to Japan. Besides, it was more and more questioned
how a policy that was formulated far away from its users could be
effective. There was a common consent that the traditional centralized
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SME policy would not be able to deal with the new problems, and that it
should be organized in a more decentralized way and develop policies and
instruments of its own. In article 6 of the new revised law, this new strat-
egy is formulated explicitly: ‘Local public entities are responsible for
formulating and implementing measures for SMEs which are suited to the
natural, economic or social conditions in a local public entity’s locality,
and which are in accordance with the basic principles and based on an
appropriate division of roles with the State’ (the revised SME Basic Law,
1999). The orientation towards the regional economy is, by the way, not
specific to SME policy, but can be found in other policies as well.
The Ministry of Economy and Trade, for example, formulated so-called
‘Industrial Cluster Plans’ in 2001 (sangyô cluster keikaku), which had the
intention of every region developing its own, innovative strength.6
Two case studies will illustrate the change in SME policy and support
the assumption that a decentralized, local level of SME policy can be more
effective as it offers better targeted answers to the special needs of SMEs.
The first example is Higashi Osaka, a city in the prefecture of Osaka.
In 1997, the Higashi Osaka Industrial Technology Centre (Higashi Ôsaka-
shiritsu Sangyô Gijutsu Shien Centâ) was opened. The centre aims at sup-
porting local SMEs’ innovation activities, especially the development of
new products. Since SMEs have hitherto focussed on process innovation,
product development is a general weakness of SMEs. The centre is mainly
active in three areas. In the first place it offers technological consulting
and advice in product development and research, second, trainings for
SME entrepreneurs concerning new production methods, and third, incu-
bation facilities for business start-ups, especially for venture businesses.
The Higashi Osaka Industrial Technology Centre used to be a kôsetsushi
(Ôsaka-furitsu Sangyô Gijutsu Sôgô Kenkyûsho) and then extended its
hitherto exclusively technological consulting to management consulting
(compare Chapter 4 in this volume). The centre receives a considerable
number of requests from SMEs which are trying to give up their position
as exclusive sub-contractors, and would like to develop and market
their own technologies for their own products: out of 3,734 enterprises in
Eastern Osaka, which fall under this centre’s responsibility (4–299
employees), 942 used the centre in total, 295 applied for technical
consulting, 647 used the testing machines. This is about every fourth
enterprise (Higashi Osaka-shiritsu Sangyô Gijutsu Shien Centre 2002).7
Despite the small number of SMEs that used the consulting services,
namely 7.9 per cent, this figure is significant as it shows the SMEs’ trans-
formation from sub-contractors to autonomy-oriented businesses. The fig-
ure of SMEs that use testing machines also deserves attention, because it
indicates that a considerable number of SMEs are starting to develop
products of their own.
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The second example is a successful co-operation between local univer-
sities and the public sector, called sangakukan. In the prefecture of Osaka,
the Northern Osaka Regional Vitalization Council (Kita Ôsaka Chiiki
Kasseika Kyôgikai) was founded in April 2002. Members are the Kansai
Bureau of METI and the prefectural government of Osaka, from the
academic sphere, the Osaka University of Advanced Science and the
Technology Joint Research Centre, and from the sphere of enterprises,
executives from local SMEs. One common project is the ‘Industry–
Academic Exchange and Matching Fair with Osaka University’, a regular
come-together which attracted more than 1,500 participants in October
2002 – among them 67 SMEs, who presented their own new product
developments. In almost all cases intense technological consultations
between universities and SMEs had taken place. In five cases proto-type
orders or joint research projects were realized. Even if the number is not
high at first glance, the co-operation between universities, especially lead-
ing universities, and SMEs is highly innovative in the Japanese context.
From the Japanese perspective, the fair has to be judged as a success,
especially as the participating SMEs were not independent venture busi-
nesses, but suppliers which were at the threshold of becoming inde-
pendent actors on the market and were in the process of reducing the
dependence on their respective parent enterprises. Considering the fact
that Japanese universities had rarely committed themselves to innovation
of SMEs until recently, this case should be regarded as pioneer work,
which indicates that universities in the region are apparently moving
toward supporting innovations by local SMEs.
Résumé
The Japanese supplier system finds itself at a historical turning point,
which results in new tasks concerning their innovation strategies and
also leads to new challenges for the SME policy. Up to the 1980s, suppli-
ers were so dependent on their parent enterprises that their innovation
processes were interrelated to their parent enterprises’ innovation
processes in many cases. This had three consequences: first, these suppli-
ers did not search for new innovative fields themselves. Second, suppliers
were mainly active in process innovation and not in product innovation.
Third, they did not possess marketing capabilities of their own for mar-
keting their own innovations. As a result they needed technological and –
to an even greater extent – marketing guidance. The Japanese SME policy
has reacted to this situation. Their understanding of the role of SMEs in
the whole economic process has changed radically. Today, they expect
SMEs to be innovative and independent companies. On a meta level the
new policies are aiming at a change from a hitherto closed, exclusively
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industrial structure to an open, horizontally-networked one. The boom that
the term venture business experienced, signals the changed perception.
Nevertheless, such a strategic change is difficult because of existing
path dependencies. SME policy tries to support ‘locked-in’ SMEs and
especially former ‘locked-in’ suppliers in this changing situation.
They especially seem to have deficiencies in the area of marketing. We do
not have any information yet, whether this policy change has been suc-
cessful. But there are at least some case studies which indicate that
Japanese SME policy can be relatively successful on a local level. This
may be traced back to the fact that flexible prefectural technology centres
had already been effectively supporting SMEs since the beginning of the
last century. The Centre in Higashi Osaka, which now offers new areas of
consulting that are intensively used by SMEs, may be one example.
In summary it can be ascertained that the paradigm change in supplier
relations resulted in a paradigm change in SME policy, too. This shift is
not easy to perform, but there are signs – especially on the local level –
that this shift can be managed successfully.
Notes
1 Those are for example: investment in specific equipment for parent enterprises
(except for asset investment), production of customized parts and location of
factories adjacent to parent enterprises’ factories, realization of synchronous
collaboration (design-in) with subcontractors in product development for parent
enterprises.
2 See Fujimoto/Tekeishi/Aoyama (2001) and Aoki/Ando (2002) as representative lit-
erature.
3 The law supports companies which want to develop new business fields in order to
escape from stagnating sectors. Loans with low interest rates can be granted for
testing, research, development of new markets or specific investments.
4 This programme offers funds, loans with low interest rates, loan guarantees and
direct venture capital.
5 This law intends to make the establishment of start-ups easier. Up to the imple-
mentation of this law, new companies in the form of private limited companies or
stock corporations needed a capital stock of 3 million, resp. 10 million yen. Today,
founding a start-up company is possible with a start-up capital of 1 yen (less than
1 per cent) in the first five years.
6 The industrial cluster plans are a reaction to the traditional regional policy which
was not very successful in strengthening the local regions’ competition with
metropolitan areas. The new programme aims at supporting the endogenous devel-
opment potential (http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/local_economy, accessed 16 April
2005).
7 If local SMEs are to transform themselves from sub-contractors to autonomy-
oriented businesses, they need to have capabilities for developing products of their
own. For that purpose, prototype manufacturing accounts for an important part,
though it requires various machine tools, not all of which are usually owned by
SMEs. To improve this situation, Higashi Osaka-shiritsu Sangyô Gijutsu Shien
Centre set up its Prototype Craft Centre (Shisaku Kôbô Centre), equipped with
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machine tools for local SMEs to use. Meanwhile in Higashi Osaka, Creation Core
Higashi Osaka, a comprehensive support facility for SMEs was jointly established
by industry, universities, and local governments (phase I was completed in April
2002, phase II in July 2004). It includes facilities aiming at accelerating innovation
by local SMEs, such as full-time business coordinators and incubation managers,
incubation rooms and university liaison offices.
Bibliography
Aoki, M. and Ando, H. (eds) (2002) Mojûruka: Atarashii Sangyô Akitekuchâ no
Honshitsu (Moduralization: Substance of New Industrial Architecture), Toyo
Keizai Shinposha.
Aoshima, Y. and Takeishi, A. (2001) ‘Akitekuchâ to iu Kangaekata’ (Concept of
Architecture), in T. Fujimoto, A. Takeishi and Y. Aoshima (eds) Bizinesu Akitekuchâ
(Business Architecture), Yuhikaku, 27–70.
Asanuma, B. (1997) Nihon no Kigyô Soshiki: Kakushinteki Tekiô no Mekanizumu
(Corporate Structure in Japan: Mechanism of Innovative Adoption), Yuhikaku.
Egashira, H. (2001) ‘Kankoku, Taiwan ni Okeru Purasuchikku Kanagata Sangyô no
Genkyô’ (Situation of Plastic Injection Mould Industry in Korea and Taiwan), The
Economic and Business Review, 14: 1–12.
Fujimoto, T. (2001) ‘Akitekuchâ no Sangyô Ron’ (Industry Theory of Architecture),
in T. Fujimoto, A. Takeishi and Y. Aoshima (eds) Bizinesu Akitekuchâ (Business
Architecture), Yuhikaku, 3–26.
Fujimoto, T., Nishiguchi, T. and Ito, H. (1998) Sapuraiyâ Shisutemu (Supplier
System), Yuhikaku.
Imai, K., Itami, H. and Koike, K. (1982) Naibu Soshiki no Keizaigaku (Economics of
Internal Organization), Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Itami, H., Kagono, T. and Ito, M. (1993) Nihon no Kigyô Shisutemu (Japanese
Business System), Yuhikaku.
Kusunoki, K. and Chesbrough, H.W. (2001) ‘Dynamic Shift of Product Architecture’,
in T. Fujimoto, A. Takeishi and Y. Aoshima (eds) Bizinesu Akitekuchâ (Business
Architecture), Yuhikaku, 263–285.
Ministry of International Trade and Industry & SME Agency (1981) Dai 6kai Kôgyô
Jittai Kihon Chôsa Hôkokusho (The 6th Basic Research Report on Manufacturing
Industry), Ministry of International Trade and Industry & SME Agency.
MITI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) (2004) Dai 33 Kai Kaigai Jigyô
Katsudô Kihon Chôsa (The 33rd Survey of Overseas Business Activities).
Miyake, J. (2000) Chûshô Kigyô Seisakushi (History of SME’ Policies), Jichosha.
Nakamura, S. (1983) Chûshô Kigyô to Dai Kigyô: Nihon no Sangyô Hatten to Jun
Suichoku Tôgô (SME and large enterprises: Industrial Development in Japan and
Semi-vertical Integration), Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Piore, M.J. and Sabel, C.F. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilites for
Prosperity, New York: Basis Books.
Shoko Chukin Chosabu (The Shoko Chukin Bank Research Division) (1989)
Atarashii Bungyô Kôzô no Kouchiku o Mezashite: Endakaka no Shitauke Kikai
Kôgyô no Shintenkai (Towards Structuring of New Specialization Structure System:
New Development of Subcontracting Machinery Industry Under The Strong Yen).
SFAI-07.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 149
150 Hiroshi Ueno, Takashi Murakoso and Takumi Hirai
Shoko Sogo Kenkyusho (Shoko Research Institute) and Shoko Chukin Chosabu (The
Shoko Chukin Bank Research Division) (June 2001) Dai 6kai Chusho Kikai
Kinzoku Kôgyô no Kôzô Henka ni Kansuru Jittai Chôsa (1) (The 6th Survey on
Structural Changes of Small and Medium Machinery and Metal Industry (1)).
SME (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency) (each year edition) Chûshô Kigyô
Hakusho (White Paper on SME), annual issues.
Takada, R. (2002) ‘Keizai no Gurôbaruka to Chûshô Kigyô no Kôzô Henka’
(Economic Globalization and Structural Changes of SME), in K. Uchida (ed.)
Gurôbaru Keizai to Chûshô Kigyô (The Global Economy and SMEs), Sekai
Shisosha.
Uchida, K. (ed.) (2002) Gurôbaru Keizai to Chûshô Kigyô (The Global Economy and
SMEs), Sekai Shisosha.
Ueda, H. (2004) Gendai Nihon no Chûshô Kigyô (SME in Present Age Japan),
Iwanami Shoten.
Williamson, O.E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization, New York: The
Free Press.
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T. and Roos, D. (1990) The Machine That Changed the World:
The Story of Lean Production, New York: Rawson Associates.
SFAI-07.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 150
Act on Technological Research
Associations in Mining and
Manufacturing (Kokogyo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai-ho) 35
AnGes MG see bioventures
assembling industry: function and role
of SMEs 7, 8, 138; see also
subcontracting system
Basic Law on Intellectual Property
(chiteki zaisan kihonho) 49
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (US) 123,
126–127
biotechnology industry 113; American
model 7, 112; Japanese model
113–114; Japanese model failure
112, 128–129; network structure
114–115; problems of SMEs in 51;
SMEs in 7, 119–120, 126;
technological innovation 115–117,
126–128
bioventures 119, 125; AnGes MG 125;
GeneticLab 125
bureaucracy, Japanese: councils
(shingikai) 40; organization and
attitude to science and technology
policy 38–40; reorganization 50;
viewpoint of technology transfer
centres 96–98
catch-up economy 1, 2, 58
central government research centres
36–37, 45
cognitive constructivism 15
cognitive maps 16, 17–19, 22;
homogenization of 24
collaborative research 47–48, 50–51,
52, 57; see also research and
development
communication 22, 28; cognitive-
evolutionary perspective 16–17;
technology transfer centres 98
competition: technological 52
contract system: R&D personnel
45–46; university teachers 46
defence-related R&D 34–35
diffusion-oriented innovation system
4–5, 36, 40, 49, 58
economic policy: cognitive models in
the process of 84–86; constructivism
perspective 15–17, 27–28;





individual level 17–20; and voters
19–20
econo-political action 23; evaluation of
24–27
Enterprise Consultation System (Kigyô
Shindan Seido) 143
entrepreneurial behaviour in SMEs: shift
in 5
Equipment Modernization Fund (Setsubi
Kindaika Shikin) 143
Euro: German public opinion on
introduction of 23
‘exchange plazas’ 68, 77
Exploratory Research for Advanced
Technology (ERATO) 45; see also
research and development
Federal Ministry of Education
and Research (BMBF) (Germany) 40
forecasting 16
Index
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 151




Germany: bioventures 125; negative
public attitude towards entrepreneurs
91; political significance of
introduction of Euro 23; R&D 37,
38; technology transfer structures,
cross-cultural borrowing 57, 77–78
heterarchic networks 61
hierarchic networks 61
Higashi Osaka Industrial Technology
Centre (Higashi Osakashiritsu
Sangyô Gijutsu Shien Centre)
146, 148
‘independent’ small and medium
enterprises (dokuritsugata) 141
industrial culture 6, 57, 60, 62–63
industrial organization: American
65–66; Japanese 63–65, 87
informal institutions see formal and
informal institutions
information 16; services of technology
transfer centres 68; significance in
economic policy-making 15–16;
transformation and transfer 16, 18–19
innovation policy 14, 56
innovation policy, Japanese 28;
institutional structure 1–2; necessity
of reforms 3–4, 6; political reforms
4–5; shift in 6, 7; traditional 7;
weaknesses 1
innovation system, American 56; social
and cultural organization 65–66; vs
Japanese 6, 7; see also
Manufacturing Extension Partnership
programme
institutional change 2–3, 5, 98; barriers
8; science and technology system 52
institutional economics 82
institutional path dependence 2–3, 4, 6,
8, 57
institutional theory 2
intellectual property rights 122–123;
strengthening 49–50; see also patent
system
internationalization: of production 140;
of science and technology system 38,
48–49, 51, 52





activity 47–48, 50–51, 57
kôsetsushi see technology transfer
centres
kyôryokukai see subcontracting system
Law Facilitating the Creation of New
Business (Japan) 120, 121, 126, 145
Law for Facilitating Technology Transfer
from Universities (Japan) 126
Law on the Promotion of
Subcontracting Small and Medium
Enterprises (Japan) 144
Manufacturing Extension Partnership
(MEP) programme (US) 6, 59, 66,
72, 96; budget 74–75, 76;
competence building 75; evaluation
system 75–76, 77–78; networking
with clients 77; pricing policy 74,
76; services 72–74, 77
mass media 14, 23, 90
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (Japan) 119
Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) (Japan) 65, 67, 
123; Guideline for Technology
Evaluation 77
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT)
(Japan) 50
Ministry of Education, Science, Sports
and Culture (MESC) (Japan) 38, 40;
merger with Science and Technology
Agency 50
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(Japan) 119
Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) (Japan) 35, 40, 42;
bioventures 119; New Business
Promotion Office 120
NASA Technology Transfer programme
for SMEs (US) 66
national innovation system 62
national innovation system for
biotechnology, Japanese 111–112,
113–114, 131–132; adoption of
152 Index
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 152
American model 112, 114–119, 129;
cultural aversion to risk-taking 131;
government spending on
biotechnology R&D 121; network
structure 114–115; other reform
policies 124; policies for
development of new ventures
119–121; relative competitiveness
130; restructure 112–113, 119;
results of new policies 125–128, 
129; technology flow 126–128;
universities’ role enhancement
121–124; weaknesses 117–119
National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (US) 59, 75, 77
Northern Osaka Regional Vitalization
Council (Kita Osaka Chiiki Kasseika
Kyôgikai) 147
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development
(OECD) 1, 7, 140
organizational learning 4, 61;
willingness 5
overseas production system 140
patent system 38–39, 128; Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980 (US) 123, 126–127;
biotechnology field 115, 118–119,
126; reforms 49
policy making 5–6, 13
political decision-making 13–14
political reforms 4–6; influence of
cognitive models 83, 98–99
product development 146–147
production architecture 141–142
public opinion: formation 22–24
quality systems 72
regional innovation system 6, 60,
61–62, 74
re-regulation 94, 95
research and development (R&D):
central government centres 36–37,
45; conducted by universities 37–38;
consortia 35–36; cooperation
preferences of large and small firms
64–65; government support for
business R&D 35, 44–45, 50;
increases in public spending 42–44,
51; international comparison 37;
internationalization 38, 48–49, 51,
52; knowledge transfer to firms
47–48, 50–51, 57; limited-terms
contract for personnel 45–46;
prefectural-level centres 37; publicly
financed R&D centres 36–37; public
spending 6, Japan vs West 34–35,
36, 43–44; reorganization of
governmental centres 45–46; 
special corporations (tokushu hojin)
36, 45; Triple Helix model
(university–state–industry) 61; see
also intellectual property rights;
technology transfer centres
sangakukan 147
Science and Technology Agency (STA)
(Japan) 40; merger with MESC 50
Science and Technology Basic Law
(Kagaku Gijutsu Kihon-Ho) 6, 41,
42; revisions 144–145
science and technology policy, Japanese
33–34; catch-up orientation 33,
34–41; laws and plans 41–42;
organization and attitude of
bureaucracy 38–39; overall
evaluation 50–51; reorganization of
bureaucracy 50
Small and Medium Enterprise Basic
Law (Japan) 68, 76, 91, 92–93, 99,
137, 143
Small and Medium Enterprise
Modernization Promotion Law’
(Chûshô Kigyô Kindaika Sokushinhô)
143–144
small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
56–57; challenges 57–58; role in
innovation process 2, 60, 88; support
policy 58–59, 60–61
small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
American 65–66
small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
Japanese 2, 5, 63–64; bio-ventures
119–120, 126; emergence of new
concept 88–90, 92, 137; government
support of R&D activities 44–45;
government support schemes 65;
‘independent’ (dokuritsugata) SMEs
141; lack of evaluation by third party
95–96; persistent perception of weak
SMEs 90–91; R&D cooperation
64–65; role in innovation process
6–7, 137; tradition of weak SMEs
86–88, 99, 142–144
Index 153
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 153
small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
policy, Japanese 7, 28, 83, 120, 137,
148; 1950s to 1980s 142–144;
centralization 145–146;
decentralization 146; evaluation
95–98; identification and admission
of problems 86–91; incremental
change 83, 98, 99–100; new policies
for weak SMEs 94–95; target
definition and programme
formulation 91–95; tolerance of
defection and re-regulation 93–94
Small and Medium sized Enterprise
Agency (SMEA) (Japan) 65, 67, 120
Small Business Administration (SBA)
(US) 66
Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) system (Japan) 44–45, 126




changes 140; kyôryokukai 139
supplier system, Japanese 2, 8,
147–148; changes 140–142;
characteristics 137–138; response of
local politics to changes 145–147
technological competitiveness 52
technology licensing offices (TLOs)
47–48, 123, 126, 127
technology transfer centres 6, 56;
international comparison (Japan vs
US) 59, 76–78; research study
59–60; see also research and
development 
technology transfer centres, 
Japanese (kôsetsushi) 6, 56, 65,
66–67, 96, 143; budget 67, 76;
competence building 70–71;
evaluation system 77; networking
with clients 68, 77; pricing policy
69, 76; services 67–70, 77, 96;
viewpoint of staff and central






United States, Department of Defence
(DoD) 40
universities: co-operation between
public sector and (sangakukan) 147;
enhancement of role in Japanese
biotechnology innovation 121–124,
126–128; knowledge transfer to
biotechnology firms 116–117;
knowledge transfer to firms
47–48, 57; limited-term contract 
for teachers 46; R&D activities
37–38; R&D cooperation with SMEs
64, 147
venture businesses 7, 44, 90, 119, 137,
140, 144–145, 146, 148; 1998 survey
47; originating from universities and
government laboratories 48; see also
bioventures
voters: and evolution of content in
economic policy 19–20
154 Index
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 154
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 155
Annual subscription packages
We now offer special low-cost bulk subscriptions to
packages of eBooks in certain subject areas. These are
available to libraries or to individuals.
For more information please contact
webmaster.ebooks@tandf.co.uk
We’re continually developing the eBook concept, so
keep up to date by visiting the website.
eBooks – at www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk
A library at your fingertips!
eBooks are electronic versions of printed books. You can
store them on your PC/laptop or browse them online.
They have advantages for anyone needing rapid access
to a wide variety of published, copyright information.
eBooks can help your research by enabling you to
bookmark chapters, annotate text and use instant searches
to find specific words or phrases. Several eBook files would
fit on even a small laptop or PDA.
NEW: Save money by eSubscribing: cheap, online access
to any eBook for as long as you need it.
www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk
eBooks 
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 156
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 157
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 158
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 159
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 160
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 161
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 162
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 163
SFAI-Index.qxd  25/11/05  2:41 PM  Page 164
